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ABSTRACT 
What is the content of the claim that tropes a and b are co-instantiated if there is no such 
thing as tropes? I begin this thesis by arguing that a sentence expressing such a claim 
would be deficient in content and would, therefore, not be truth-apt. I use this claim to set 
up a general presupposition problem for the truth-apt sentences of our language. I argue 
that all truth-apt sentences presuppose the existence of the kinds of things which are to 
serve as the semantic values of their terms. Understanding the content of such a 
presupposition requires understanding the content of a categorial existence claim. 
However, I argue, it is incredibly difficult to provide a construal of categorial existence 
claims which does not presuppose the existence of the very things that they would be used 
to assert the existence of. I argue that to provide a satisfactory construal, we need to appeal 
to the notion of an ontological category. I contend that the notion of an ontological 
category with which we can provide a satisfactory construal of existence claims is a 
broadly Lowean one. I show that, as it stands, Lowe’s construal is not adequate to the task 
but that it can be modified so that it is. Making use of such a modified construal, I defend 
a metalinguistic construal of categorial existence claims.  In chapters five and six, I argue 
that if we fully appreciate the notion of an ontological category which has been 
introduced, the notion of that which I claimed we have to make use in answering the 
question of ontology and referring to things in the world, we will recognise that such 
ontological categories ground, or partially ground, de re modal truths, and through them, 
the truths of metaphysical modality. 
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Chapter 1 
 
§1 
 
The treaty they signed sat down and began to play poker with Simon.  
 
It is not possible for the above sentence to be true. Intuitively, the reason, or at least a 
reason, why it is not possible for this sentence to be true is that treaties are not the kind of 
thing which can sit down and/or play poker. It is remarkably easy to generate sentences 
which are similar to the above sentence in being such that the entities involved seem to be 
of the wrong kinds to be related as the sentence presents them to be. For example:  
 
Her anger was taller than he had been when he was that age.  
The trees surrounding the house were true.  
 
 
Following Ryle (1949), we can call sentences such as these category mistakes. Ofra 
Magidor, in her (2013), contends that sentences such as these are distinctive in being 
grammatically correct but having a characteristic infelicity. She uses their putatively 
characteristic infelicity to identify her target notion, that of category mistake. At a later 
point in this thesis I shall take a different position to this on the question of what makes a 
sentence a category mistake1, but to begin with I shall adopt Magidor’s approach to 
identifying category mistakes by means of their apparently characteristic infelicity. If we 
do this, and if we also go on to say (as Magidor definitely would not) that the (or a) reason 
why such sentences can’t be true is that the things involved are of the wrong kinds, or 
                                                          
1 Magidor is concerned to explain what she takes to be an infelicity characteristic of category mistakes. 
Since something is only infelicitous for someone in some context, Magidor’s category mistakes end up 
being category mistakes only relative to a context and a hearer (Magidor, 2013, 133). My notion of 
category mistake will not be relative in this way. I am using what Magidor calls the characteristic infelicity, 
along with examples, to roughly identify the target notion but, on the account I will ultimately defend, 
one can be mistaken about whether something is a category mistake. This will usually happen when one 
fails to some degree to understand the nature of the entities involved.  
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categories, to be related as the sentence presents them to be, then it would also be plausible 
to say that when a sentence is not a category mistake, the (or a) reason why it is possible 
for it to be true is that the things involved are of the right kinds or categories to be as they 
are presented to be by the sentence.  
It may or may not be true that David sat down and began to play poker with Simon. 
Nevertheless, intuitively, the (or at least a) reason why it is possible that David sat down 
and began to play poker with Simon is that David is the right kind of thing to do this 
(alternatively, that sitting down and playing poker is a thing of the right kind for something 
like David to be able to do).  
I shall argue that something like the intuition mentioned above is correct; that a thing’s 
category or kind really does ground, and/or partially ground, de re modal truths concerning 
it.  
As evident from the last example, the truths which I hold to be grounded, or partially 
grounded, by categories are not limited to category mistakes. Ultimately, I will expand my 
claim and argue that all modal truths, and certainly all de re modal truths, are either fully 
or partially grounded by categories. Category mistakes are not to be considered distinctive 
in this regard. They simply provide a compelling entry point to the claim I am defending. 
I consider category mistakes to be cases where the work of ontological categories in 
grounding modal truths is more exposed than it is elsewhere and for this reason I shall try 
to make use of them in my effort to defend my claims concerning the grounding work of 
categories.    
I said above that I would argue that something like the intuition that a thing’s category or 
kind really does ground, and/or partially ground, de re modal truths concerning it, is correct 
because the intuitive claim, as presented above, is imprecise and in need of clarification. 
One point which needs to be clarified is what I mean by ‘category/kind’ in making this 
claim. Certain ways of clarifying these terms render my target claim either false or trivial. 
My aim is obviously not to defend the target claim for just any interpretation of these key 
terms. Instead, my aim is to argue that there is an interpretation of these terms under which 
the claim is both true and substantive.  
So, the first issue to which I shall turn is the issue of the interpretation of the term(s) 
‘category/kind’ relevant for my target claim.   
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§2 
The terms ‘category’ and ‘kind’ as used in metaphysics are, to some degree, though not 
completely, terms of art. They are also terms which are used, both in metaphysics and 
outside it, in a number of different, though arguably related, ways. The understanding of 
these terms which is relevant to my claims corresponds to a use which I think is well-
established, but which is neither the only common, nor the most common use which is 
made of these terms.   
A common way of using a version of the term ‘category’ is found in talk of categorising 
things, that is, sorting them into groups on the basis of some criterion relevant to whatever 
motivates the sorting. One use of the term ‘category’ takes categories to be the groups 
which are the products of such categorising. For this understanding of the term ‘category’, 
the intuitive claim introduced in §1 seems clearly false. It is not particularly plausible that 
belonging to a group which results from sorting would ground de re modal truths 
concerning the sorted entity. If there were any interesting correlation between the groups 
and the de re modal truths holding of the members, it would seem to be more plausible to 
suggest that the ground of these truths would be that on the basis of which the entities were 
sorted, rather than the group which was the result of this sorting.  
One of the most widely defended positions in the literature concerning the question of how 
we should understand the notion of an ontological category is the position that ontological 
categories are sets or classes (not just any sets or classes, usually sets satisfying some 
further criterion). Such a position is defended in, for example, (Westerhoff, 2005) and (van 
Inwagen, 2014). This position could be taken to correspond to something like the use of 
the term mentioned above. Sets are ontologically dependent entities since they depend for 
their existence and identity on their members. Ontological categories, conceived of as very 
general sets of some sort, would also be ontologically dependent entities, dependent for 
both their existence and identity on the entities belonging to them. As such, they would be 
implausible candidates for the role of that which grounds, or partially grounds, modal 
truths concerning the entities on which they themselves depend. This is not the notion of 
category in which I am interested. 
The term ‘category’ could be used in connected but distinct ways with respect to this 
approach to the notion. One might hold that the entities were sorted into their groups on 
the basis of their category, so that the sorting merely exhibited category membership rather 
than determining it. In such a case, one might find ‘category’ being used for both the basis 
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of the sorting and its products (the groups or sets). With respect to such an approach, I 
would simply note (a) that it would be important to note and maintain the distinction 
between the two uses and (b) that it is only the second which plausibly corresponds to the 
identification of categories as sets and so only the second which I have, at this point, set 
aside as being a different notion of category than that in which I am interested. 
The other position commonly taken in the literature on the question of how we should 
understand the notion of an ontological category is the position that ontological categories 
are properties (again, not just any properties, but rather properties which satisfy some 
further criterion). Versions of this position are defended in (Cumpa, 2011) and (Tegtmeier, 
2011). A position along these lines seems to be suggested by talk of ontological categories 
as ‘highest kinds’ when that is accompanied by the treatment of kinds as properties. On 
this interpretation of the term(s) ‘category’/ ‘kind’, the target claim, that an entity’s 
category grounds at least some of the de re modal truths concerning it, no longer seems 
obviously false, but it also doesn’t seem particularly interesting or distinctive. On this 
understanding, the claim about categories would seem to collapse into a wider claim about 
certain of an entity’s properties, perhaps the entity’s essential properties and their role in 
grounding de re modal truths concerning that entity. While this broader position is 
interesting, and may yet be true, it is not the claim that I am making, and this interpretation 
of the notion of ontological category is not the interpretation I am targeting either.  
To be clear, I do not take the fact that these construals of the notion of an ontological 
category wouldn’t support the position that my target claim is both true and substantive to 
constitute an argument against them as construals. I am not, at this point, arguing against 
them as construals. Instead, I want to argue that there is an interpretation of the key term(s) 
‘category/kind’ on which my target claim is both true and substantive. If that were the case, 
it would have implications for positions using versions of the other two construals. In the 
next three chapters, my aim will be to draw out the interpretation of the term(s) 
‘category/kind’ relevant to the claim I wish to defend. To do that perspicuously, the above 
two construals of the term(s) must be set aside. 
In chapter four I will return to argue against some of these interpretations as construals of 
a notion of ontological category. I will do this only in a limited way because some of the 
accounts of ontological categories in the literature may be best understood as simply 
having a different target notion than I do, albeit also using the term ‘category’/’kind’ for 
that notion. However, I shall argue that some other accounts in the literature may plausibly 
be understood as either considering the same notion that I aim to consider but 
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misconstruing it, or as neglecting or missing the notion in which I am interested and, 
because of this, mistakenly taking its work to be done in other ways.  
§3 
The interpretation of ‘category/kind’ in which I am interested is one which draws to a large 
degree on E.J. Lowe’s construal of the notion of an ontological category in his (2006). 
Ultimately, I will deviate from, and develop, Lowe’s construal in several ways. 
Nevertheless, the basics of the notion in which I am interested are both captured, and 
insisted upon, by Lowe in a number of different works, most prominently in his (2006), 
but also notably in his (2009), and (2013) 
Three key positions which are taken by Lowe which I shall adopt and defend, though also 
develop and modify in important ways are:  
1. Ontological Categories are not entities. 
2. Ontological Categories are involved in the individuation of entities (that is in the 
‘singling out of entities in thought’) (Lowe, 2013, 11) 
3. Ontological Categories are associated with the existence and identity conditions of the 
entities that belong to them. 
The versions of these positions which I shall defend are not exactly the same as those which 
Lowe defends. In chapter two, I shall argue that Lowe’s account of ontological categories 
faces a number of problems which require that the account be modified. Nevertheless, a 
central claim of my thesis is that broadly Lowean ontological categories play an important 
role in successful ontological theories. The argument motivating my adoption of Lowe’s 
general approach to ontological categories (as outlined in 1-3 above) is a metaontological 
argument not specifically concerning Lowe. This argument will be presented in chapter 
one and will motivate my adoption and modification of Lowe’s account of ontological 
categories in chapter two. In chapter three, I shall present my own account, drawing on 
those of both E.J. Lowe and Bob Hale. Finally, in chapter four, I shall compare my account 
of ontological categories with alternative accounts. In some cases, I shall claim that the 
alternative account simply concerns a different notion of category. Where this is not the 
case I shall contend that my account is to be preferred. In chapters five and six, I shall 
argue that ontological categories as I have construed them ground, or partially ground, de 
re truths of metaphysical modality, and, possibly the truths of metaphysical modality 
generally.  
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§4 
In his 2005 book on ontological categories, Jan Westerhoff argues that traditional views 
concerning the importance of such categories to ontology should be rejected. According to 
these traditional views, Westerhoff writes, “Every ontological theory will incorporate a 
system of ontological categories at its core” (Westerhoff, 2005, 12). It is exactly such a 
view which I wish to defend. I shall claim that ontological theories in a certain sense 
presuppose an ontology given by some ontological category, or ontological categories. I 
shall contend that this presupposition comes out in the attempted use of terms which are to 
be understood in a specified way. One way of presenting the claim that I am making is that 
ontological theories presuppose that there are things of some ontological category(ies) in 
question, i.e. that an ontological theory presupposes an ontology in terms of which it is 
given. In this chapter, I shall argue that this presupposition of an ontology by an ontological 
theory presents a serious challenge. A crucial part of my claim is the contention that, on 
some understandings of the content of claims that there are things of some ontological 
category, these claims presuppose exactly what they are used to assert. I shall argue that 
this should not be accepted and defend a way of understanding these existence statements 
which allows us to avoid the problem. The proposed way of understanding existence 
statements will motivate and support my construal of the notion of an ontological category.  
 
§5 
The alleged feature/problem is one of presupposition. Before addressing the question of 
why we should think that there is such a problem, I shall clarify the notion of 
presupposition which I have in mind. The relevant notion is that of semantic 
presupposition. The cases of semantic presupposition upon which I shall focus concern the 
way that the content which the expressions of a language (esp. referential expressions in a 
language) have depends on how the world is and what it contains.  
The notion of presupposition which is currently most discussed in the literature is not this 
notion of semantic presupposition but a notion of pragmatic presupposition which is 
commonly contrasted with it.  (Beaver & Geurts, 2011). Both notions of presupposition 
are closely linked to that of entailment. When a sentence A is a presupposition of a sentence 
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B, B entails A. What makes presupposition distinctive is that, in general2, where A is a 
presupposition of B, not-B will also entail A. However, while semantic presupposition 
holds primarily between sentences or propositions, pragmatic presupposition holds only 
derivatively between sentences or propositions. 
Stalnaker (1973) explains the notion of pragmatic presupposition explicitly by contrast 
with that of semantic presupposition and defines it as follows: 
My notion will thus contrast with the standard account of presupposition which 
has been given by philosophers and linguists. According to this standard account, 
one sentence presupposes another just in case the latter must be true in order that 
the former have a truth value at all3…According to the contrasting idea that I will 
focus on, the basic presupposition relation is not between propositions or 
sentences, but between a person and a proposition. A person’s presuppositions are 
the propositions whose truth he takes for granted, often unconsciously, in a 
conversation, an inquiry or a deliberation. (Stalnaker, 1973, 447) 
Stalnaker avers that conversations take place in a context in which certain propositions are 
assumed to be true and contends that:  
This background of knowledge or beliefs purportedly shared by the speaker and 
his audience constitute the presuppositions which define the context. (Stalnaker, 
1973, 448) 
 
Sentences such as ‘Norah stopped smoking last year.’ and ‘John knows that Michael D. 
Higgins is the president of Ireland.’ are typical examples of sentences which have features 
that pragmatic presupposition is used to explain. ‘Stop’ and ‘know’ as they occur in these 
sentences would be treated as presupposition triggers which require that the sentences’ 
contexts of utterance include certain propositions (‘Norah smoked prior to last year.’, and 
‘Michael D. Higgins is the president of Ireland’ respectively) in order for utterances of the 
sentences in question to avoid being infelicitous. It is characteristic of pragmatic 
                                                          
2 It will invariably be the case with semantic presupposition that if A is a presupposition of B, both B and 
not-B will entail A. The qualifying phrase, ‘in general’ is included above because there is some debate in 
the literature on pragmatic presupposition about whether there are contexts where a presupposition of 
sentence does not project to its negation.  
3 This characterisation of semantic presupposition is contentious. As will be noted in §6, it has been 
contended by, among others, Searle (1969) and Cooper (1974), that semantic presupposition cannot be 
defined in terms of truth-value gaps if it is to explain these truth-value gaps.  
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presupposition that complex sentences such as negated sentences, conditional sentences, 
and conjunctions inherit the presuppositions of their component clauses but not invariably, 
and not always straightforwardly. The phenomenon whereby the presuppositions are 
inherited is known as projection. The difficulties involved in predicting and explaining 
when the presuppositions of clauses are inherited by the complex sentences of which they 
are components gives rise to the projection problem which is the problem of predicting 
and explaining exactly that. (Beaver & Geurts, 2011). Pragmatic presupposition failure 
occurs when a proposition is taken to be part of the conversational context, but it is not.  
Pragmatic presupposition failure is not a serious problem; it generally results merely in 
infelicity. Speakers can even choose to utter a sentence which presupposes that the context 
contains propositions which it does not as a way of introducing those propositions into the 
context. Where this is successful, accommodation is said to have occurred but not all 
presuppositions are as easily accommodated as others. (Beaver & Geurts, 2011). 
 I will return to the topic of pragmatic presupposition briefly later in this thesis in 
discussing Ofra Magidor’s use of the phenomenon of pragmatic presupposition to explain 
what she takes to be the characteristic infelicity of category mistakes. I will also touch 
briefly on the topic in discussing some of the consequences of my own view. However, at 
this point I have raised it only to set it aside and ensure that the notion of presupposition 
in which I am interested is distinguished from it.  
The notion of presupposition which is relevant for my arguments in this thesis is a version 
of the notion of semantic presupposition which is preserved under negation and leads to 
truth value gaps of some sort.4 As noted earlier, with semantic presupposition, if a sentence 
                                                          
4 In his ‘Presupposition’, D.E. Cooper includes these in his list of four salient characteristics of paradigmatic 
presuppositions (Cooper, 1974, 15), noting that for the semantic account of presupposition the truth value 
gap claim is the most important (Cooper, 1974, 32). He argues against accepting the semantic account of 
presupposition on the basis of what he contends are ordinary people’s intuitions that the presupposing 
sentences are not truth valueless when the account says they should be. He notes that if there were 
theoretic pressure, ordinary people’s intuitions would not be relevant (Cooper, 1974, 40) but argues that 
there is no such theoretic pressure. There are two problems with his argument for the conclusion that 
there is no theoretic pressure to regard sentences whose presuppositions are false as presenting truth 
value gaps. The first is that he considers a limited range of ways in which a sentence could presuppose. In 
the argument in question he mainly considers cases where the presupposition in question is that a definite 
description occurring in a sentence has to be satisfied e.g. ‘The King of France’ in ‘The King of France is 
not bald’. But, as he elsewhere acknowledges, this is not the only way a presupposition can occur, and it 
is not, I shall argue, the form of presupposition which is most forceful in compelling us to accept truth 
value gaps. The second problem is that on the basis of the dismissal of one argument that might be used 
to provide the required theoretic pressure, Cooper concludes “that no argument can demonstrate that 
sentences do or do not lack truth values where their presuppositions fail” (Cooper, 1974, 40-41). In this 
chapter, I hope to provide some theoretic pressure to support the claim that the failure of some 
presuppositions does threaten to create truth value gaps.  
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B presupposes a sentence A, then not-B will also presuppose it, and if A is false, neither 
B, nor not-B will be truth apt. On one understanding, the truth value gaps to which semantic 
presupposition failure leads are propositions which lack truth values. Defending the claim 
that there are such gaps would require defending modifications to classical bivalent logic. 
I shall not defend the claim that there are propositions which lack truth values. What I shall 
defend is the claim that there are, or could be, sentences we might be inclined to call truth-
apt which nevertheless actually fail to express propositions, and so fail to be truth-apt, due 
to a deficiency of content which results from semantic presupposition failure. Truth-value 
gaps of this kind do not require any revision of classical bivalent logic. 
In much of the literature on presupposition, the notion of semantic presupposition is 
connected with the figures of Frege and Strawson. Given their specific views, this 
emphasis on Frege and Strawson has the result that discussion of the phenomenon of 
semantic presupposition often concentrates on the question of what is presupposed by 
sentences incorporating definite descriptions. For my purposes, the question of whether 
sentences incorporating definite descriptions presuppose the truth of sentences asserting 
the existence of entities which satisfy those definite descriptions will not be particularly 
important. Ultimately, for my own argument I shall be concerned only to claim that 
sentences presuppose the existence of those things which serve as the semantic values of 
their expressions. What those things are is a separate, and separately important, question. 
Different answers to the question of what semantic values are required by sentences can 
be defended. Indeed, the fact that different answers to this question can be defended, and 
that they lead to different understandings of the meanings of sentences is crucial to my 
arguments late in this chapter. Nevertheless, some example of expressions which trigger 
semantic presupposition is needed both to clarify the target notion of semantic 
presupposition and to defend the claim that there are expressions which are such that 
sentences incorporating them have these presuppositions. Names will serve this purpose in 
§7. 
I shall discuss names as an example of an expression which triggers semantic 
presupposition both because names (of some construal or other) are the focus of much of 
the literature on semantic presupposition, and also because I take names to present us with 
an especially convincing example of semantic presupposition. I shall begin by providing a 
brief overview of the seminal debate on the notion of semantic presupposition from the 
literature. The semantic notion of presupposition is, as I noted previously, most closely 
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associated with positions of Frege and Strawson. These positions are best understood in 
the context of a debate between Frege, Russell, and Strawson. 
 
§6 
The notion of semantic presupposition has been widely understood in the literature to be 
relevant to the question of how we should understand singular propositions generally, 
singular existential propositions specifically, and even propositions of other forms (e.g. 
‘All my children were asleep’ (Strawson, 1950, 344)). 
The basic point is that the content of a name, or definite description occurring in subject 
position, seems to require the existence of that which the term denotes. The fact that this 
is the case and that its being the case can be a problem can be brought out by focusing on 
existential statements. In these cases, the sentence seems to require, in order that the name 
or definite description which it incorporates have content, that the referent of that name 
exist, even if that existence is exactly what is being asserted by the proposition in which 
the term occurs. The existential proposition would thus seem to presuppose exactly what 
it is being used to assert. That this is a problem is especially clear when we consider cases 
in which we would want to say that reference fails. Some take fiction to present us with 
examples of such sentences. Other typical examples are scientific posits which are 
ultimately rejected e.g. ‘Vulcan’, which was a planet posited to explain perturbations in 
the orbit of Mercury, e.g. ‘phlogiston’, which was the chemical element posited as that 
which was released in combustion. By considering these cases where the presupposition 
of a referent for a name is a problem, it can be made obvious both that the presupposition 
at least seems to occur and that its occurrence can be a problem. One of the main points of 
discussion in the debate between Frege, Russell, and Strawson is whether, and how, 
significance can be secured for sentences incorporating empty names since such sentences 
abound in natural language and are generally taken to be significant. 
 
Frege introduced his position on semantic presupposition in ‘On Sense and Meaning’: 
If anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or 
compound proper names used have meaning. If therefore one asserts ‘Kepler died 
in misery’, there is a presupposition that the name ‘Kepler’ designates something;  
(Frege, 1892/1980(b), 69).  
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Frege aimed to accommodate the apparent significance of sentences containing names 
which failed to refer with his distinction between a name, its sense and its meaning. The 
name is the linguistic item, the meaning of the name is its referent and the sense of the 
name contains a “mode of presentation” of the referent. (Frege, 1892/1980(b), 57). Frege 
claimed that names without meaning (reference) could nevertheless have sense, and that 
sentences containing such names could be significant by expressing a thought, the sense 
of the sentence, even though these sentences would not designate a truth-value, the 
meaning of a sentence. The idea is that the sentence can have a sense because the name 
occurring in it does have a sense to contribute towards that sense, but the sentence can’t 
have a meaning, i.e. can’t have a truth value, because a name occurring in it lacks the 
meaning it would be required to contribute towards a meaning for the sentence.   
Russell also recognised a presupposition problem and responded by distinguishing 
between logically proper names which presuppose the existence of their referents5 
(basically just demonstratives) and natural language names which Russell claimed are 
usually6 disguised definite descriptions. Russell’s logically proper names were supposed 
to be such that their referents couldn’t fail to exist; one would have to be acquainted with 
an entity in order to use a demonstrative to refer to it. Given this, the fact that these logically 
proper names presupposed the existence of their referents was not supposed to be a 
problem because that presupposition could not fail.   
Russell accepted that, unlike his logically proper names, his definite descriptions, and 
disguised definite descriptions, could fail to have bearers but he denied that these definite 
descriptions presupposed the existence of their referents. He attempted to resolve the 
presupposition problem for sentences involving definite descriptions by providing an 
analysis of such sentences which incorporated the existential claim which was putatively 
presupposed into the sentence which putatively presupposed it. On this analysis, the 
definite descriptions which would be thought to give rise to the presupposition problem 
                                                          
5 Here, and elsewhere, I speak of expressions presupposing the existence of their referents. I do this for 
the sake of convenience and perspicuity. As introduced, semantic presupposition is a relation between 
interpreted sentences or between propositions. All sentences where I speak of expressions presupposing 
the existence of their referents should in principle be able to be reformulated in terms of interpreted 
sentences or propositions presupposing the truth of interpreted sentences or propositions which assert 
the existence of relevant referents.  
6 Russell (1912/1998) claimed that whether a natural language name actually functioned as a disguised 
definite description could vary between language users. The basis for this variation would be the kind of 
knowledge the language user had of the referent of the name. If it was the knowledge by acquaintance 
that one might have of oneself, the name could function as a logically proper name, but if it was the 
knowledge by description that people generally have of other people, then the name would function as 
a disguised definite description. (Russell, 1912/1998, 30-1) 
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were said to “have no meaning in isolation” (Russell, 1905, 492). For Russell, the 
significance which Frege seems to secure for sentences containing terms which lack 
denotation is insufficient. He contends that it is clear that these sentences do have a truth 
value, usually the truth value false (Russell, 1905, 484) Thus, he concludes that the 
denotations required for such a truth value must either be secured or rendered unnecessary 
for truth-aptness. (Russell, 1905, 484) His position aims to render the denotations in 
question irrelevant to truth-aptness. The analysis he provides for a sample sentence which 
might be thought to run afoul of the presupposition problem, ‘The round square is round.’, 
is: “There is one and only one entity x which is round and square, and that entity is round” 
(Russell, 1905, 491)  
Responding to Russell, Strawson (1950) contended that the proposed resolution of the 
presupposition problem was misguided. Strawson argues that Russell went wrong in 
thinking that since a sentence is significant it must be truth-apt. Strawson contends instead 
that expressions are significant insofar as they can be used to refer to something (Strawson, 
1950, 327) and sentences are significant insofar as they can be used to make true or false 
assertions. However, Strawson insists, it is uses of expressions that refer, and it is uses of 
sentences to make assertions that are truth-apt. If one fails in an attempted use of a sentence 
to refer to something even though such reference is called for, what one says will fail to be 
truth-apt. Strawson says in this circumstance there will fail even to be a use: 
I will add that it will be used to make a true or false assertion only if the person 
who is using it is talking about something. If, when he utters it, he is not talking 
about anything, then his use is not a genuine one, but a spurious or pseudo-use: he 
is not making either a true or false assertion though he may think he is. (Strawson, 
1950, 329).  
For Strawson, when such presupposition failure occurs, the question of a sentence’s truth 
or falsity will not arise. Following Strawson, many, such as Stalnaker (1973) took truth-
value gaps to be definitive of semantic presupposition:  
According to this standard account, one sentence presupposes another just in case 
the latter must be true in order that the former have a truth value at all (Stalnaker, 
1973, 447) 
However, following Searle (1969), Cooper points out that if presupposition is defined in 
terms of truth-valuelessness, it cannot explain that truth-valuelessness (Cooper, 1974, 41). 
Defining presupposition in such a way would also capture something too broad. Given 
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these points, it can be seen that the conditions mentioned at the beginning of this section 
(according to which presupposition is preserved under negation, and leads to truth-value 
gaps in cases of presupposition failure) are necessary conditions for semantic 
presupposition but are not definitive of it. Hopefully, the overview provided above of the 
seminal debate between Frege, Russell, and Strawson on apparent cases of semantic 
presupposition build upon the necessary conditions and make the notion of semantic 
presupposition which was taken to be at issue clearer.  
The notion of semantic presupposition which I shall appeal to is not tied to a specific 
verdict on the debate outlined above concerning definite descriptions. My own view 
simply relies on the claims; that many expressions in our language rely for their content 
on entities in the world which serve as their semantic values, that the way in which 
expressions in our language do this is systematic, and that where expressions rely for their 
content on the truth of an existence statement which is in fact false those expressions lack 
the content they need in order to play their role in sentences in which they occur.  
There can be arguments over cases, and, as I have noted, I am certainly not committed to 
taking the cases discussed above to present the presupposition problem in the ways they 
are sometimes there held to. ‘The present King of France’ in ‘The present King of France 
is bald’ for example, may, I think, plausibly be taken to attempt to refer to a person in an 
indirect way which avoids presupposing the existence of a person who is the present king 
of France.  
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the meaning of linguistic items in general depends in part 
on the world. In ‘General Semantics’ Lewis articulates the crucial point clearly.  
The Markerese method is attractive in part just because it deals with nothing but 
symbols…But it is just this pleasing finitude that prevents Markerese semantics 
from dealing with relations between symbols and the world of non-symbols – that 
is with genuinely semantic relations.  
(Lewis, 1970, 19) 
We confer meaning on linguistic items by connecting them to the world in specified ways. 
In particular, insofar as one accepts a referential semantics, one may say that in many cases, 
we use things in the world to confer meaning on linguistic items. We need not, and should 
not, say that this is always the case. Lewis, in his argument against Armstrong’s use of a 
relation regress argument against various forms of nominalism emphasises the 
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impossibility of providing a fully general analysis of predication without using primitive 
predication, noting that an attempt to achieve this would simply open up an objectionable 
regress but could never succeed (Lewis, 1983, 352-3). Accepting this need not discourage 
those who think there are facts of the matter concerning ontology; as Sider points out 
(Sider, 2011, 13) we can take primitive predicates, like ‘instantiates’ as it occurs in 
Armstrong’s theory of universals, and ‘participates’ as it is used by Platonic realists, to 
make demands of the world, and to be such that it can succeed or fail to represent the world 
without demanding that it do so through denotation.  
Insofar as one accepts a referential semantics, one often takes terms to connect to the world 
by having, or putatively having, a denotation. If this is the case, and it is the case that we 
can be mistaken in our understanding of how the world is made up, then it is plausible to 
think that such a mistake concerning what there is could lead to our mistakenly thinking 
that we have conferred meaning on some symbols when we have not. And where we are 
successful in using the world or something(s) in the world to confer meaning on some 
symbol, it is likewise plausible to think that we are successful in part because we are not 
mistaken in this way. The meaning conferred depends on the world being a certain way or 
containing a certain thing or certain things. Insofar as this is the case it seems to me that 
the meaning conferred will presuppose the existence of that in/of the world which was used 
to confer that meaning. It is this claim which I shall pursue.  
I should note also that the primary notion of presupposition in which I am interested is not 
one connected to the conscious content of beliefs or to questions of rationality or 
irrationality. There will be a contradiction involved in using a term whose content depends 
on the existence of something to reject that thing’s existence. However, it is evident that it 
is not completely transparent what the things are in the world upon which our words 
depend. Given this, it need not be any more irrational to deny the existence of something 
with a sentence which presupposes the existence of that thing than it is to hold any other 
position which though it does not seem paradoxical, can, ultimately, be revealed to be 
paradoxical. In keeping with this, I should note that when I say that someone presupposes 
something in this primary sense, I am not saying that that person holds the position that it 
exists.  
In my attempt to clarify the notion of presupposition which I shall make use of in this 
thesis, I have distinguished it from the more frequently discussed notion of pragmatic 
presupposition, and in so doing, set aside as irrelevant the examples of sentences which 
are used to make the notion of pragmatic presupposition clearer. I identified the notion 
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with which I am concerned as a version7 of the notion of semantic presupposition and 
provided an overview of a seminal debate from the literature concerning that notion, but I 
went on to set aside the example of semantic presupposition upon which that debate 
focuses, definite descriptions, as an example which is not necessarily apt. I suggested that 
definite descriptions are very plausibly not a case of semantic presupposition in the way 
that they are taken to be by Frege and Strawson. Certainly, it is plausible that they have 
semantic values, and if they do they presuppose the existence of the entities serving as 
their semantic values. I just do not find it particularly plausible that they presuppose the 
existence of bearers which satisfy the relevant descriptions. Other people might find this 
plausible. Alternatively, one might give an account of the semantic value of a definite 
description which took it to be something, such as the intersection of various sets, which 
itself required the existence of the relevant entity. My position does not require me to take 
a firm view on this question. However, one consequence of my lack of commitment on 
this question is that I am not taking definite descriptions to be useful, or even somewhat 
clear, examples of the target notion of semantic presupposition.  
I have located the notion of presupposition in which I am interested within a theoretical 
debate but since I have, to some degree, set aside the examples which are used to clarify 
the other notions of presupposition addressed in that debate, what remains to be done in 
clarifying the notion of presupposition I have in mind is to provide an example. Names 
seem to me to provide such an example8.  
For this reason, in the next section I shall conclude my attempt to clarify the notion of 
semantic presupposition that is relevant to my argument by providing a little more 
discussion of the case of presupposition as it occurs with names. I shall focus on attempts 
to allow singular existential claims to have a truth value within a Fregean account of names. 
Singular existential sentences present us with a particularly pressing case of the 
presupposition problem because we face strong pressure to allow them to come out true or 
false, not merely truth-valueless. Nevertheless, standing in the way of our doing so is the 
fact that the names figuring in these sentences seem to presuppose the existence of their 
bearers.  
                                                          
7 Perhaps narrower in some ways, more general in others.  
8 They provide an example but not an uncomplicated one. Later, in the thesis I will have more to say on 
the question of what is plausibly presupposed by what. Ultimately, I shall not take the undifferentiated 
class of names to be particularly useful for saying what semantic values are required for our language to 
have its content.  
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I shall focus on the Fregean attempt to resolve this problem in part because versions of it 
are widely adopted for singular existential statements and in part because a parallel course 
is very widely embraced for the case of general existential claims/ categorial existence 
claims. It is the general existence claims/categorial existence claims with which I shall 
mainly be concerned in the body of this thesis, but I think both versions fail for similar 
reasons. If that is correct, then drawing out what goes wrong in the case of singular 
existential claims will be useful both in itself and by way of preparation for the later 
discussion of general existential claims.  
I shall not claim that my conclusion, that names presuppose their bearers, is ineluctable. I 
shall only claim that it is difficult to avoid, that many attempts to avoid it are unsuccessful, 
and thus that names present at least a prima facie plausible case of semantic presupposition 
of the kind I am interested in. I shall also claim that a successful attempt to avoid the 
conclusion that names presuppose the existence of their bearers would simply shift what 
it was whose existence is presupposed. Such a result is completely acceptable for my 
overall argument. For my purposes, all I need to argue is that names are at least a prima 
facie plausible case of the notion of presupposition at issue and that as such they facilitate 
an understanding of the notion of presupposition which is at issue. 
 
§7 
In this section, I shall discuss in greater detail the problem of presupposition as it occurs 
for names in order: (a) to make the alleged problem clearer, and (b) to present arguments 
against some apparent solutions. The problem is clearest in cases where we would want to 
deny the presupposed existential claim. For this reason, discussions of the problem often 
focus on sentences involving fictional names, e.g. ‘Sherlock Holmes lives at 221b Baker 
street’, or mythical names e.g. ‘Odysseus was king of Ithaca’, or on negative existential 
claims that we would want to count as true. I am going to focus on true negative and false 
positive existential claims in part to avoid debates around the status of fictional or mythical 
entities but mainly because of the importance of existential claims in ontology and because 
it seems especially counter-intuitive that a negative existential claim should presuppose 
exactly what it is being used to deny.  
The basic function of a name is to designate an object. Intuitively, understanding a 
particular name involves knowing what object that name designates. If a name occurs in 
subject position in a subject predicate sentence, e.g. ‘Agustin Creevy is an Argentinian 
20 
 
rugby player.’, it seems that the name serves to refer to something in the world, Agustin 
Creevy, and the sentence says something about that thing, that it is an Argentinian rugby 
player. A negative existential sentence which we want to regard as true cannot be treated 
in this way despite the fact that it appears to be a subject predicate sentence. It cannot be 
treated this way because if we took the name to denote something in the world which the 
sentence went on to say something about there would be no way for the sentence to be true. 
We seem to face a presupposition problem in understanding what is said by these 
sentences. The case is complicated by the fact that although the problem seems most acute 
when we want to count a negative existential sentence to be true or a positive existential 
sentence to be false, as Kripke notes (Kripke, 2013, 147) we cannot plausibly give different 
analyses of existential sentences depending on whether they are true or false.  Further, the 
way the problem occurs indicates that, at least prima facie, names are taken to presuppose 
the existence of their referent; we face a problem with negative existentials, a need to 
provide alternative analyses to either resolve the problem or show that there was never a 
problem to begin with, exactly because names are generally taken to presuppose the 
existence of their referents but in these cases, it is implausible for them to do so. 
 
§7.1 
How might we either resolve or avoid the problem?  
Frege’s solution (1892/1980(b)), which was outlined above, does not involve denying that 
the content of a name, in one sense of content, depends on its having a referent. Frege does 
deny that a name without a referent will fail to be significant. It will be significant because 
it will have a sense and so sentences in which it occurs will be able to express a thought. 
However, since the name does not have a referent to contribute to the sentence, the 
sentences in which it occurs will not be truth-apt. So, on Frege’s position, it is accepted 
that names presuppose their referent:  
I reply that when we say ‘the Moon’, we do not intend to speak of our idea of the 
Moon, nor are we satisfied with the sense alone but we presuppose a meaning.  
(Frege, 1892/1980(b), 61) 
Indeed, Frege contends that in a logically perfect language all names will be guaranteed a 
referent (Frege, 1892/1980(b), 70). Since he accepts that the content (in one sense) of 
names presupposes a referent and that sentences containing names without such a referent 
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fail to be truth-apt, Frege needs to provide an alternative analysis of existence sentences in 
which such names seem to occur in order to be able to take such sentences to be truth-apt. 
He does this by arguing that existence is a second order concept (Frege, 1892/1980(a), 49). 
It will therefore be first order concepts, not objects, which fall under the second order 
concept of existence.  
 
§7.2 
What first-order concept does Frege take existence to be said of? There is one passage in 
‘On Concept and Object’ which suggests it is the concept denoted by ‘being named ‘…’’. 
This is not the only or the most plausible interpretation of Frege’s view, but it is one worth 
pausing on just to point out why it wouldn’t work. 
I do not want to say it is false to say concerning an object what is here said 
concerning a concept; I want to say it is impossible, senseless to do so. The 
sentence ‘there is Julius Caesar’ is neither true nor false but senseless. The 
sentence ‘there is a man whose name is Julius Caesar’ has a sense, but here again 
we have a concept as the indefinite article shows.  
(Frege, 1892/1980(a), 50) 
Dummett treats this as an available, though not a particularly plausible, interpretation of 
Frege’s view (Dummett, 1993, 283) and both he and Kripke make the same obvious 
objection (Dummett, 1993, 283) (Kripke, 2013, 153); understood in this way, the claim 
would fail to express the intended content. We want to say that some person doesn’t exist 
but the non-existence of whoever we are interested in is compatible with many others who 
exist being called by the same typographically individuated name. Thus, the simplest 
version of a meta-linguistic approach to existence sentences, the simplest version of what 
Quine would call semantic ascent (“the shift from talking in words to talking about them” 
(Quine, 1960/2013, 250)) is clearly not sufficient to resolve the problem because it fails to 
capture the intended content; it could be true that a word, typographically individuated, has 
reference even though the use, in some sense, that we are interested in does not succeed in 
referring.   
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§7.3 
A more plausible understanding of Frege’s solution draws on his notion of sense. As noted 
above, Frege allows that names (a term he construes broadly to include definite 
descriptions) which lack referents can nevertheless have a sense. For Frege, senses are 
modes of presentation of their referents. What are modes of presentation? It might be 
thought that there cannot be a mode of presenting that which doesn’t exist. Although this 
might be thought to be supported, for instance, by an analogy Frege uses in explaining 
sense (the moon (the referent), the telescope image (the sense), and the retinal image (the 
subjective idea)), ultimately, it is clear from Frege’s writings that senses are to be capable 
of existing even though the denotation of the name of which the sense is a sense does not 
exist. Further, if senses are to be useful in the task at hand, providing a first order concept 
which can be said to fall or not fall under the second order concept of existence, then senses 
will have to be first order concepts.  
What first order concepts will they be? One option is that they should be concepts by which 
we recognise, or attempt to recognise, the object in question. Kripke (1981) has provided 
well-known and compelling objections against the satisfactoriness of this option. Kripke 
argues that uniquely identifying features are usually just contingently held by an object 
and thus the general absence of anything satisfying a condition specifying those features 
does not necessitate the truth of the conclusion that an object in question does not exist. 
There could be a world in which an object in question both existed and failed to satisfy the 
relevant concept. Identifying the sense with a concept which specifies the features we use 
to identify an object and then saying that nothing satisfies that concept seems to get the 
content of an existence claim wrong.  
Another option, pursued by Dummett (1993) and others is to take the relevant concept to 
be a concept such as e.g. that denoted by ‘identical to Venus’. One problem with this is 
that intuitively the content of a condition ‘being identical to Venus’ depends on there being 
such a thing as Venus to be identical to.  In Fregean terms, one might think that the name 
needs to have a denotation to contribute to the denotation of the predicate if the predicate 
in which it occurs is to have a denotation and we need it to have a denotation because we 
need it to denote the first order concept we want to predicate existence of.  
 
So Dummett faces the problem of the source of the content of the ‘Arthur’ in the concept 
‘identical with King Arthur’ which is to exist regardless of whether Arthur himself does. 
He contends that the source is to be the sense of the name:  
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That a name lacking reference may still have a sense resolves our uncertainty 
whether, if King Arthur did not exist, there is any such concept as being identical 
with King Arthur     (Dummett, 1993, 289).  
But the sense of a name seems to be taken in two different ways by Dummett as both the 
manner in which something is given to us “the sense is no more and no less than a 
particular way of singling out that object” (Dummett, 1993, 227); which seems to be what 
Frege held it to be, and “an agreed means of determining, for any object, whether or not it 
is the bearer of the name” (Dummett, 1993, 289). These two understandings would only 
coincide if an object’s manner of presentation were essential to it and therefore being 
presented in a certain way could determine that something was the referent of a name.  
As noted above, Kripke has presented cogent arguments against such a position and 
Dummett himself seems to reject it in his argument against Miller’s position that a name 
should be taken as a predicate. If an object’s satisfaction of a concept is contingent, then 
it doesn’t need to satisfy the concept in order to exist and satisfaction of the concept cannot 
be among the conditions for ‘being that object’.  Without these contingent features, the 
sense doesn’t seem to yield a uniquely determining condition. But if one accepts that the 
sense of ‘King Arthur’ taken as a manner of presentation cannot yield such a condition, 
we cannot use it to provide the content of Arthur in the concept ‘being identical to King 
Arthur’, if that is to be the condition for something being King Arthur, and thus as the first 
level predicate of which existence is denied in the negative existential claim.  
 
Taking just the second option, whereby the sense of a name is “an agreed means of 
determining, for any object, whether or not it is the bearer of the name” (Dummett, 1993, 
289), as the sense of the name ‘King Arthur’ is also problematic. Dummett writes that a 
“complete sense borne by a proper name” is “one which uniquely determines the bearer of 
the name” (Dummett, 1993, 289) and he also writes of “the condition which someone must 
have fulfilled for him to have been King Arthur” that “to fulfil that condition is precisely 
to fall under the concept identical with King Arthur” (Dummett, 1993, 290). Having ruled 
out manner of presentation as the relevant condition, this makes it appear that the sense of 
the name ‘King Arthur’ is the condition of falling under the concept identical with King 
Arthur. But if the sense of the name is this condition, then the sense of the name can’t also 
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be the source of content for ‘King Arthur’ as it occurs in this condition. That would yield 
a circularity which, when looking for a source of content, can’t be accepted.  
 
So even though the sense of the name ‘King Arthur’ is taken to allow for the existence of 
the concept identical to Arthur, independent of the existence of Arthur, the sense of the 
name appears to consist in the condition of falling under that concept and therefore there 
does not appear to be a source for the content of ‘King Arthur’ in the concept identical 
with King Arthur. This is a problem.  
 
The circularity can be seen in Dummett’s summation of the proposal:  
there must be a condition which must hold if the singular term is to have a referent 
and which is not necessarily known to hold by anyone who grasps the relevant use 
of the term: the content of the affirmative existential statement will then be that 
this condition obtains             
(on Dummett’s account this condition is that something falls under the concept e.g. 
identical to King Arthur)  
There will be such a condition only if the term, as so used, has a sense. The sense 
of the term will consist in the condition that any given object has to satisfy to be 
the referent of the term.         
(on Dummett’s account the condition an object has to satisfy is to fall under the concept 
e.g. identical to King Arthur)   
the condition for it to have a reference is then that there is some such object  
(Dummett, 1993, 297) 
(on Dummett’s account the condition for ‘King Arthur’ to have a reference is for 
something to fall under the concept identical to King Arthur).  
 
But if, as outlined above, the sense of the name ‘King Arthur’ is the condition of falling 
under the concept identical to King Arthur, this sense presupposes, and therefore cannot 
provide, the content for ‘King Arthur’ as it occurs in the predicate apparently denoting the 
concept. The name seems to occur in its own sense. This being the case, and having 
already ruled out manner of presentation as the source of content for the name as it occurs 
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in the concept, it does not appear that there is a source for the content of ‘King Arthur’ as 
it occurs, apparently independently of the existence of King Arthur himself, in the concept 
identical to King Arthur.  This is a serious problem for the account as an explanation of 
true negative existentials involving empty names. 
 
§7.4 
So, the presupposition problem for names remains unresolved. The basic problem, as 
Kripke (2013) diagnoses it, is that we seem to need to use a term, not merely mention it, 
in order to make an existential claim but using it seems to require that its referent exists. 
So, it at least seems to be the case that the use of names, paradigm tools of reference, 
presupposes the existence of the referents of those names. The content of the names, in 
one sense of content at least, seems to require that the entities exist.  
There are other ways one might develop Frege’s view, and there are other similar views. 
However, since my primary interest is not in the case of names themselves but in the way 
in which the content of linguistic terms depends on, and thus presupposes, the entities in 
the world used to confer that content upon those terms, I don’t need to argue that it is 
impossible that any such attempt should be successful. Instead, having used the case of 
names to present what is at least a prima facie forceful case of presupposition, I can note 
that if any attempt along the lines of that described above were successful, it would simply 
change what was presupposed.  
Instead of presupposing the existence of a person, Arthur, it would presuppose the 
existence of a concept/property, …is identical to Arthur. In such a case, we would have 
interpreted the existential sentence in such a way that it no longer referred to Arthur and 
said something about him but instead referred to a concept/property, …is identical to 
Arthur, and said something about it, i.e. that it falls under the higher-level property …is 
instantiated. The content of the language would still be provided, at least in part, by some 
entities. In order to be used the words would need to have the content thus provided, and 
thus the use of the words (semantically individuated) would presuppose the existence of 
the relevant entities, here first-order concepts and possibly also second-order concepts. In 
this way, the problem of presupposition generalises. It is not just a problem that comes up 
for names. It is the generalised version of the problem in which I am really interested and 
which I shall pursue in the next section.  
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§8 
The last three sections focused on introducing and clarifying a notion of semantic 
presupposition and motivating the appeal to it. The motivating idea is that language, as 
used in truth-apt sentences9, depends on the world for its content in systematic ways. A 
sentence incorporating expressions of various kinds presupposes the truth of claims that 
the semantic values of its expressions exist. At the end of the last section, I emphasised 
one way that the presupposition problem generalises; it is not only names whose content 
depends on the existence of their semantic values but also expressions of other kinds. For 
instance, a specific predicate might depend for its content on the existence on a specific 
property. In both of these cases, however, what is at issue is the way that the content of 
individual expressions depends10 on the existence of their individual semantic values, e.g. 
specific names on their bearers. The discussion of the literature on semantic 
presupposition in the previous sections also concentrated mainly on the way that 
individual expressions require the existence of their individual semantic values. In this 
section, and those following it, I shall focus more on the claim that the way in which our 
language depends on the world for its content is systematic11.  
Expressions of varying kinds have varying kinds of semantic values. We can distinguish 
between expressions on the basis of the different kinds of entities they need as semantic 
values; the differing kinds of entities which sentences incorporating these terms will 
presuppose the existence of. In this section, I am going to connect this systematic version 
of the phenomenon of semantic presupposition to the question of ontology, the question 
of what there is. Ultimately, I shall claim that it is ontological category notions with which 
we can answer this question, and articulate the kinds of entities the existence of which is 
required if our language is to have its content.  
There is an obvious way in which this approach draws on, and seems to fit neatly with, 
the well-known Quinean dictum that we should affirm the existence of whatever entities 
                                                          
9 What I am interested in is how language depends on the world when we succeed in making the 
connection with the world which is required for the expression of truth-apt sentences. In other words, I 
am interested in how language depends on the world in those cases where things go right in the way 
required for us to be able to express truth-apt sentences. Later in the thesis, I shall discuss briefly a case 
where things go wrong in the sense that although we are trying to express truth-apt sentences, we fail 
to. I shall not be engaging with the question of how we should understand the meaning of expressions 
which do not express, or try to express, a proposition.  
10 As I discuss in greater detail elsewhere in the thesis, I take the phenomenon of semantic 
presupposition which holds between interpreted sentences or propositions to be a consequence of the 
status of words as artefacts dependent for their identity on what they denote.  
11 Later in the thesis, the systematic dependence and the individual dependence will be linked. 
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are required for the bound variables of first-order quantification to range over in order to 
make the sentences of our best theory true. Over the course of this section, part of what I 
shall do is draw out and defend this connection between the Quinean approach to ontology 
and the basic approach to ontology which I am in the course of developing and defending. 
However, I shall also complicate the connection.  
Realism about metaphysics will be an assumption of this thesis. What I mean by this is 
that it will be a default assumption of this thesis that there is a correct answer to the 
question of what there is, and that the correctness of this answer is not a mind-dependent 
matter. This assumption will not go completely unquestioned. I shall defend realism about 
ontology against some specific challenges. However, I shall not attempt to give an 
independent defence of it. My assumption of realism about ontology will be the point 
which complicates the relation of my approach to Quine’s. My approach takes there to be 
a fact of the matter about the entities in the world which our expressions take as their 
semantic values, and on which they depend for their content. In a later chapter, I shall 
defend a version of the view that articulating what those entities are on which our language 
depends on for its content is how we can make claims about what there is. One of the 
central claims of the thesis will be the claim that it is with category notions, understood in 
a specific way, that we can do this.  
By contrast, I shall argue, Quine’s approach to ontology is more pragmatist than is 
usually12 realised. I shall identify and set aside some of the aspects of his approach which 
are tied up with his pragmatism on the basis that they are incompatible with a realist 
approach to ontology. Another claim I shall go on to make later in the thesis, and for which 
I shall lay the groundwork in this section, is the claim that there are aspects of the position 
that Carnap uses to dismiss ontology that can be usefully appropriated by a realist about 
ontology13 and that will fit in well with the realist approach for which I argue.   
 
 
 
                                                          
12 The pragmatism of Quine’s approach to ontology is not widely acknowledged in metaphysics but there 
is a growing recognition of it in recent literature on metaontology (see for example (Metametaphysics, 
2009)). I draw on and discuss some of this literature in making the argument of this section.  
13 In making this claim I am following Amie Thomasson (2015) to some degree but the way in which I 
propose to make use of Carnap’s approach differs significantly from the way in which she does. I shall 
discuss this in greater detail later in the chapter.  
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§8.1 
 
Much of the recent discussion in metaontology has focused on the debate between Carnap 
and Quine, (Carnap, 1931) (Quine, 1948/1980) (Carnap, 1950/1956) (Quine, 1951/1980) 
(Quine, 1951 (b)) on the status of, and appropriate methodology for, ontology, and on the 
widely held view that Quine won this debate and in so doing defended heavyweight or 
realist ontology. Putnam’s claim that Quine saved ontology is frequently quoted. 
If we ask when ontology became a respectable subject for an analytic philosopher 
to pursue, the mystery disappears. It became respectable in 1948, when Quine 
published a famous paper titled “On what there is”. It was Quine who single-
handedly made Ontology a respectable subject. (Putnam, 2004, 78-9) 
Much recent discussion has focused on the questions of what was really defended by 
Quine, what the disagreement between Carnap and Quine actually was, and whether a 
version of Carnap’s position can be defended against Quine’s criticisms.  
Quine presents what he calls the ontological problem as the question ‘What is there?’ 
(Quine, 1953/1980, 1) and with his first comment on this problem he might be thought to 
raise the question of what kind of term would occur in an appropriate answer. He claims 
that ‘everything’, though accurate, is not enough to provide a satisfactory answer to the 
question: “There remains room for disagreement over cases” (Quine, 1953/1980, 1).  
Quine’s reputation as the saviour of ontology rests to some extent on his introduction of a 
method of determining ontological commitment which has subsequently been widely 
adopted. Having argued that Russell’s theory of descriptions can be used to resolve the 
presupposition problem for names, he concludes that “the burden of objective reference” 
(Quine, 1953/1980, 6) is not borne by names but only by the bound variables of first-order 
quantification. Accordingly, the test for ontological commitment concerns those variables. 
Quine claims that we should affirm the existence of those entities which these bound 
variables of first-order quantification have to range over in order to make the sentences of 
a favoured theory true.  
There are two points which I want to emphasise about this. The first is that this is a test of 
presupposition, but the relevant notion of presupposition differs subtly from that which 
upon which I have been focusing. The notion of presupposition in play here is what I shall 
call the derivative notion. I shall expand on what is meant by this later, but the basic idea 
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is that instead of presupposing the truth of some existence statement itself, with Quine’s 
notion what is presupposed is the truth that someone has made an existence claim.  
The variables of quantification, ‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘everything’, range over 
our whole ontology, whatever it may be; and we are convicted of a particular 
ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presuppositum has to be 
reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one 
of our affirmations true.  
(Quine, 1953/1980, 13) (italics added) 
The second point I want to emphasise is that for Quine, the answer you give to the 
ontological question by saying what your variables range over will be a consequence of a 
more general ontological position you have taken. Quine is explicit about this. We don’t 
determine what there is by considering what our variables range over. We determine what 
we have already taken there to be by considering what our bound variables of 
quantification range over.  
We look to bound variables not in order to know what there is, but in order to know 
what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone else’s, says there is; and this 
much is quite properly a problem involving language. But what there is is another 
question. 
(Quine, 1953/1980, 15-16) 
How do we determine the answer to this other question? In keeping with Quine’s 
confirmation holism (Quine, 1951), he contends that we are to use theoretical virtues such 
as simplicity, adequacy, economy and efficaciousness to evaluate a potential position. If 
we can provide acceptable paraphrases of sentences of a given kind (e.g. of sentences 
concerning species), then we need not accept entities of that kind (e.g. species) among the 
values of our bound variables, and if we need not, we should not.  
We adopt insofar as we are reasonable the simplest conceptual scheme into which 
the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged. Our 
ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the overall conceptual scheme 
which is to accommodate science in the broadest sense. 
(Quine, 1953/1980, 17) 
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§8.2 
As noted at the beginning of this section a question raised frequently in recent 
metaontological literature is the question of what sort of realist ontology Quine can be 
said to save or defend with the above view. 
Huw Price (2009) emphasises that Quine takes the relevant considerations to be broadly 
pragmatic ones (Price, 2009, 327). And having noted above that Quine takes the question 
of what is there to be answered once one has fixed upon a conceptual scheme which 
accommodates science, we can look to ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ and find Quine 
elaborating what is meant by ‘conceptual scheme’ in a way which supports Price’s 
contention.  
As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, 
ultimately, for predicting future experience in light of past experience…Physical 
objects are conceptually imported into the situation as intermediaries…as 
irreducible posits comparable epistemologically to the gods of Homer…The myth 
of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more 
efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into 
the flux of experience 
(Quine, 1951/1980, 44) 
Price’s claim is that insofar as Quine is adopting conceptual schemes which yield an 
answer to the question of what there is on the basis of pragmatic considerations, he cannot 
plausibly be taken to be defending a realist approach to ontology, and he is not really at 
odds with Carnap’s anti-metaphysical claims (Price, 2009, 325-7) 
 
§8.3 
As noted previously, Carnap has often been taken to have been the defeated participant in 
a debate with Quine on the status of ontology but recently that status has been called into 
question. Many metaontologists who are in one way or another sceptical of realist or 
heavyweight ontology now defend what they identify as neo-Carnapian views, for 
example Amie Thomasson and Eli Hirsch.  These views tend to draw upon the notion of 
linguistic frameworks which Carnap proposes in his paper, ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and 
Ontology’ (1950/1956) and which he uses to argue that the existence questions 
metaphysicians focus on are meaningless because insofar as they are significant they can 
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generally be given trivial positive answers. In this subsection, I am going to present two 
of Carnap’s arguments against the significance of ontology in order to draw out the 
comparison with Quine, consider whether we should think Carnap’s arguments against 
the significance of metaphysics are successful, and provide the set up for later 
considerations of the neo-Carnapian position of Amie Thomasson.  
In a paper titled ‘The elimination of metaphysics through the logical analysis of language’, 
Carnap argues that logical analysis can reveal that metaphysical statements are 
meaningless either because they contain words which have been deprived of their 
customary meaning but not supplied with a new one (Carnap, 1931, 66) or because they 
fail to be well-formed in a way that is not immediately apparent due to a gap between 
logical syntax and grammatical syntax (Carnap, 1931, 67). Carnap’s argument for the 
meaningless of terms occurring in metaphysics is based on an empiricist criterion of 
meaning.  
Every word of the language is reduced to other words and finally to the words 
which occur in the so-called “observation sentences” or “protocol sentences”. It is 
through this reduction that the word acquires its meaning. (Carnap, 1931, 62) 
Carnap uses examples of sentences from metaphysicians (esp. Heidegger) to defend the 
claim that sentences occurring in metaphysics are guilty of what he identifies as errors. 
However, even if successful, this would only be sufficient to justify a dismissal of these 
sentences, from these metaphysicians. It would not be sufficient to justify a dismissal of 
all of metaphysics. To justify such a dismissal Carnap claims that the sentences of 
metaphysics fail to be meaningful because they aim to state that which in principle cannot 
be stated “knowledge which is not accessible to empirical science” (Carnap, 1931, 76). 
The claim that such an attempt could never succeed is based on the specific empiricist 
criterion of meaning which Carnap supports. According to Carnap, the sentences in 
question will always be meaningless because “the meaning of a sentence is given by its 
method of verification” and so, “such sentences cannot possibly be expressed” (Carnap, 
1931, 76).  
Carnap’s argument for the meaninglessness of metaphysical claims in his (1931) is based 
on an empiricist criterion of meaning which is assumed but not defended in the piece. This 
criterion of meaning is used to make the argument that specific terms as used by 
metaphysicians are meaningless because they cannot be appropriately connected to 
observation sentences. But the position that such reduction is required for meaning is not 
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particularly plausible (indeed it no longer defended in his (1950/1956)) and it seems itself 
be based on, if not a specific ontological position, then at least a position which rules out 
a broad range of ontological positions. Carnap says he won’t commit to a position on the 
content of observation sentences but it is clear that there are many putative entities which 
are not even thought to be such as to serve as or to be part of that content. Carnap’s 
subsequent move from arguing that sample sentences from metaphysics are meaningless 
to the more general conclusion that all sentences of metaphysics are meaningless is also 
justified by his empiricist criterion of meaning. Resisting Carnap’s conclusion just 
requires rejecting his empiricist criterion of meaning or even just refusing to accept its 
inclusion as an undefended premise in an argument of this kind. 
The anti-metaphysical position of Carnap’s which is most frequently defended by 
contemporary metaontologists is not that outlined above. It is the position he articulates 
in ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’ (1950/1956). In that paper, Carnap aims to 
allow for reference to and quantification over entities of various kinds (e.g. things, abstract 
objects, numbers) in a way that is free of any ontological commitment that would be 
objectionable to empiricists. In order to do this, he introduces the notion of a linguistic 
framework.  
How the notion of a linguistic framework should be understood is a question whose 
answer is much disputed in the literature. As Carnap introduces it, it seems to be a set of 
conventions the adoption of which allows for expansion in some sense of a previously 
used language.  
If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to 
introduce a system of new ways of speaking subject to new rules; we shall call this 
procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in 
question 
(Carnap, 1950/1956, 205)  
Although the way Carnap writes here of wanting to speak of a new kind of entities might 
lead one to think that this new kind of entities had been antecedently recognised, that is 
exactly the sort of claim that Carnap is most concerned to deny. He notes that although he 
speaks of “the acceptance of a new kind of entity…this phrase does not mean for us 
anything more than acceptance of the new linguistic forms” (Carnap, 1950/1956, 214). 
Carnap uses the notion of linguistic framework to make a distinction between internal and 
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external questions. The idea is that internal questions are asked within the framework in 
some way whereas external questions are asked outside of it.  
Price contends that the best way to understand this distinction is to understand it as a 
distinction between the use and mention of terms (2009, 324). The way that Carnap talks 
about his frameworks supports this interpretation: “Internal questions and possible 
answers to them are formulated with the help of the new forms of expressions” (Carnap, 
1950/1956, 205). External questions, by contrast, are introduced as questions about “the 
existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole” (Carnap, 1950/1956, 205). 
Carnap’s claim is that existence questions of the kind philosophers ask (e.g. Are there 
properties?) have trivially positive analytic answers if they are understood as internal 
questions, as questions asked using the framework. However, if they are understood as 
questions asked outside the framework they lack cognitive content. Carnap claims that the 
only way an external question is other than meaningless is if it is the pragmatic question 
of whether it would serve one’s purposes to adopt some particular framework. Carnap 
claims that this is “a matter of practical decision” rather than “a theoretical question” 
(Carnap, 1950/1956, 205).  
The use vs. mention interpretation of Carnap’s internal/external distinction seems to bring 
us back to the problem of presupposition. It seems to present us with exactly that problem. 
If our terms rely on certain entities for the content which allows for their use then, if they 
can be used, it follows that whatever supplies the content allowing for this use exists. By 
contrast, if we try to avoid presupposing the content by merely mentioning a term, we 
have great difficulty in saying what we want to say or even saying anything at all. Amie 
Thomasson (2015) defends what she calls an easy ontology of simple realism on the basis 
of an interpretation of Carnap’s distinction which takes something like this line. I will 
consider Thomasson’s position later in this chapter. Thomasson does not offer her 
interpretation as an exegesis of Carnap’s position but instead as a promising way to 
interpret it. She deliberately sets aside other aspects of his position in order to develop 
what she takes to be the most promising parts of his view into her own Neo-Carnapian 
position. I shall discuss Thomasson’s Neo-Carnapian position later in this chapter but the 
point I want to make here is simply that insofar as we are interested in exegesis of Carnap, 
this doesn’t seem to be the right way to interpret him.  
The interpretation outlined above builds on recognition of the fact that language depends 
on the world for its significance and that at least some expressions depend for their content 
on an entity in the world which is their referent. In his (1950/1956), Carnap doesn’t seem 
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to accept this. He goes back and forth between talk of accepting new entities and talk of 
accepting new forms of expression and repeatedly insists that the former amounts to no 
more than the latter (Carnap, 1950/1956, 207) (Carnap, 1950/1956, 214). His frameworks 
seem to amount to no more than systems of rules for manipulating symbols; to construct 
a framework you simply need to provide expressions with specified rules governing their 
behaviour. The introduction of numerals and sentences containing them is not explicitly 
tied to the world in any way. There could be a version of such a view in which we would 
find the worldly component of the semantics for these terms in the introduction rules of 
the terms for them but Carnap could not allow this. He would reject any appropriately 
overarching notion of a world or reality. He specifically denies what he takes to be the 
metaphysicians’ demand for “some ontological insight” to justify the introduction of the 
terms (Carnap, 1950/1956, 214), and although he claims that the rules for ‘designates’ and 
‘exists’ allow for trivial analytic inferences of the claims that e.g. “ “five” designates a 
number” and “Abstract objects exist” (Carnap, 1950/1956, 217) (Carnap, 1950/1956, 209) 
the main claim of his article is that one can accept claims like this without accepting a 
Platonist ontology or indeed any ontology. In light of this, it doesn’t seem that the 
internal/external use-mention distinction, as Carnap employs it, can give rise to the 
presupposition problem in the way it might seem to. Since the framework specific terms 
in internal statements haven’t been provided with worldly referents, the problem for 
external statements can’t be a lack of such referents.   
Indeed, when we look to Carnap to see the basis he provides for the dismissal of external 
questions, we do not find claims about lack of content for framework specific terms in 
external questions. Carnap’s justification for dismissing external questions has to do with 
notions of reality. He interprets the question of whether numbers exist, understood as an 
external question, as a question about whether a system exists (Carnap, 1950/1956, 205) 
(italics added). Carnap objects to this question by claiming that for something to exist is 
for it to exist within some system. It seems that there cannot be systems of systems because 
Carnap claims that being an element of a system is not something which can be 
meaningfully said of systems themselves14. (Carnap, 1950/1956, 207).  
In light of the above, it can be seen that Carnap’s dismissal of metaphysics in his 
(1950/1956) depends on two claims: (1) Metaphysicians are trying to make external 
                                                          
14 It is worth noting that it is not clear why there shouldn’t be systems of systems. Insofar as, for Carnap, 
accepting systems seems often to be no more than accepting new forms of expressions, systems of systems 
would be new forms of expressions for new forms of expressions which seems to be exactly what Carnap 
is proposing in introducing talk about frameworks. 
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existence statements (in his sense of external statement). (2) There is no overarching 
notion of reality and no notion of reality which is common to different systems of entities 
so there is nothing coherent we could mean by asking whether some thing or things are 
real/exist simpliciter. 
Both of these claims can be resisted. In asking about whether abstract objects exist 
metaphysicians are asking about whether those entities exist. It is difficult to give the 
content of that question but claiming that it is a question about whether some other entity, 
the system containing those entities, exists just seems to get the content wrong and Carnap 
provides no real justification for the interpretation. But it is an important claim for his 
argument because Carnap’s claim seems to be that to exist is to exist within a system but, 
he claims, that is not something that a system can be said to do. Thus, the external 
existence statements which have been thus interpreted lack cognitive content because they 
are not well-formed.  
That brings us to claim (2). It too may be resisted because it seems that there really is a 
commonality to be captured. Even if, for the sake of argument, we accept Carnap’s claim 
that different notions of reality correspond to different systems, still insofar as they are all 
notions of reality, there seems to be a commonality. Indeed, it is this commonality that 
allows Carnap to make a general claim like the claim that “To be real in the scientific 
sense means to be an element of the system” (Carnap, 1950/1956, 205).  If there is a 
coherent general notion of being real, then one can claim that we are pursuing the answer 
to this question by asking a system relative one. If that is the case, we can claim coherence 
for what looks like a non-internal question of existence. If we reject both (1) and (2) above, 
we can also reject Carnap’s conclusion that the statements of metaphysics are external 
statements (in his sense) which lack cognitive content.  
 
§8.4 
As noted, a number of philosophers in recent metaontological literature (e.g. (Eklund, 
2013) (Price, 2009)) argue that those who take Quine to have saved ontology from 
Carnap’s anti-metaphysical arguments fail to appreciate how much Quine and Carnap 
have in common. Eklund notes that both Quine and Carnap took the analytic/synthetic 
distinction to be relevant to their debate over ontology. In an attempt to see how it could 
be relevant, Eklund (2013) draws out a number of potential interpretations of Carnap’s 
frameworks. He notes that Carnap creates a three-way distinction: (1) internal questions, 
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(2) external questions understood as pragmatic questions, and (3) external questions 
understood as factual questions. He argues that in attacking the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, Quine doesn’t argue against Carnap’s dismissal of group (3) but instead argues 
against Carnap’s distinction between groups (1) and (2) (Eklund, 2013, 237). Somewhat 
similarly, Price (2009) argues that those who take Quine to have saved ontology fail to 
appreciate that Quine was really pushing Carnap’s claim that the question of framework 
adoption should be decided on the basis of pragmatic considerations further. Price quotes 
Quine to this effect: 
Carnap maintains that ontological questions ... are questions not of fact but of 
choosing a convenient scheme or framework for science; and with this I agree 
only if the same be conceded for every scientific hypothesis  
 
((Quine, 1966, 134), quoted in Price, 2009, 327) 
 
If we accept this, and we are not pragmatists regarding ontology but are instead ontological 
realists, do we go wrong in adopting Quine’s ontological method? The answer seems to 
depend on whether we adopt the method in its entirety, and, if not, on which parts of the 
method we adopt. The most widely adopted aspect of Quine’s approach is his test of 
ontological commitment, summarised in the slogan ‘To be is to be a value of a variable’. 
We are to recognise commitment to the entities over which our bound variables have to 
range in order that certain affirmations turn out true. This test is sometimes taken to 
provide a way of answering the ontological question but as noted earlier, for Quine this is 
not what it does. Instead, for Quine, the test is used to determine the ontological 
presuppositions of someone’s position (Quine, 1953/1980, 15-16). Quine’s pragmatism is 
relevant to what he does take to be the right method to determine the answer to the 
ontological question. He has a pragmatic approach to, at least the method for answering, 
but possibly also the content of, the question posed by the ontological problem. Then he 
has a test for ontological commitment which doesn’t involve obvious pragmatic 
considerations and whose role seems to be to clarify the answer to the ontological question 
which was previously given. I am going to argue that these two aspects of Quine’s method 
can be separated.  
We can acknowledge that theoretical virtues such as simplicity have some role without 
taking that role to be determinative and without adopting Quine’s seemingly pragmatic 
understanding of the problem posed by the ontological question. We can also, I shall 
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argue, understand and apply Quine’s test for ontological commitment, or presupposition, 
in a different way to the way he himself did. The way in which I hope to do this draws on 
the notion of semantic presupposition and is key to the metaontological approach which I 
shall ultimately defend. Finally, the metaontological approach I shall defend is that which 
will allow me to explicate the notion of ontological category which I shall claim has 
consequences for how we should understand the truth conditions of de re modal claims.  
 
§8.5 
Quine’s pragmatism is relevant to:  
(a) His understanding of the question posed by the ontological problem ‘what is 
there?’. The task is that of fixing upon a conceptual structure (Quine, 1953/1980, 
17) and conceptual structures themselves are thought of as tools: “As an empiricist 
I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for 
predicting future experience in light of past experience” (Quine, 1951/1980, 44)  
and it is also relevant to 
(b) The basis on which he thinks an answer should be determined; we are to choose 
the best conceptual scheme which accommodates science but ‘best’ here is to be 
understood pragmatically.  
 
We can depart from Quine on both of these points. I shall not at this point defend the 
substance of alternative answers. I just want to point out that there are prima facie plausible 
alternatives. 
 There is a more robustly realist understanding of the ontological question which I 
gestured towards earlier and which I shall later develop which understands the question to 
ask what the world contains or consists of and which takes this question to be something 
we can get right or wrong (though not every answer need be comprehensive). There is 
plenty of room for debate about how we should understand such a claim, but it is prima 
facie plausible as an interpretation of the question. We can see this by considering the 
frequency with which ontologists make claims about the world and what the world is like 
in providing answers to the ontological question.  
The world is the totality of facts, not of things (Wittgenstein, 1961/2001, 5)  
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I propose now that entities like our fine parts or abstract components are the 
primary constituents of this or any possible world, the very alphabet of being. 
(D.C. Williams, 1953/1997, 115) 
 
We can also plausibly depart from Quine on the second point. Again, I shall not defend an 
alternative epistemology of metaphysics at this point, but I shall claim that it is prima facie 
plausible to claim that not all knowledge of things there are is based on pragmatic 
considerations of overall theory.  
Quine’s test of ontological commitment was to be applied to pragmatically determined 
answers given to the pragmatically conceived ontological question. Its role was to clarify 
these answers. If we reject the pragmatic interpretation of the question and the pragmatic 
method of answering it, what role is left for the test of ontological 
commitment/presupposition?  In a way that I shall now explain, my claim is that its role is 
to facilitate the articulation of an alternatively determined answer to the realist version of 
the ontological question.  
At this point, I want to return to the notion of semantic presupposition which I spent the 
first part of this chapter trying to clarify and review the way in which I suggested that 
semantic presupposition is connected to the question of ontology. The notion of semantic 
presupposition which I have delineated assumes an approach to semantics according to 
which expressions of various types have entities which serve as their semantic values. The 
intuitive ideas here are that language depends on the world for its content, and that the way 
we confer meaning upon words is by systematically connecting them with the world. We 
do this often, but not always, by connecting them with entities in the world. My claim is 
that if this is the case, the content of language, and especially of denotational terms, is 
dependent on the existence of that in the world which was used to give it meaning. If this 
is correct, and use requires content, then the use of language generally, and denotational 
terms in particular, presupposes the existence of that in the world on which its content 
depends and it does so in a way which has nothing to do with the ontological positions 
taken by those who use the language.  
It is clear however that the way in which language depends for its content on the world is 
not transparent. As is clear from the fact that different analyses are provided by different 
ontologists for the same sentence, many different positions can be taken on the question of 
what the world is required to contain in order to provide the content of sentences we wish 
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to take to be true. Working with the notion of semantic presupposition however one can 
claim that there will be a right answer to this question. My proposal is that making a claim 
as to what this right answer is is a way of articulating a position on the question of what 
there is. The new role for Quine’s test of ontological commitment/presuppositions is to 
reveal the ontological commitments/presuppositions of both ontological and ordinary 
language (at least insofar as that language is meaningful. Sometimes we shall have to say 
that, as it stands, it is not.) 
The original purpose of the test was to reveal ontological commitments of positions taken. 
We are revealed to be committed to, or to presuppose, those entities we have to take our 
bound variables of quantification to range over in order for a certain class of sentences to 
be true. An important difference between this original purpose and my own is that what 
Quine takes to be revealed are the presuppositions of someone’s position whereas I am 
claiming that we should use the test of commitment to make claims about the 
presuppositions of terms in a language we use, not of our positions. The test is, 
nevertheless still supposed to work in basically the same way but, as mentioned above, 
instead of being a test, it is to be a tool.  
A further important difference between Quine’s position and my own is that I do not 
follow Quine in taking the bound variables of first order quantification to be the only terms 
which “bear the burden of objective reference” (Quine, 1953/1980, 6). This difference can 
be supported in two different ways.  
1. Quine’s claim that only variables bear the burden of reference is due to his 
acceptance in his (1953/1980) of Russell’s theory of descriptions. On the basis of 
this theory Quine claims that names themselves do not refer when they occur in 
sentences; they should be given a quantificational analysis and only the bound 
variable occurring therein is properly taken to play a referential role in the sentence 
in which the name seemed to feature. However, since Quine wrote ‘On what there 
is’, Russell’s theory of descriptions has become harder to defend. In his 
(1972/1981) Kripke presented well known and persuasive arguments against it. 
According to these arguments, taking a name as a definite description will yield 
incorrect claims concerning the content of sentences in which that name features. 
Kripke claims that to capture the content correctly you need to take names to be 
rigid designators, terms which refer to the same thing across all possible worlds. 
If you allow the meaning of the name (e.g. ‘Aristotle’) to be specified by a 
description or descriptions typically only contingently true of the bearer (e.g. 
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‘...taught Alexander the Great’) you get such implausible results as the result that 
the proposition that Aristotle taught Alexander the Great is a necessary truth 
because its negation would be a contradiction (effectively, it is not the case that 
the teacher of Alexander the Great taught Alexander the Great). Indeed, not only 
will this proposition turn out, implausibly, to be necessary, it will also turn out, 
implausibly, to be known, when it is known, a priori, because it will suffice to 
know the meaning of the terms to know that the proposition is true. Kripke argues 
that results like these show that a description theory of names leads to a 
misconstrual of the content of the sentences considered.  
 
If we accept Kripke’s objections to the Russellian theory of descriptions, which I 
shall, then we should also reject Quine’s dismissal of names as referring terms. As 
noted above, first-order variables, for Quine, play a distinctive role in sentences. 
They are the only bearers of objective reference. If we do not take them to be such, 
should we follow Quine in according variables such a central role in the test for 
ontological commitment? The answer I shall give is that we should, but that the 
reason why variables will be useful on the current approach will differ, given the 
point above, from the reason why they are important within Quine’s approach. The 
reason to continue to accord variables a central position is that we can shift from 
talking about variables already occurring in sentences (such as the variable that 
will occur in a sentence incorporating a disguised definite description) to talking 
about the legitimacy of quantifying into various positions in varying ranges of 
sentences. Talking about when and into what position it is legitimate to quantify 
into various sentences facilitates the task which the current construal of the 
ontological question aims to carry out: the task of making explicit what entities 
our language depends on the existence of in order to have the content that it does, 
in other words, what existence claims are presupposed if our language is to have 
its actual content.  
The intuitive idea which supports this shift is cogently presented by Bob Hale in a 
discussion of the legitimacy of quantifying into predicate position.  
it would be obviously and grossly implausible to claim that ‘Something is 
wise’, for example introduces a commitment to the existence of objects of 
which ‘Socrates is wise’ is wholly innocent. On the contrary, it seems plain 
that quantification into a position in a sentence, assuming it carries an 
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existential commitment, merely generalises a commitment already borne 
by the constant expressions – whether names or predicates – which can 
occupy those positions and which its bound variables replace. (Hale, 2013, 
12) 
   
 
2. A second reason not to follow Quine in taking only the bound variables of first 
order quantification to bear objective reference is that to do so is to build an 
ontological assumption into the methodology with which one approaches 
ontology. As Hale (2013) notes, to take this position is to rule out by assumption 
the possibility that any entities exist which are not apt to be referred to by first 
order variables.  
It is – to put the same point in a way that brings out its massive ontological 
significance – simply an assumption of Quine’s whole approach that 
expressions of other types, such as predicates like ‘is wise’ or ‘weighs more 
than’, etc., do not refer or stand for entities of any kind, so that our use of 
them carries no existential commitment” (Hale, 2013, 12). 
Accepting this point, we can reject Quine’s assumption and treat the question of 
whether to accept variables in predicate position as an open one while still holding 
on to the claim that ‘to be is to be the value of a variable’. 
 
I claimed above that on the approach to ontology which I am currently defending we 
should use the test of ontological commitment more as a tool than a test. It is to be a tool 
we can use to articulate an answer to the question of what there is by making a claim about 
what the answer is to the question of what our bound variables of quantification have to 
range over. The reason it is such an important tool for my purposes lies in the answer to 
my next question which is: how are we to say what our variables of quantification have to 
range over in order that our language has the content that it does? With what sort of term 
can we specify what our variables have to range over? 
This is not a question in which Quine was particularly interested. Although, famously, he 
notes that the answer ‘everything’ is not satisfactory, he is not particularly concerned to 
provide an answer to the question of what makes for a satisfactory answer. He sometimes 
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seems to take open sentences to be satisfactory. The difficulty is that in saying what there 
is we are not interested in a list of open sentences. On account of this feature of Quine’s 
approach to ontology Schaffer labels the answers his approach to ontology yields ‘flat’.  
For the Quinean, the target is flat. The task is to solve for E = the set (or class, or 
plurality) of entities. There is no structure to E.       (Schaffer, 2009, 354) 15.  
 
The claim I aim to defend is that the right sort of term to use to give an answer to the 
ontological question is an ontological category term. Ontological categories are commonly 
parsed as the highest or most fundamental kinds.  The fundamentality of ontological 
categories makes them indefinable. They can’t be defined in other terms. They provide 
the notions in terms of which other things are defined. For this reason, clarifying them by 
showing how their content is built into the content of terms for those things that would be 
defined in terms of them is important in enabling one to use such category terms to give 
an answer to the question of what there is. 
This work of clarification is especially important in light of the apparent possibility of 
reduction of one category to another. To explain why this is so, in the next section I shall 
return to the issue of the derivative notion of presupposition which was noted earlier in 
this chapter.  
 
§9  
The question to be addressed in the next few sections is: how are we to say what our 
variables of quantification have to range over in order that our language has the content 
that it does? Or to put the question another way: with what sort of term can we specify 
what our variables have to range over? In the next few sections I shall consider a number 
of ways that this question has been answered. I shall argue that none of them are 
satisfactory because they all fall afoul of what I shall call the presupposition problem.  
The basic presupposition problem is that you need to find a way of saying what there is 
without presupposing the existence of the very things whose existence you are asserting 
but it is very difficult to avoid presupposing the existence of those things while still 
providing the intended content for the term with which you say what it is that there is. I 
                                                          
15 Schaffer provides a three-way distinction between this understanding of the target as flat, an 
understanding of it as flat but sorted, and (his own approach) an understanding of it as ordered. 
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discussed and motivated the presupposition problem for singular terms earlier in this 
chapter.  
The presupposition problem with which I shall be concerned going forward is similar to 
that one, but it is generalised in two different ways, both of which have been anticipated 
over the course of this chapter. First, I shall be concerned not only with the presuppositions 
of individual entities by individual names but also with the presuppositions of individual 
entities by individual instances of other types of expression. For example, I shall say that 
it may be the case that a predicate ‘...is F’ presupposes the existence of a property, F. 
Second, I shall be concerned with the presuppositions of expression types. For instance, 
given certain background assumptions, one would say that using second-order variables 
presupposes the existence of properties of some kind. The justifying idea here is that the 
legitimacy of quantifying into predicate position depends on the existence of properties 
serving as the semantic values of those predicates.  
The first account of how we should answer the ontological question which I shall consider 
is that which Quine offers in his (1960/2013). Quine frames the problem that the use of 
certain terms presupposes the existence of their referents, not as I have, as a threat to 
genuine content, but instead as a threat to the possibility of debate. His proposed resolution 
combines a move to talking about words instead of things (a move he calls semantic 
ascent) and a pragmatist framework for what the ensuing discussion about words should 
be.  
it does happen that semantic ascent is more useful in philosophical connections 
than in most and I think I can explain why. Consider what it would be like to debate 
over the existence of miles without ascending to talk of ‘mile’. “Of course, there 
are miles. Wherever you have 1760 yards you have a mile.” “But there are no yards 
either, only bodies of various lengths.” “Are the earth and moon separated by 
bodies of various lengths?” The continuation is lost in a jumble of invective and 
question-begging. When on the other hand we ascend to ‘mile’ and ask which of 
its contexts are useful and for what purposes, we can get on; we are no longer 
caught in the toils of our opposed uses. The strategy of semantic ascent is that it 
carries the discussion into a domain where both parties are better agreed on the 
objects (viz. words) and on the main terms concerning them. (Quine, 1960/2013, 
250-1) 
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There are two main problems with Quine’s proposed method of semantic ascent. The first 
is that unless the words to which we ascend are typographically individuated the 
participants will not agree on them as required, so it seems that the words will have to be 
merely typographically individuated words to allow for the participants to agree on them, 
but such words will be close to useless in making the relevant claims. Quine suggests, as 
another example of semantic ascent that “‘There are wombats in Tasmania’ might be 
paraphrased ‘’Wombat’ is true of some creatures in Tasmania’” (Quine, 1960/2013, 250). 
However, if ‘wombat’ here is to be understood merely as a typographically individuated 
word, then the truth of the paraphrase is compatible with there being no mammals at all in 
Tasmania and if this is the case it is clear that the intended content has not been preserved 
across the paraphrase. The objection here addresses existential sentences which 
incorporate general terms, but it parallels one which, as I noted earlier, Kripke (2013) 
makes concerning singular existential sentences. Kripke argues that a metalinguistic 
construal of existential claims which took them to be claims about whether some name 
has a referent would fail to capture the intended content because we would not want to say 
that if Moses had not been given the name ‘Moses’, and no one else had been given the 
name ‘Moses’, that that would make it true that Moses did not exist. And on the other 
hand, we would want to deny that Vulcan would have existed, simply if something or 
other had been named Vulcan (Kripke, 2013, 152-3). 
The problem, in both the general and the singular case, is that the typographically 
individuated words, although they might provide common ground, do not allow us to make 
the existence claims we are interested in, the existence claims which are the topic of our 
disagreement. To express these claims, we need to give content to the words we would 
use to make them but once we do this the words will no longer function as common 
ground. I have argued that this is exactly what we should expect because the existence of 
the entities needed to give content to the terms is the topic of the disagreement.  
The second problem with Quine’s proposed method of resolution is that the pragmatist 
criterion, whose application he suggests the ensuing discussion about words should 
consider, would result in a discussion that was largely beside the point from a realist point 
of view. Once the words had some content, one might suggest that the discussion’s verdict 
could be a contributing consideration in a realist discussion, but the usefulness of 
typographically individuated words does not seem like it could contribute even this.  
Typographically individuated words are not enough to allow us to say what it is that exists, 
what it is that our variables range over. We seem to need words with content to do this but 
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if we are to use words with content to that end, we need to provide that content without 
relying on the entities whose existence is asserted to provide it.    
 
One of the most common ways in which philosophers try to provide the appropriate 
content to their existence claims without presupposing the existence of the entities whose 
existence they are asserting is through the strategy of locating the content with which they 
say what it is that there is in the predicate. This strategy parallels Quine’s suggestion in 
his (1953/1980) that we can move from saying that ‘Pegasus exists’ to saying that 
‘Something Pegasizes’ (Quine, 1953/1980). In a similar way, instead of saying ‘Tropes 
exist’, we might say that ‘There exists an x such that x is a trope’. The motivating idea in 
both cases is the idea that the content of the predicate (‘Pegasizes’/ ‘is a trope’) does not 
depend on the existence of that of which the predicates are true and so avoids presupposing 
the existence of the very things whose existence is being asserted. My response, 
anticipated earlier in my discussion of the problem as it arises for individual existence 
claims, is that the content of relevant predicates will presuppose the existence of the 
entities in question.   Versions of this approach are so prevalent that I am going to consider 
the general approach first and then briefly consider specific versions of it.   
 
§9.1 
In this section, I shall argue that the presupposition problem arises for the specific kind 
predicates which one might be inclined to use to answer the ontological question and that 
for this reason existence claims which make use of them presuppose the existence of the 
entities whose existence is in question. If this is the case, then we need to seek an 
alternative construal of the sentences with which we say what there is.  
The basic reason to take this position, that individual kind predicates presuppose the 
existence of the entities of which they are true, echoes the reason given earlier to take the 
content of the predicate ‘is identical to Aristotle’ to presuppose the existence of Aristotle. 
The kind term ‘trope’ features in the kind predicate ‘is a trope’. My argument will be: if 
trope is, at least taken to be, a kind which is basic in the sense of not being reductively 
defined in terms of any other kind, then the term ‘trope’, will depend for its content on 
the existence of tropes. The kind predicate ‘is a trope’, since it incorporates the term 
‘trope’ will depend for its content on the existence of tropes if the kind term ‘trope’ does. 
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The kind term ‘trope’ does depend for its content on the existence of tropes and so the 
kind predicate ‘is a trope’ also depends for its content on the existence of tropes.   
To anyone who is inclined to resist this argument by claiming that the kind term ‘trope’ 
should be understood as the predicate ‘is a trope’ rather than as a term which features in 
that predicate, I give the following response. For the approach such a person would be 
defending, the challenge is to give content to, or make explicit the content of, the kind 
predicate ‘is a trope’ (a) without using tropes to do so (otherwise the content would 
presuppose their existence), (b) without reductively defining this kind predicate in terms 
of some other kind predicate, and (c) without interpreting the kind predicate as mere 
qualitative predicate16. I deny that this is possible. Once the challenge is understood along 
the lines described above, basically the same reasons which lead us to say that the kind 
term ‘trope’ cannot be given the desired content without presupposing the existence of 
tropes should lead us to say the same about the predicate ‘is a trope’. For this reason, I 
think the argument below should in principle be able to answer the objections of such a 
response 
 
§9.2 
Over the course of the next six subsections I shall address the question: why should we 
think that providing the appropriate content to a kind predicate such as ‘is a trope’, and 
the kind term ‘trope’ which occurs in it, requires presupposing the existence of the entities 
whose existence is being asserted? 
In answering the ontological question, the question of what there is, ontologists use terms 
for kinds. With terms for kinds one is supposed to be able to say what it is our bound 
variables range over. Obviously, there is disagreement about the answer. There is 
disagreement about which terms are referring terms and also about what those terms 
which are referring terms should be understood to refer to.  
For example, someone who believed in tropes or moments might claim that ‘Peter’s 
smile’ is a referring term, whereas someone with a certain kind of object-property 
ontology might think that ‘Peter’s smile’ is not a referring term, that there is no such entity 
as Peter’s smile, there is only Peter, the property of smiling and the fact that Peter satisfies 
                                                          
16 It is prima facie implausible that ‘is a trope’ is a mere qualitative predicate since it incorporates the 
substantival general term ‘a trope’ but I shall in any case explain later in this section why merely qualitative 
predicates will not suffice to provide answer to the ontological question. 
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or instantiates that property. Even among those who agree that ‘Peter’s smile’ is a 
referring term, there will be disagreement about what the term should be understood to 
refer to. The moment theorist might say that it should be understood to refer to an 
essentially dependent entity which is partially constituted by the object, Peter. The trope 
theorist might reject this and claim that a term like ‘Peter’s smile’ should be understood 
to refer to an independent entity, and that the object, Peter, if any such entity exists, should 
be understood in terms of the independent tropes which make it up.  
Ontologists use kind terms to make claims about how referring terms should be 
understood.  The kinds supposedly corresponding to the kind terms are used to specify 
the correct interpretation of terms for individuals17 (e.g. this is a term for a set, or this is 
a term for a number, or this is a term for a function). They are used to make claims about 
what notion of entity we should use to interpret some range of terms which are to be taken 
to refer to individuals (e.g. Lowe (2006) thinks substantival general terms (such as 
‘elephant’) are such as to have substantial kinds (kinds which are also objects) as their 
semantic values. Hale (2013) thinks that predicates should be understood to have 
unsaturated properties as their semantic values.) 
How are we to understand the kind terms with which we can say what entities various 
expressions have as their semantic values?  
§9.3 
For any given putative kind term, the question of how we should understand it is itself 
generally a point of dispute in ontology. What is important for my purposes is recognition 
of the fact that once two different positions are taken on a question such as this, there is 
not a single kind notion at issue, there is a single kind term, typographically individuated, 
but two kind terms, semantically individuated.  
For instance, consider a moment ontologist who claims that Peter is an object and that 
Peter’s smile exists but depends on Peter, and the trope theorist who allows for the 
existence of objects such as Peter by reducing them to bundles of tropes such as Peter’s 
smile. These two people might both use the putative kind term ‘object’ for Peter but the 
moment ontologist, faced with the trope theorist’s ontology, would be justified in 
claiming that the object Peter, as he understood him, was simply not to be found there. 
The trope theorist aims to allow the term ‘Peter’ to be used as a referring term, and he 
                                                          
17 In this piece ‘individual’ is intended to be understood as a categorically neutral term for any entity. 
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may use the term ‘object’ for whatever it is that that term refers to but his notion of object 
and the moment ontologist’s notion of object are two entirely different notions. Although 
they both use the term ‘object’, they are using it in such different ways that we should say 
they are not both using the same semantically individuated term.  
 
The question of this sub-section was: how are we to understand the kind terms used to 
specify the correct interpretation of terms for individuals? Two points from the above 
provide the first steps towards answering this question.  
1. What are taken to be ontologically more basic kind terms are used to explain what are 
taken to be ontologically less basic kind terms. 
2. In taking a kind term to be ontologically less basic than some other, one uses the more 
basic term to specify an interpretation for the less basic term and this may differ from 
how others use that term.  
 
§9.4 
If the ontologically more basic terms are used to explain the ontologically less basic terms, 
then the question of how we understand kind terms shifts to the question of how we 
understand what are held to be the ontologically basic kind terms.  
A subsidiary question is: what is meant by ‘ontologically basic’ here? How, for instance, 
is an ontologically basic term different from a semantically basic one? I take semantically 
basic terms to be those which are learnt first, and which are not learnt on the basis of 
others. I make no claim that any kind term which is a candidate for being ontologically 
basic is such a term. It seems unlikely that they would be. The basicness in which I am 
interested concerns what something is. It relates back to the idea that kind terms are used 
to say what referring terms refer to. They express notions which say what something is. 
They will be used in real definitions of things. Any kind which is such that the real 
definition of things of that kind is given with some other kind is less ontologically basic 
than that other kind.  The relation of being ontologically more basic than will be transitive 
and asymmetric.  
Relating it back to the ontological question, the idea is that if we use a kind to say what 
terms for individuals should be understood to refer to that kind should be an ontologically 
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basic one. If it is not ontologically basic, then the real answer is given by the more basic 
kind in terms of which it should be understood. If one is neutral on the question of whether 
a kind is ontologically basic, then one leaves the ontological question open and to that 
extent unanswered because, as noted, there can be disagreements about whether and how 
an apparent kind should be understood or reduced. Different positions in such a 
disagreement result in very different answers. If one tries to remain neutral on the question 
of how a kind term should be understood one simply doesn’t give it the content required 
to be able to use it to give an answer to the question.  
For brevity, I shall from this point simply use ‘basic’ instead of ‘ontologically basic’. I’ll 
specify ‘semantically basic’ if I intend to talk about semantic basicness instead. 
 
§9.5 
The question was: how do we understand the kind terms we use to give answers to the 
ontological question. A partial answer is that we understand some by taking the kinds to 
which they correspond to be less basic than other kinds. The question then becomes: how 
do we understand the terms for the most basic kinds in terms of which we are 
understanding the others? Indeed, not alone are we understanding the less basic kinds in 
terms of the most basic kinds, since we are using the most basic kinds to say what terms 
for individuals should be understood to refer to, we are also using these kinds to 
understand the individuals in our ontology. Allowing for this understanding is a primary 
role for these notions in an ontological theory. We need to be able to explain how terms 
for the most basic kinds should be understood because we are using the most basic kind 
notions to which they correspond to provide an answer to the contested question of how 
we should understand many other things.  
 
We use kind notions to explain what our referring terms stand for, and we explain less 
basic kinds in terms of more basic kinds. At some point some kind notions must be taken 
as primitive, that is, as non-reducible, otherwise none of the kind notions will be such as 
to provide an answer to the ontological question. We cannot reduce or define the terms 
for the most basic kinds, yet we still need to make the kinds they are supposed to 
correspond to intelligible because it is in terms of these kinds that our other answers are 
given.  
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The solution seems to be that we cannot define them from below, in terms of the more 
basic, so instead we have to make them intelligible from above, in terms of the less 
basic18. If we were aiming at definition such a move would fail because the less basic 
which would be serving as the definiens would themselves be properly understood only 
in terms of the definiendum. But a definition is not what is aimed at because it has already 
been accepted that definition is not possible for terms for the most basic kind notions. 
Instead, the goal is to make the primitive kind notions corresponding to the most basic 
kind terms intelligible and in so doing to fix what is meant by those terms. The idea is 
that this will be done from above by appeal to less basic but more accessible notions. 
Once these less basic notions are used to make the primitive intelligible our understanding 
of the less basic notions themselves will be slightly modified because we will apprehend 
them more clearly and precisely in the light of the primitive they helped us to understand 
and which we take to underlie them.  
An example of using the less basic to understand the more basic would be the use of our 
inchoate notion of a feature to introduce the notion of a trope which is then used to define 
a more precise notion of feature. Existence and identity conditions are another way in 
which ontologists frequently make primitives intelligible through the use of something 
less basic which will ultimately be understood in terms of those primitives. By appeal to 
an inchoate understanding, e.g. of the mental, or of the moral, or of artefacts, a rough 
range of sentences is demarcated. The primitive kind notion is introduced as that which 
allows, or partially allows, these sentences to be understood because, it is said, something 
of that kind should be understood to feature in the worldly correlate of these sentences in 
a systematic way whenever these sentences are true. The sentences, having been used to 
introduce the primitive, are then to be understood in terms of it.  
                                                          
18 The move here draws on Bob Hale’s defence of his neo-Fregean approach to ontological categories. 
This approach shall be discussed at greater length later in this chapter and again in Chapter Four. I shall 
not adopt his construal of ontological category notions, but I shall adopt aspects of it. One part of the 
approach which I shall adopt is the distinction between the task of definition and the task of making a 
basic notion intelligible in terms of less basic notions and his insistence on the point that the circularity 
involved in doing the latter is of an unproblematic sort. However, I shall not exactly follow Hale on the 
question of what is required for the circularity involved in the task of making a notion intelligible to be 
unproblematic.  
 
It is important to grasp that the threatened circularity is epistemological, not definitional, and 
that what is required to avoid it is a way of recognizing expressions as functioning as singular 
terms which does not involve discerning that there are objects for which they stand. It is not 
necessary that the notion of a singular term be explicable or definable without invoking that of 
an object. On the contrary, the semantic function of a singular term is precisely that of identifying 
an object as what we are talking about – that is just what it is to be a singular term. (Hale, 2013, 
footnote 19, p. 15) 
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§9.6 
If the above is correct, then the answer to the question of how primitive kind terms are 
explained is that less basic but more accessible notions, which will ultimately be 
understood in terms of the primitive kind notion said to correspond to the basic term, are 
used to explain how that term should be understood. The epistemically prior notion is 
used to explain the ontologically prior notion which ultimately defines it.  
This is where the problem of presupposition comes back in. The basic argument for 
thinking that the presupposition problem generalises to kind terms goes as follows: The 
primitive is explained as that which underlies, in some specified way, the less basic 
notions used to introduce it. If there is in fact nothing which underlies the less basic things 
in question in the way specified, then appropriate content is not provided for the term 
supposedly corresponding to the primitive.  
One claim in the background here is that the less basic things couldn’t be as they are but 
be constituted differently. This seems right. If the less basic things are to be properly 
understood in terms of the more basic, then they couldn’t be what they are but have a 
different real definition. If a primitive is introduced by being used to provide an analysis 
of a roughly demarcated range of sentences, but there is nothing which occurs in the really 
correct analysis of the sentences in the way the primitive is said to (perhaps the range of 
sentences are not correctly analysed together at all) then the term for the primitive which 
was being explained in this way has not been successfully explained. It has not been given 
the content that the introduction aimed to give it.  
Another claim in the background is that in trying to allow the term for the primitive to be 
understood we are (to slightly modify Kripke’s terms) fixing the content of the term, not 
specifying its meaning. This also seems right. Most importantly, if we treat the 
introduction or explication as specifying the meaning, we won’t get the required 
clarification of what were supposed to be non-basic notions appealed to in the 
introduction or explication. These non-basic notions are supposed to be used to make the 
primitive intelligible and are then to be understood more clearly in light of it. If the 
introduction specifies the meaning, there will be nothing which would provide this result; 
the non-basic notions will remain only as clear as they were to begin with.   Also, if we 
treat the attempts to specify how primitive kind terms should be understood not as fixing 
their content but instead as specifying their meaning, we seem to miss our target. We end 
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up with various instances of one kind, whatever corresponds to predicates, if any one 
thing does, rather than with entity notions which could be used to say what corresponds 
to predicates or to sentences or to terms like ‘Peter’s smile’ etc. i.e. rather than with terms 
which we could use to say what it is that our variables range over. 
 
§9.7 
If the argument outlined above works, then the presupposition problem arises for 
primitive kind terms because we only succeed in giving them the content we want them 
to have, or explicating the content they do have, when things of the relevant primitive 
kind exist. This is because we only succeed in giving them the content we want them to 
have if there are less basic things available which are correctly understood in the way that 
we specify in terms of our target primitive. If there are no such non-basic things available, 
or the non-basic things we choose are in fact properly understood in some way other than 
that which we propose, then our attempt to fix the content of our primitive does not 
succeed. Without the content it would need to serve as a primitive, our term cannot be 
used as one, it can only seem to be so used.  
We need it to have the requisite content in order to provide with it an answer to the 
ontological question. Further, if a primitive lacks requisite content, then all the words 
defined in terms of it within a theory will also lack requisite content, so the problem of a 
lack of appropriate content for the primitive kind terms of a theory becomes a problem of 
lack of appropriate content for all the kind terms of that theory.  
So, the presupposition problem arises for primitive kind terms19, and predicates which 
incorporate such terms, because if we get the answer to the question of how the world is 
made up wrong, then the putative primitive kind terms, or primitive kind predicates, that 
we try to use in giving this answer will fail to have the content they need to have in order 
to be used. The kind terms and the predicates incorporating them will also fail to have the 
content they need to have in order for someone to claim using them that our position is 
wrong. It is only if we get the answer to the question of how the world is made up right 
that we will succeed in providing our primitives with the content they need to be used. 
                                                          
19 The presupposition problem will also arise for non-basic kind terms understood in terms of a basic kind term but 
in a slightly different way. What is presupposed will still just be that there are things of the basic kind.  
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But if our primitive kind terms and the predicates which incorporate them depend for their 
content on the existence of entities of the kinds apparently in question, then these terms 
cannot plausibly feature in the sentences with which we claim that entities of these kinds 
exist.  
Two final points should be made.  
First, in claiming that we when we go wrong we don’t succeed in fixing the requisite 
content for our putative primitives, I do not claim that we do not endow them with any 
significance at all. We can clearly make some sense out of incompatible answers to the 
ontological question and the fact that we can do so must be accommodated. However, 
this is a common problem for semantic presupposition. We can clearly make some sense 
out of claims about Vulcan. The claim that words have some significance can plausibly 
be taken to be compatible with the claim that they nevertheless fail in one way or another 
to have the meaning they would require to occur as intended in truth apt sentences. How 
they do so is a problem I shall address briefly in chapter three.  
Second, I have raised the problem for those kind terms which should be understood to 
correspond to primitive kind notions made intelligible through the less basic notions 
which are understood or defined in terms of them, and which are such as to provide an 
answer to the ontological question. Which notions these are remains an open question and 
my argument is not intended to be specific to any answer to it. Whatever the answer is, 
having the putative primitive kind term occur in a predicate would not allow one to evade 
the task of specifying its content. One would need to specify its content in order to say 
what was required to satisfy this predicate and, once one faced that explanatory task, all 
the problems discussed above would arise again.  So, locating the intended content of the 
category or kind terms that we want to use to answer the ontological question in the 
predicate will not allow us to avoid the presupposition problem. Taking categorial 
existence claims to have the form ‘There exists an x such that x is an F’ is not tenable. 
We need to find an alternative construal for the existence claims with which we say what 
it is that our variables range over.  
 
§9.8 
The discussion over the course of the last few sections focused on the construal of 
existence claims as being of the form ‘There exists an x such that x is an F’ i.e. ‘ƎxFx’. I 
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argued that this approach is taken by many to allow one to say what there is without 
presupposing the existence of the entities that one is claiming exist. I argued that, in fact, 
locating the content of the category/kind term in the predicate does not allow one to do 
this and so the approach should be rejected. At the beginning of the discussion I said that, 
although the argument against the approach would not be specific to any philosopher’s 
version of it, I would give examples of philosophers who take the approach at the end of 
the section. That is what I shall do in this section. I shall focus on two different 
philosophers, Peter van Inwagen, and Gottlob Frege, both of whom, in very different 
ways, provide construals of existence statements which locate the content of the category 
term being used to say what there is in the predicate. They also both take these existence 
statements to be of the form ‘There exists an x such that x is an F’ but they construe this 
form in different ways. My objection to both will be that their approaches run afoul of the 
argument made in this section. I shall argue that they are not able to provide the intended 
content to the predicates included in their existence statements unless entities of the kind 
in question exist.  
I shall consider van Inwagen first because his construal of existence statements is more 
straightforward in some respects than Frege’s and is closer to what I take to be the default 
approach taken to existence claims by philosophers.  
§10 
At first glance, van Inwagen’s (2014) account of existence statements seems to threaten 
to run afoul of the presupposition problem for existence statements in the most obvious 
way possible. To defend the univocity of the notion of existence/being, van Inwagen 
connects the notion of existence with that of cardinal number and argues that since the 
latter is clearly univocal the former must be so also (van Inwagen, 2014, 61-3). He credits 
Frege with the recognition of the connection between statements of cardinal number and 
statements of existence, quoting, and endorsing, Frege’s claim that “Existence is 
analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is nothing but denial of the number zero” 
(Frege, 1884/2007, 65). However, van Inwagen does not propose to understand either of 
these types of statement in the same way that Frege does.  
As I shall discuss in more detail below, Frege construes both statements of number and 
statements of existence as claims that certain first-order concepts fall under certain 
second-order concepts. van Inwagen contends that such a construal fails to capture the 
content of existence claims. He insists an existence claim such as ‘Horses exist’ is about 
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the objects in question, the horses, and not about the first-order concept, ‘…is a horse’. 
To maintain the connection with number which he is using to defend the univocity of the 
notion of existence while accommodating his claim that existence claims are about 
objects, not concepts or properties20, van Inwagen provides his own construal of the 
statements of number with which he is connecting existence claims. On his account, 
statements of existence such as ‘Fs exist’ are equivalent to statements of the form ‘The 
number of Fs is not zero’ and the latter statements should be understood to feature 
variably polyadic predicates of the form ‘The number of …is not zero’. This variably 
polyadic predicate is predicated of the objects in question, the horses.  
But it does not follow from these things that I have conceded that the predicate 
‘the number of…is not zero’ is a predicate of concepts. I would say that on a given 
occasion of use, it predicates of certain things that they number more than zero’ 
(van Inwagen, 2014, 62) 
 
The reason why this approach seems to fall afoul of the most obvious version of the 
presupposition problem for existence statements is that it seems that on this construal to 
say that horses exist is say something about the very things in question, i.e. that they 
satisfy a certain variably polyadic predicate, ‘the number of…is not zero.’. If this is the 
right way to understand van Inwagen’s proposal, then that construal is untenable because 
such existence claims would presuppose exactly what they were being used to assert and 
the proposed analysis would be unable to handle true negative or false positive existence 
claims. However, there is reason to think that this is not the right way to understand van 
Inwagen’s proposal because he also gives another formulation of existence claims which 
he takes to be equivalent to the first. In presenting the alternative formulation he is more 
careful to at least attempt to avoid obvious presupposition of the truth of the existence 
claim in question. Since the alternative formulation is supposed to be equivalent to the 
first, we should favour an interpretation of the first which avoids taking it to have such 
obviously problematic presuppositions. The second formulation van Inwagen defends is 
a version of the traditional existentially quantified construal of the claim that there are 
horses. The claimed equivalence between the first formulation and this one suggests that 
the way of avoiding taking the first formulation to fall afoul of the presupposition problem 
                                                          
20 If the existence claim in question was that properties existed, van Inwagen would, presumably allow 
that such a claim would be about properties. The claim is just that statements that certain objects exist 
should not be understood to be statements about some corresponding property.  
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in the most obvious way is to focus on the fact that ‘Horses’ seems to be taken by van 
Inwagen to be a predicate. For example, he writes that:  
When I say affirmation of existence is denial of the number zero, I mean only that 
to say that Fs exist is to say that the number of Fs is not zero. For example, in my 
view, ‘Horses exist’ is equivalent to ‘The number of horses is not zero.’ (van 
Inwagen, 2014, 61) 
In the above quotation, ‘Horses’ is symbolized by van Inwagen with a capital F suggesting 
that it is intended to be understood as a predicate. But, if ‘horses’ is a predicate of objects 
and ‘the number of…is not zero’ is a predicate of objects, we need to take as implicit in 
the sentence some introduction of the objects being talked about. In light of this, one way 
to proceed is to understand the first formulation of existence statements, as well as the 
second, to involve existential quantification. Adapting the construal of the existential 
quantifier which van Inwagen goes on to provide in connection with his second 
formulation, this approach would interpret ‘Horses exist’ as ‘It is true of some things that 
they are horses and the number of those things is not zero’. On this formulation, van 
Inwagen’s first construal of existence statements is not guilty of the most obvious version 
of presupposition of the existence of the things in question. This version is now 
recognisable as a version of the approach discussed above whereby the content being used 
to say what exists is located in the predicate and so problematic presupposition is thought 
to be avoided. van Inwagen’s second version is exactly such an approach.21 It is to this 
second approach I shall now turn. 
§10.1 
The second construal van Inwagen provides for existence claims is a version of the typical 
quantificational approach to these claims. He argues that ‘Horses exist’, ‘Numbers exist’, 
‘Sentences exist’ etc. can all be construed in the form ‘ƎxFx’. He contends that the 
existential quantifier occurring in such a construal fully captures the notion of existence. 
To explain how we should understand this construal of existence statements, he provides 
                                                          
21 Comparison of the second version with the above formulation of the first brings into question what 
justification van Inwagen has for including the variably polyadic predicate ‘the number of…is not zero’ in 
the first to begin with. The second version will be (very nearly) the first version with the clause concerning 
number excluded. Given that, the inclusion of the clause concerning number in statements of existence 
seems inessential; unnecessary for the work of asserting existence. If that is the case, the connection 
between the notion of number and the notion of existence is weakened and so too is van Inwagen’s 
argument from the univocity of the former to the univocity of the latter.   
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an explanation of how he thinks we should understand the variables and quantifiers 
occurring in them.  
van Inwagen distinguishes between referential and general uses of terms like ‘a cat’. 
Roughly, in the referential use, the expression ‘a cat’ is used to refer to a single cat, 
whereas in the general use, no particular cats are referred to. Having made this distinction, 
van Inwagen connects the use of variables to the use of the English pronoun ‘it’. He claims 
that just like ‘it’ needs an antecedent, variables need an antecedent. However, van 
Inwagen claims, ‘it’ can take either referential or general uses of terms like ‘a cat’ as its 
antecedent, and will function either generally or referentially depending on whether its 
antecedent does. To illustrate this, he gives as examples the sentences ‘Jack saw a cat and 
he chased it’ (referential use of both ‘a cat’ and ‘it’) and ‘If Jack sees a cat, then he chases 
it’ (general use of both ‘a cat’ and ‘it’). By contrast, van Inwagen claims, variables always 
function generally.  
the way occurrences of variables function and the way occurrences of the third 
person singular pronoun function- when they function ‘generally’ are essentially 
the same. (van Inwagen, 2014, 74)  
 
Having explained how we are to understand the variables featuring in existence claims, 
van Inwagen goes on to explain how we should understand the quantificational 
expressions featuring in these claims. He does not construe quantifier phrases as second-
order properties in the way that a Fregean would. Instead, he claims that (a) the universal 
and existential quantifier expressions of first-order logic should be understood as 
abbreviations of the English phrases ‘It is true of everything that it is such that…’ and ‘It 
is true of at least one thing that it is such that…’ respectively. (van Inwagen, 2014, 74). 
These expressions should be filled in by expressions for open sentences featuring 
variables which become bound when the open sentence of which it is part is prefixed by 
one of the expressions above.  So, as an example, ‘It is true of everything that it is such 
that…’ could be prefixed to ‘it is a cat’. van Inwagen claims that the quantifiers provide 
antecedents for the pronouns or variables occurring in the open sentences to which they 
are prefixed. The universal quantifier provides the antecedent ‘everything’ and the 
existential quantifier provides the antecedent ‘at least one thing’.  
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These formulations of universal and existential quantifiers phrases reflect the 
assumption that ‘everything’ and ‘at least one thing’ are syntactically suitable 
antecedents for the third person singular pronoun. (van Inwagen, 2014, 74) 
 
van Inwagen’s discussion of the notion of a domain of quantification clarifies the way he 
takes quantifier phrases to provide antecedents for variables. van Inwagen denies that you 
need to specify the domain over which you want your variables to range before you use 
them. Instead, he claims, you can just directly quantify over all the things in the world.  
The notion of a ‘domain of quantification’ is not an essential part of an 
understanding of quantification. Quantification, unless it is explicitly restricted to 
suit the purposes of some particular enquiry, is quantification over everything. 
(van Inwagen, 2014, 77) 
 
In light of the above, we can see how existence statements on van Inwagen’s second 
formulation are to be understood, and how they might seem to avoid presupposing the 
existence of the things whose existence they are used to assert. The statement ‘Fs exist’ 
is to be construed as ‘ƎxFx’. The quantifier ‘Ǝx’ is to provide an antecedent for the 
variable x in the sentence ‘Fx’ which occurs in the scope of the quantifier phrase. The 
quantifier phrase provides this antecedent by ranging over all things without referring to 
any one thing in particular. (If it referred to one thing in particular, the statement would 
no longer seem to avoid presupposing the existence of that thing). The quantifier phrase, 
as it were, refers indifferently to all things, and is used to say of them that it is true of at 
least one of them that it satisfies the predicate F. In this way, it seems, we can say that 
there are Fs by saying that something is an F without presupposing the existence of any 
Fs. 
My contention is that this construal of existence statements will not manage to avoid 
presupposing the existence of the very things whose existence is being asserted, at least 
in the cases of the existence claims of interest in ontology, i.e. those instances of the 
formula ‘ƎxFx’ where what is substituted for F is a notion general enough or basic enough 
to make the resulting statement one which is of use in answering the ontological question. 
The argument for this contention is that outlined previously. My claim is that it will not 
be possible in these cases for the intended content to be given to the predicate ‘F’ 
59 
 
occurring in the claims without presupposing the existence of Fs. If the notion of an F is 
basic enough, or putatively basic enough, to be of interest in answering the question of 
ontology, then its content will not be able to be conferred or explicated in terms of a 
notion yet more basic, i.e. it will not be able to be defined from below. Its content will 
have to be conferred on it through ostension, through abstraction from something(s) 
ostended, or in some other way fixed as that in terms of which some less basic but more 
accessible notions or things should be understood. But if the content of F is conferred or 
explicated in any of these ways, that content will presuppose the existence of Fs. For the 
content to be somehow ostended (this seems unlikely), there would have to be an F. For 
the content of F to be abstracted from something ostended, that thing would have to be 
something satisfying the predicate F, so there would have to be an F. For the content to 
be in some other way fixed as that in terms of which some less basic but more accessible 
notions or things should be understood, there would have to be non-basic things which 
were properly defined in terms of the notion F, and so there would have to be Fs.  
§10.2 
To make the point clearer, I shall finish my consideration of van Inwagen’s position by 
illustrating my objection by applying it to some cases of existence claims apt to provide 
a partial answer to the ontological question which van Inwagen considers. van Inwagen’s 
approach to ontology is a realist one. He presents it as a broadly Quinean approach and 
defends a number of Quinean positions. He claims that the existence statements that 
philosophers are interested in are ones that have to be clarified through the application of 
the notion of ontological commitment. The explanation he provides of what this will 
involve is that we should accept the existence of those things that we need our variables 
to range over in order for the sentences of our best science to come out true. If a 
paraphrase can be provided for a sentence which avoids the need for the variables to range 
to over some kinds of things that it was thought they needed to be able to range over, then 
that paraphrase will show that we do not need to allow our variables to range over such 
things to have our target sentences come out true. But such paraphrases are difficult to 
provide. To show this he considers a fictional nominalist, Norma, and draws out the 
difficulties that beset her attempt to be consistent in advocating nominalism (van 
Inwagen, 2014, 80-4). 
van Inwagen sets up the basic difficulty for Norma by noting that the very statements she 
would make to assert and defend her nominalism would imply the falsity of her position.  
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Something ‘Norma the nominalist' might say is: “Although there are true 
sentences that appear to imply the existence of abstract objects, these sentences 
do not really have that implication”. That sentence logically implies (or certainly 
seems to) that there are sentences - for the same straightforward reason that “There 
are biological weapons hidden somewhere in Iraq” certainly seems to have ‘There 
are weapons’ among its logical consequences 
But, van Inwagen notes: 
it is obvious from the context that the open sentence ‘x is a sentence’ is to be 
understood in such a way that ‘∀x(x is sentence → x is an abstract object)’ is 
indisputably true. Therefore, Norma’s statement at least appears to imply the 
falsity of ‘¬∃x(x is an abstract object)’ – that is the falsity of nominalism.  
(van Inwagen, 2014, 81) 
 
What is important about this for my purposes is that the content of the predicate ‘…is a 
sentence’, how it is to be understood, is what undermines Norma’s claim that there are no 
abstract objects. There is a way that the predicate, or the relevant open sentence, should 
be, or is intended to be, understood, and the content that it has when it is understood that 
way prevents nominalists consistently talking in terms of things which satisfy it. Could 
they nevertheless use the predicate without becoming inconsistent? Could they, for 
instance, say ¬∃x(x is a sentence)? Well, what would it be that they were saying nothing 
was? They cannot be saying that nothing is the kind of thing that different sentence tokens 
are tokens of because they do not think inscribed sentences are tokens of any type and so 
they will not think that the above description determines any kind. There are a number of 
things that they might say that would seem to imply that there was no thing of a kind such 
as they knew believers in sentence types took sentence types to be (e.g. there is nothing 
that doesn’t occupy space) but although saying something like this would seem to 
preclude the truth of realism about sentence types, it would not explicitly express the 
falsity of it. The content of ‘…is a sentence type’ as realists use it just doesn’t seem to be 
available for nominalists (at least if they are to be consistent). The conclusion I draw from 
this is that predicate ‘is a sentence type’ having the content it is intended to have by 
realists about sentence types is not consistent with the non-existence of sentence types; 
the content presupposes the existence of sentence types.    
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The point can be further illustrated by considering the debate van Inwagen considers 
between a nominalist and a realist who accepts the existence of species. Drawing on 
Quine’s discussion of the case in his (1948/1980), van Inwagen points out some moves 
available to Norma, his imaginary nominalist, while emphasising how difficult it is to 
make these moves successful.  
van Inwagen’s case starts with a claim made by our best science which both the realist 
and the nominalist want to make come out true; that is the claim that some zoological 
species are cross-fertile. The question becomes: what is required for this claim to be true? 
And that question is approached by considering the question: how should the sentence 
expressing the true claim in question be interpreted? Since the realist accepts the existence 
of abstract objects, he has species to work with and can give a face value interpretation 
of the sentence expressing the target claim. van Inwagen offers the following as the face 
value rendering of the claim that a realist can provide:  
‘∃x∃y(x is a zoological species & y is a zoological species & x ≠ y & x and y are 
cross-fertile)’ (van Inwagen, 2014, 82).  
However, van Inwagen notes, the nominalist cannot accept this rendering of the claim 
because it quantifies over, and thus commits one to, species. So, the nominalist has to 
give a different interpretation of the target claim, they have to give a paraphrase. van 
Inwagen claims that appropriate paraphrases are available. He provides an example of 
one:  
 This paraphrase makes use of four open sentences (abbreviated as indicated): 
 Ax    x is a living animal 
  Cxy  x and y are conspecific (animals) 
Dxy  x and y are fertile (sexually mature and non-sterile) animals of different 
sexes 
 Ixy    x can impregnate y or y can impregnate x 
 And here is the paraphrase:  
 ∃x∃y [Ax & Ay & ~ Cxy. & ∀z∀w (Czx & Cwy & Dzw. → Izw)]. 
 (van Inwagen, 2014, 81) 
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What van Inwagen wants to point out with this example is that we can limit our ontology 
if we are willing to increase and complicate our ideology, our stock of primitive 
predicates. What I want to note about the example is that the point of disagreement 
between the realist and the nominalist over what there is becomes a point of disagreement 
about the content of sentences accepted as true.  
The disagreement about ontology forces a disagreement about content and can be 
mediated through it. Both the realist and the nominalist accept the target sentence as true 
and aim to capture its intended interpretation. What is being contested becomes the 
intended content of the target sentence. The realist’s predicate ‘…is a zoological species’ 
does not appear in the nominalist’s paraphrase. The realist takes that predicate to have 
content such that it appropriately features in the target sentence in the way they claim. 
Since the nominalist analyses the disputed content a different way, and denies that that 
content really contains anything corresponding to the realist’s predicate ‘…is a zoological 
species’, they have to claim that the realist’s proposed interpretation of ‘…is a zoological 
species’ is confused, based on a mistake.  
 
This shows that taking there to be a predicate ‘…is a zoological species’ which can be 
used with the content the realist intends it to have is not an ontologically neutral position. 
Taking the predicate to have this content presupposes the truth of the realist’s position 
and so asserting the realist’s position with a sentence that uses the predicate is not 
acceptable because to do so would be to assert the existence of some things (species) with 
a sentence that presupposes the existence of those very things. 
 
§10.3 
 
The discussion above of van Inwagen’s construal of existence statements was intended to 
provide an illustration of the way that the strategy of locating the content of the term with 
which we say what there is in the predicate doesn’t succeed in avoiding the presupposition 
of the existence of the very things in question. I considered van Inwagen’s view because 
his view is a version of the widely held view that we should consider existence statements 
to have the form ‘ƎxFx’. I have argued that van Inwagen’s view is not tenable. The 
reasons his view was not tenable were not specific to his view but common to views 
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which adopt his approach. However, there is a way of taking existence statements to have 
the form ‘ƎxFx’ which differs from van Inwagen’s in important respects and so should 
be considered separately. It is the view of Gottlob Frege, and those who have followed 
him. I shall now consider this view.  
 
§11 
On the Fregean approach, existence claims are taken to have the form ‘ƎxFx’ but this 
form is construed in a different way than it was on van Inwagen’s approach as discussed 
above. For Frege, and neo-Fregeans such as Bob Hale (2013), the first-order existential 
quantifier stands for a second order property because second order properties are “the 
referents of second level predicates – including first-order quantifiers Ɐx…x…, Ǝx…x…, 
Ɐy…y…, etc. which may be combined with first level predicates to form sentences” 
(Hale, 2013, 13).  So, the Fregean approach to existence claims construes claims of the 
form ‘ƎxFx’ as saying of some first-level property that the second level property of being 
instantiated is true of that first level property: “In the sentence ‘There is at least one square 
root of 4’, we are saying something, not about (say) the definite number 2, nor about -2, 
but about a concept, square root of four; viz. that it is not empty.” (Frege, 1892/1980(a), 
49).  
One problem with the Fregean approach’s construal of existence claims as claims to the 
effect that a second-level property, …is instantiated, is true of a first level property, is that 
this limits such claims to use in asserting the existence of objects. But even the Fregean 
would want to say in some way that there are properties, of various orders. If the Fregean 
construal of existence claims is inadequate for this task, that undermines its plausibility 
because it would then seem insufficient even to make the existence claims which someone 
subscribing to the Fregean position would want to make.   
However, this problem seems to be one which may be resolved. In his (2013) Bob Hale 
develops a neo-Fregean position which is designed, among other things, to provide a 
satisfactory resolution to the problem of ‘the concept ‘horse’’22 and allow for a consistent 
                                                          
22 The problem of ‘the concept ‘horse’’ is a problem with Frege’s account of the nature of concepts that 
became apparent due to objections pressed against him by Benno Kerry, objections to which Frege 
responded in ‘On Concept and Object’ (1892/1980). Kerry had suggested that since Frege took concepts 
to be the sort of thing designated by predicates and objects to be the sort of thing designated by names 
(including definite descriptions), sentences such as ‘The concept ‘horse’ is easily attained.’ should lead 
one to conclude that the concept ‘horse’ is both a concept and an object and thus that, contrary to what 
Frege had claimed, there could be concepts which were also objects. Frege (1892/1980) responded by 
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statement of Frege’s position. Hale allows for this in part by arguing in favour of the 
rejection of what he calls the reference principle:  
expressions can stand for the same thing only if they are of the same syntactic 
type, which will be the case only if they can be interchanged in all contexts salva 
congruitate 
(Hale, 2013, 25). 
Hale argues that the reference principle not only leads to Frege’s problem of ‘the concept 
‘horse’’ but also undermines a crucial thesis underlying Frege’s approach, viz. that there 
is a single semantic relation holding between expressions of different types and entities 
of different categories, i.e. that expressions of different types all stand for something but 
for different kinds of things:  
It is not just the specific relation of reference that holds between expressions and 
objects that is debarred from holding between expressions and entities of any other 
type – there can be no semantic relation of any kind whose domain comprises 
expressions (a kind of object) and whose range comprises entities of different 
types…Since Frege’s semantic theory says – or attempts to say – that expressions 
of different logical types all have both sense and reference, it is – by the lights of 
the Reference Principle – simply incoherent! (Hale, 2013, 33)  
The problem which I mentioned above, that of how, on the Fregean approach, existence 
claims can be made concerning the higher-level properties which Frege accepts, is not 
that which Hale is aiming to resolve23 in rejecting the reference principle. Nevertheless, 
if we follow him in his rejection of the reference principle, that allows us to claim that 
                                                          
rejecting Kerry’s claim and insisting that being an object and being a concept were mutually exclusive. 
However, that left him with the problem of explaining sentences such as Kerry’s example in which a term 
apparently standing for a concept could occur as a name. The problem is a general one, as Frege pointed 
out in his reply, since when one tries to say something about a concept, one will be inclined to put the 
term for the concept in subject position but, given Frege’s general position, insofar as one does that one 
will fail to speak about the concept one wanted to speak about (1892, 47-9). Frege’s response in his 
(1892/1980) is to bite the bullet. He claims that expressions such as ‘the concept ‘horse’’ do fail to 
designate the concept in question (because that concept is essentially predicative and unsaturated). Such 
expressions instead designate an object which Frege says goes proxy for the concept (1892, 47-9). Frege 
suggests that the resulting sentence about the proxy object can still express the thought that a sentence 
properly about the concept might, just presented a different way. Nevertheless, Frege did accept that the 
issue presented a problem which could lead to the failures of sentences to express an intended thought. 
He claimed this was something that would just have to be accepted and accommodated (1892/1980, 54) 
but many others who have come after him have thought that it could not or should not be accepted and 
so the issue of ‘the concept ‘horse’’ has persisted as a problem to be solved.  
23 With his rejection of the reference principle Hale aims to allow for a resolution of Frege’s problem of 
‘the concept ‘horse’’ and make it possible for Frege’s theory to be articulated consistently.  
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relations and concepts do not have to have a specific level built into their argument places. 
Given this, we can claim that to say of a property that it is instantiated need not require 
that property to be of one specific level e.g. first level.   
This mostly resolves the problem of the implausible limitation of existence claims to 
existence claims for objects because it allows there to be existence claims regarding 
properties as well. However, the problem of the limitation of existence claims to fewer 
than those we might want to make and fewer than those to which we might think the 
Fregean is committed is not completely resolved because by construing existence claims 
concerning entities as predicative claims concerning entities of the level above the entities 
in which we are interested, the Fregean position creates a situation where their ontological 
commitment will always exceed their stated ontological position on what exists; whatever 
existence claim is made will presuppose the existence of an entity a level up, and no 
matter how high you go this will be the case. This might not be considered a serious 
problem as it is not obvious that we need to be able to say what there is all at once. 
However, I think it is still a problem and I shall try to show how this is so in the second 
objection I bring against the Fregean approach to existence claims.  
First, I shall argue that there is another problem with interpreting the claim that some 
objects exist as the claim that a relevant first-order property falls under/within24 the 
second order property ‘…is instantiated’. It is a version of the problem which I suggested 
afflicts all approaches to the construal of existence claims which attempt to avoid 
presupposing the existence of the entities in question by having the predicate do the work 
of saying what it is that there is. Since I have gone over the problem in detail previously 
I shall be as succinct as possible in explaining how I think it comes up for Frege’s 
approach.  
 
§11.1 
 Frege’s approach to existence claims is supposed to avoid presupposing the existence of 
the entity or entities whose existence is being asserted because the existence of first-order 
properties is not taken to depend on there being an object which satisfies those properties. 
                                                          
24 Frege claims that the relation of falling under which an object bears to a property differs subtly from 
the relation of falling under that a first-order property can bear to a second order property and one way 
of reflecting this would be to speak of the former relation as a relation of falling under and the latter 
relation as a relation of falling within. (Frege, 1892/1980, 50-1) 
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For Frege, there will be uninstantiated properties, properties of which it is true to say that 
the number of things falling under them is zero.  
If I say ‘Venus has 0 moons’, then there is no moon or aggregate of moons at all 
about which anything could be asserted; but the concept ‘moon of Venus’ thereby 
adds a property, namely that of including nothing under it. (Frege, 1884/2007, 56) 
Given this, you can take the second order property denoted by ‘Ǝx…x…’ to exist without 
presupposing the existence of any particular objects, and you can take a relevant first-
order property such as ‘…is a number’ to exist without presupposing the existence of any 
particular objects, and you can then make the claim that the first-order property falls under 
the second order property. This claim is supposed to be such that its content does not 
presuppose the existence of any particular objects, and certainly does not presuppose the 
existence of the particular objects in question. Nevertheless, its truth would require the 
existence of those objects and so it can be used to assert that those objects exist. 
My objection to this account is going to focus on the question of how the uninstantiated 
kind properties required for the expression of ontologically interesting existence claims 
are to be available to serve as the semantic values of the predicates for first-order kinds 
which will features in the relevant existence statements.  
Answering the question of ontology requires saying what there is. This point is one for 
which I have argued throughout this chapter and which will be important here. I could 
press it against Frege whether he accepted it or not, but I think it is worth noting that he 
makes a point repeatedly (1891/1980, 21, 40-1) on account of which I think he should 
accept it. The point in question notes the difference between using terms which require 
that a thing of a certain sort exist and saying what the thing that those terms require the 
existence of is. The terms initially in question are terms for functions. Frege notes that 
(1891/1980, 21) mathematicians were using terms for functions adequately at a time 
when, if asked, they would give utterly implausible answers about the nature of the 
semantic values of those terms. Later in the same paper (1891/1980, 40-1), he presents 
the move from using terms of a given kind to being able to articulate an adequate 
conception of the nature of the semantic values of those terms as a move from level to 
level. 
 I have tried to show through the course of this chapter is how difficult it is to say what 
there is without presupposing that there are those things. The way I want to press this 
point against the Fregean approach will easily be seen to be a version of the general 
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objection I have been developing against approaches of the sort in question albeit adapted 
to the specifics of the Fregean account of existence statements.  
My objection is based on the claim, for which I have argued previously in this chapter, 
that we aim with the existence claims with which we answer the ontological question to 
say what there is. If we are to do this with existence statements having the form ‘ƎxFx’, 
then the work of expressing what there is will fall on the predicate ‘F’. We might try to 
use novel kind terms for F, or we might try to use ones already in use. If we go for the 
former course, we will have to fix the meaning we intend our kind term to have. 
Alternatively, we might go for the latter course, and use kind terms already in use. 
However, it should be accepted that the natural language kind predicates with which we 
might do this are unclear, and often subject to differing interpretations. The kind terms 
current in philosophical discourse with which we might do this will certainly be subject 
to conflicting interpretations. So, even if we go for the latter course and take a term 
already in use for ‘F’ we will have to either fix or clarify its intended meaning if it is to 
play its role as the part of the formula ‘ƎxFx’ which does the work of expressing the what 
in our claim about what there is.  
My objection to the Fregean approach is that there is no way of doing this work of fixing 
or clarifying the intended meaning of F in a way which avoids presupposing the existence 
of fs. If this is right, then using an instance of the formula ‘ƎxFx’ to provide a full or 
partial answer to the ontological question, will presuppose the truth of that full or partial 
answer. If that is the case, then we should not accept that ‘ƎxFx’ as Frege construes it is 
the form of the existence statements with which we answer the question of ontology. 
Since we should accept that those are existence statements, we should not accept that 
‘ƎxFx’ as understood on this construal is the general form of an existence statement25.  
Part of the problem for the Fregean approach is that, given the construal, you need to both 
give the meaning of ‘F’ and use it to make your existence claim. But, for the ‘F’s that 
might plausibly feature in an answer to the ontological question, all the ways of fixing or 
clarifying their intended meaning are such that their actually having that meaning would 
                                                          
25 It may be that the form of existence statements like ‘There are tropes’, ‘There are mental properties’, 
‘There are numbers’ is not the same as the form of existence statements like ‘There is a red book on the 
second shelf’. I make no claims about this issue either way. My interest is in the existence claims of interest 
in ontology. These are clearly existence claims, so if it should turn out that examples such as that given 
above concerning the red book demand a different analysis, then perhaps we should say that there is no 
general form for existence statements. In any case, if a form is not adequate to the existence claims of 
interest in ontology, then it cannot be the general form of existence claims and that is all I need for my 
claims.  
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presuppose the existence of the relevant things. But if the term F can only have its 
intended meaning if there are fs, then using it (or trying to use it) with that meaning 
presupposes the existence of those things, the fs26.  
To defend my objection to the Fregean approach I need to show that the available ways 
of fixing or clarifying the intended meaning of a term for a first-order kind property are 
such that their actually having that meaning would presuppose the existence of the 
relevant things. It is to this task that I shall now turn. For Frege, properties are a type of 
function: “a concept is a function whose value is always a truth value” (Frege, 1891/1980, 
30). Concepts are functions of one argument place whose value is always a truth value. 
Relations are functions of two argument places whose value is always a truth value 
(Frege, 1891/1980, 38-9). Functions of all types are, by their nature, unsaturated (Frege, 
1891/1980, 24-5). Objects, by contrast, are whole and can serve as the arguments which 
complete an unsaturated function (Frege, 1891/1980, 25).  
 
§11.1.1 
The first option I shall consider is fixing the meaning of a property term. On the Fregean 
approach, the way you secure reference to functions in general and concepts in particular 
is to empty a complete expression of content by removing from it a term for an object; by 
splitting it into function and argument.  
We get the expression for a function by splitting up the complex sign for an object 
into a saturated and an ‘unsaturated’ part. (Frege, 1891/1980, 11) 
Since concepts are functions whose value is always a truth-value, to secure reference to 
a concept you have to split a sign for a truth-value into expressions for function and 
argument. Sentences which are either true or false are the signs for the truth values (Frege, 
                                                          
26 One way out of this might be to insist that you do not need to fix or clarify the intended meaning of 
your kind term. I argued above that if one does not do this one will not be able to make with it any 
determinate claim about what there is, in part because all the relevant terms in this area are opaque or 
contested. One philosopher who defends the position that you can and should simply use kind terms as 
they occur in natural language in your existence statements is Amie Thomasson (2015). In the next and 
last section of this chapter I shall argue that Thomasson’s position should be rejected. I shall argue that 
the framework she uses to allow us to avoid the task of fixing or clarify the meanings of our kind terms 
should be rejected. However, for the moment I shall set aside the objection, both on the basis of the 
previously defended response to it to which I alluded and also on the basis that it is not a plausible position 
to take to defend Frege who certainly thought (1884/2007)(1892/1980)((1892/1980(b)) that terms for 
kind predicates like ‘…is a number’, ‘…is a function’, ‘…is an object’, ‘…is a concept’ stood in need of 
clarification if they were to be used in specifying his ontology.  
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1891/1980, 28) so to secure reference to a concept and fix it as the content of your 
predicate F, you need to remove a term for an object from a sentence which is either true 
or false.  
However, it has been assumed that your predicate is not antecedently understood, at least 
not adequately or clearly. And it has been assumed that you are trying to fix its meaning 
in a way that will allow it to be understood so that you can use it to say what there is. But 
if that is the case then fixing the meaning by removing terms for objects from a false 
sentence which could yield a term for the property will be inadequate for the purpose. 
Such a procedure would meet the narrow requirements for fixing reference to a property 
but would not do so in a way that allowed that property to be understood; removing the 
term ‘Peter’ from the sentence ‘Peter is a proposition’ to yield ‘...is a proposition’ would 
not allow that predicate term to be understood in an intended sense if it wasn’t already so 
understood. Repeating the procedure with numerous false sentences might help but would 
still be insufficient. The only use of false sentences that would seem sufficient would be 
a use of all the false sentences that could yield the predicate along with the claim that they 
were all the false sentences that could yield it and a specification of what remained in the 
domain but hadn’t been named in any of the sentences. However, that last clause is where 
the procedure runs into a problem because that procedure would only work to allow 
understanding of the predicate if there were things remaining in the domain, things which 
the referent of the predicate won’t map to false. But if fixing the content of ‘F’ in a way 
that allows for understanding requires there to be such things, then this method of fixing 
the content of ‘F’ in a way that allows for understanding requires there to be fs.  
 
§11.1.2 
The problem is more obvious if true sentences are used. Intuitively, if one removed names 
from (what one took to be) true sentences which could yield the predicate in question 
fewer sentences would be needed to fix the content of the predicate in a way that allowed 
for understanding. Indeed, something like this seems to be one way that we do fix and 
clarify the meaning of many of our predicates. However, if one needs there to be true 
sentences from which one can remove a name to yield ‘F’ in order to fix or clarify the 
intended meaning of ‘F’, then one needs there to be fs in order to do this; the named 
objects whose names are removed from the sentence will be objects that F maps to the 
true.   
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§11.1.3 
How else might one fix or clarify the intended interpretation of a predicate ‘F’ that one 
wished to use in an existence claim? The problem is: if the term is to be a candidate for 
use in an answer to the question of what there is, it won’t be such as to be subject to 
definition from below27 28. If we cannot define it, and we cannot reach it by abstraction 
without presupposing the existence of the relevant things, then the remaining option 
seems to be making it intelligible from above. Indeed, this is the position that Frege took 
with respect to his terms ‘concept’ and ‘object’.  
Concerning the term ‘object’, Frege writes: 
the question arises what we are here calling an object…I regard a regular 
definition as impossible, since we have here something that is too basic to admit 
of logical analysis. It is only possible to indicate what it meant. Here I can only 
say briefly: An object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for 
it does not contain any empty place.   (Frege, 1891/1980, 7) 
However, indicating what is meant only secures content if there is appropriate content 
there to be secured. This is a point that I made in the initial statement of the presupposition 
                                                          
27 The definition would only be as clear as the term used to define it, and our attention would simply turn 
to that term. The problem would be restated for that term. At some point, if a determinate answer was 
to be given to the ontological question using these terms, we would need one of them not to be defined 
from below in terms of another. It would simply be that term in which we were interested. 
28 The problem I am raising is a problem for such terms as might feature in an answer to the ontological 
question. The problem is a problem of how you might fix or clarify the meaning of such a term in a way 
that did not presuppose that there are things it is true of, i.e. in a way that would allow it to feature in a 
true negative existential claim. It is noteworthy that the true negative existential claims that Frege 
considers in detailing his approach to existence statements do not feature terms like this. Instead, they 
tend to feature terms for concepts which are complex in some way. This allows for nothing to fall under 
them while they get their meaning from their parts. One example of a true negative existential that Frege 
considers is the sentence ‘Venus has 0 moons’ (Frege, 1884/2007, 56) Although this is a number 
statement, for Frege, such statements are equivalent to existential statements: “Affirmation of existence 
is indeed nothing other than denial of the number 0’” (Frege, 1884/2007, 60). For Frege, ‘Venus has 0 
moons’ says of the concept ‘moon of Venus’ that it has the higher-level property of nothing falling under 
it. We can understand the concept term ‘moon of Venus’ without relying on moons of Venus because 
‘Venus’ is a name with a meaning and ‘moon of…’ is a functional expression with a meaning. Filling in the 
latter with the former as argument yields a concept which we can understand on the basis of our 
understanding of its parts.  
Interestingly, Frege also introduces talk of concepts formed from other concepts of the same level (e.g. 
the concept ‘is a rectangular, rectilinear, equilateral triangle’ (1884/2007, 60)). He takes this concept, and 
others like it, to be constituted by component concepts, e.g. in this case one of the components is 
‘rectangular’. (1884/2007, 60). He calls these components characteristics of the concept that they 
constitute and writes: 
In fact, one can also arrive at a concept from characteristics; and then it is possible that no thing 
falls under it. If this did not happen, one would never be able to deny existence, and therewith 
the affirmation of existence would also lose its content. (Frege, 1884/2007, 58) 
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problem for kind terms. Frege does not intend the meaning of ‘object’ to be ‘is not a 
function’, especially since ‘function’ is also supposed to be logically simple. He is not, in 
Kripkean terms, specifying the meaning of ‘object’ as that of ‘not a function’. He is trying 
to fix the meaning of ‘object’, by saying that to be an object is to be something other than 
a function. But, for that to work there have to be things that are not functions and those 
things which are not functions all have to be the same in some way, otherwise ‘not a 
function’ and ‘the expression for it does not contain any empty place’ wouldn’t serve to 
indicate a single notion, that of object. Frege thinks this is how the world is made up. He 
thinks that there are objects and functions and that these notions are mutually exclusive 
and jointly exhaustive of the things that there are. So long as he is right, it seems that he 
will be able to fix the meaning for his basic predicates in the way that he tries to, by 
making them intelligible from the top down. But the issue is that he will only secure such 
an intended meaning for a predicate29 ‘F’ if the world is as he takes it to be, i.e. in this 
case, if there are fs. But then, the predicate ‘F’ having its intended meaning will rely on 
there being fs. So, if the predicate is used in its intended sense in an existence claim of 
the form ‘ƎxFx’, that claim will presuppose that there are fs.  
In conclusion: we need to fix or clarify the intended meaning of ‘F’ if we are to use it in 
saying what there is but all the ways of fixing or clarifying this content which are available 
to the Fregean presuppose the existence of fs. Given this, the use of an instance of the 
formula ‘ƎxFx’ to provide a full or partial answer to the ontological question, will 
presuppose the truth of that full or partial answer. That being the case, we should not 
accept the Fregean construal of the existence statements with which we answer the 
question of ontology.  
 
§11.2 
The second problem I want to press against the Fregean approach to existence statements 
returns to the point that, given the Fregean construal of existence statements, you can only 
make an existence claim about some thing or things by making a claim about properties 
                                                          
29 It has to be a predicate for the purposes of this argument because it will have to feature in an 
existence claim as one.  
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of a higher level whose existence you have to assume in order to make the claim. 
Ontological commitments will always outstrip the affirmations of existence made30.  
Given the Fregean construal of existence claims, every affirmation of existence 
presupposes the existence of a relevant property of the next level along with the property 
of being instantiated. The existence of a property of some level is presupposed by every 
existence claim. Appreciating this lets us see that the Fregean construal of existence 
claims presupposes a broadly Fregean ontology of objects, first-level properties, second 
level-properties etc. which is used to interpret existence claims. The truth conditions 
given for existence claims are given in terms of properties falling under further properties 
of higher order.  
The ontological question asks us to answer the question: what is there? As is noted often, 
in asking this question we are not looking for a list of entities. We seem to be asking, in 
some sense, what kinds of things there are; how the world is made up. As answers to the 
question, object-property ontologies are in competition with, for example, states of affairs 
ontologies which consider objects and properties to be abstractions from states of affairs. 
By construing existence claims in terms of possession by properties of higher level 
properties, the Fregean account is building at least a partial answer into the content of the 
question; for anything to exist is for properties, and higher order properties to stand in 
some relation (and for objects to stand in a certain relation to such properties, otherwise 
we would not be able, by talking about the relation of one property to another, to make 
claims about the existence of objects.) 
The Fregean account provides a construal of existence statements which cannot be used 
consistently by those who have states-of-affairs ontologies such as that described above. 
It cannot be used consistently by trope theorists or nominalists. If we tried to use such 
existence statements to say that there are objects and properties, the construal of the 
statement would presuppose the truth of the very claim which we were trying to make 
with it. However, if we tried to use the proposed construal to say that there are no objects 
or properties, or that there are states of affairs such that properties are only abstractions 
                                                          
30 It was suggested above that this might not be a problem because we do not need to make all our 
existence claims at once. I shall now develop this second problem for the Fregean in a way that makes it 
clear that this response would not allow us to avoid it. The problem of the ontological commitments 
needed to make existence claims on this construal of them need not rely on a requirement that one be 
able to make all one’s existence claims at once.   
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from them, we could not do so consistently31. The form of our statement would undermine 
our claim. The form of the statement presupposes that there are properties.  
One could make the objection that statements of this form need not presuppose that there 
are any specific properties or objects (for reasons given above and reasons to be given 
below I do not accept this), but even one who would make this objection would still have 
to accept that the construal presupposes the truth of the claim that there are things 
correctly classifiable as objects, and first-order properties, and second-order properties, 
etc. Even if one accepted the objection (which I do not), one should still accept that, on 
the construal given, existence statements presuppose that there are properties. Given the 
points made previously, notably that a claim and its negation cannot be given different 
truth conditions, what this makes clear is that neither the statement that there are objects 
and properties, nor the statement that there are tropes, nor any other such statement, can 
have the form ‘ƎxFx’.  
These claims certainly seem to be ontological claims which might be used in answers to 
the question of what there is. Indeed, the question of whether properties exist is a 
paradigmatic ontological question. If a construal of existence claims cannot serve as the 
form for such claims as those in question, it would seem to be so much the worse for that 
construal.   
§11.2.1 
One way a Fregean could respond to this objection to the Fregean construal of existence 
claims is to claim that there is a distinction to be made concerning the questions at issue. 
One could distinguish between the question of what the fundamental categories are and 
the question of what specific entities there are. However, insofar as we are interested in 
the existence claims with which we answer the ontological question, this has the problem 
that it is generally accepted that the answers sought by this question are not lists of entities 
or putative entities. In his (2013) Bob Hale makes a different distinction between the 
questions that might be taken to be at issue. He distinguishes between the question of 
what the fundamental categories are and the question of what specific kinds of entities 
there are. 
The central question of ontology, then, is: what kinds of things are there?...one 
way of taking our general question is as asking what basic or fundamental 
                                                          
31 The claim would be understood as saying something along the following lines: the property ‘…is a 
state of affairs’ possesses the higher order property of ‘…being instantiated’. 
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categories or types of entity we should recognize – where candidates include 
objects, individuals, particulars, substances, properties, relations, universals, 
events, processes, states of affairs, facts etc. Clearly, we may also – presupposing 
some such categorisation – ask more specific but still highly general questions, 
e.g. What kinds of objects (or properties, events,…) are there? Are there abstract 
as well as concrete objects? Are there mental properties (or events) as well as 
physical ones? etc. (Hale, 2013, 9).   
I concluded above that the claim that there are objects and properties cannot plausibly be 
taken to have the form ‘ƎxFx’ as that form would be understood by a Fregean. Given that, 
insofar as Hale takes the question of ontology to be the question of what fundamental 
categories we should recognise, the existence claims with which we provide the answers 
to that question could not have the form ‘ƎxFx’. Hale does not take the claims concerning 
ontological categories to have the form ‘ƎxFx’, but he also does not take these claims to 
provide full satisfactory answers to the ontological question.32 Satisfactory answers are 
provided by giving answers to both the questions.  
There are a number of points that should be noted concerning where such a proposal 
would leave the claim that existence statements have the form ‘ƎxFx’. First, if making 
claims about what there is requires saying what categories we should recognise, and then 
saying what specific kinds of things of those categories there are, and statements of the 
form ‘ƎxFx’ cannot be used to provide the first part of that answer, then, insofar as both 
parts are required to make claims about what there is, statements of the form ‘ƎxFx’ are 
not adequate for the task of making these claims. Second, according to the proposal, 
claims about what there is have two parts which are separate from each other; the second 
builds on, and thus requires the first.33 Why should we accept this separation? Insofar as 
the two parts are needed, why hold them separate? Why not make use of a notion which 
includes both answers and allow the two parts of the answer to work together? Since the 
notion used to provide the second part of the answer builds on the first, and thus includes 
it, why not just use it? E.g. say that there are abstract objects, rather than saying that there 
are objects and some of the objects are abstract. The answer to this question seems to be 
that the first is required to defend the form ‘ƎxFx’ used to provide the second. The idea 
                                                          
32 I shall discuss Hale’s account of categories and existence claims in greater detail later in the thesis but 
at this point I shall cover it succinctly in order to argue against an objection that some might have to the 
second objection I pressed against the Fregean approach to existence claims. 
33 I shall discuss this aspect of Hale’s proposal in greater detail later in the thesis but at this point I shall 
simply give a brief argument as to why we should reject it. 
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would be that to provide a satisfactory answer to the question of what there is you need 
to use a statement of the form ‘ƎxFx’ which clearly uses terms for entities of certain 
categories and thus presupposes the existence of things of these categories. So, you 
include the first part, that concerned with recognizing categories, to allow for the second 
part34which includes reference to entities of such categories. This reason for keeping the 
parts separate depends on the claim that to provide a satisfactory answer to the question 
of what there is you need to use a statement of the form ‘ƎxFx’ (as that form is understood 
by Fregeans).  
I shall contend that we should reject that claim. If we reject that claim, then we undermine 
the proposed basis for holding the two parts of the question of what there is apart and 
thereby undermine the potential response that could be made from Hale’s neo-Fregean 
position to my second objection against the Fregean construal of existence claims; that 
objection being that the construal presupposes an ontology of objects, first-order 
properties, second-order properties etc.  
The reason that I claim we should reject the position that to provide a satisfactory answer 
to the question of what there is you need to use a statement of the form ‘ƎxFx’ (as that 
form is understood by Fregeans) is based on the conclusion I reached in the first objection 
I raised against Frege’s construal. I argued there that a relevant predicate ‘F’’s having the 
content it would need to have, in the way it would need to have it, in order to be used in 
saying what there is would depend on there being the very things of which ‘F’ was true. 
If that is the case, then a statement using the predicate ‘F’, such as a one having the form 
‘ƎxFx’, cannot serve as an acceptable way of asserting the existence of Fs. Given that, I 
conclude we should reject the claim that to provide a satisfactory answer to the question 
of what there is you need to use a statement of the form ‘ƎxFx’ and also to reject the 
position I have taken that claim to support, i.e. the claim that we should hold there to be 
two separate parts to answers to the question of what there is. In rejecting this, I resolve 
the potential response to my second objection to the Fregean approach.  
§11.3 
On the basis of the two objections for which I argued above, I am setting aside the Fregean 
construal of existence statements as statements of the form ‘ƎxFx’ where this form is 
                                                          
34 It provides some support to this construal to note that Hale accepts that the claims functioning as the 
second part of an answer to the ontological question presuppose an answer to the first:  
Clearly, we may also – presupposing some such categorisation – ask more specific but still highly 
general questions, e.g. What kinds of objects (or properties, events,…) are there? (Hale, 2013, 9).   
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understood to predicate the second order property of being instantiated, Ǝx…x…, of a 
first order property taking the place of F. I have concluded this construal does not capture 
the content of the existence claims with which we answer the question of ontology, the 
existence claims whose truth is presupposed by our use of putative terms for entities of 
various kinds.  
As I noted earlier, part of the problem for the Fregean approach is that in order to use 
existence claims as it construes them to provide an answer to the ontological question, 
you need to both give the intended meaning of the ‘F’ which will feature in your claim 
and then use it to make your existence claim. If the need to do both of these things is part 
of what leads to a problem for the Fregean construal, one way to avoid that problem might 
be to find a way to reject the claim that you need to do both of these things. The final 
construal of existence claims which I shall consider in this chapter defends a position 
along these lines. The construal is that defended by Amie Thomasson in her (2015).  
 
§12 
Thomasson takes her approach to existence claims to be one that draws on the Fregean 
approach but changes it in a number of crucial ways. One of the differences is that 
Thomasson explicitly defends taking terms with the meaning they have in natural 
language when using them to make existence claims. If Thomasson’s defence of this 
claim were accepted, then her view might avoid the problem I have raised for the Fregean 
because by rejecting the need to fix or clarify the meaning of the terms featuring in her 
existence claims, Thomasson would avoid the need to both explain the intended meaning 
of her terms and then use them with that meaning.  
I shall argue that we should not accept Thomason’s construal of existence claims. I shall 
contend that she does not succeed in providing a construal of existence claims which is 
such that the terms have meanings which do not need to be clarified or fixed and do not 
presuppose an ontology. I shall argue that the way in which Thomasson’s account runs 
into the presupposition problem shows that we need to understand existence claims to 
feature ontological category notions, construed along certain lines. It is an appropriate 
notion of ontological category which I shall then be concerned to develop over the course 
of the next three chapters.  
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§12.1 
 
In her (2015), Amie Thomasson argues that, when properly understood, ontological 
questions are easy to answer (Thomasson, 2015, 112-4) and the answers are usually 
positive (Thomasson, 2015, 145). Understanding this, she claims, leads one to both a 
deflationary metaontological position and also to a position Thomasson calls ‘simple 
realism’ regarding the subjects of most first order ontological debates (Thomasson, 2015, 
112-4). Thomasson’s construal of the notion of existence is crucial to her argument for 
this result. On her account, many existence claims turn out to be trivially true because the 
rules of use for relevant terms license the inference of the existence claims from widely 
accepted truths (Thomasson, 2015, 145-57), or sometimes, it seems, from observation 
(Thomasson, 2015, 110-11). The rules of use allow for this because they centrally involve 
application conditions. Application conditions are to be something fulfilled or not by a 
situation (Thomasson, 2015, 90). Rules of use will stipulate certain situations as ones in 
which it is appropriate to use a certain term and this will determine the application 
conditions for the term to be such that the term applies in those situations (Thomasson, 
2015, 89-94). Thomasson avers that consideration of the rules of use for the terms for 
entities on which ontological disputes focus will reveal that these rules determine that 
application of these terms just is warranted by various commonplace situations 
(Thomasson, 2015, 145-58). She argues that this licences the inference of existence 
statements by presenting a construal of the notion of existence according to which to 
claim that something exists just is to claim that some application conditions are fulfilled 
(Thomasson, 2015, 86). This allows her to draw her positive conclusions regarding the 
existence of most philosophically contentious putative entities because she simply needs 
to say that terms were introduced by being stipulated to apply in certain situations, it is 
accepted that there are those situations and so it should be accepted that the entities exist 
because nothing more is involved in the claim that the entities exist than the claim that 
there are the situations which the terms for the contentious entities were stipulated as 
applying to.   
In this section, I am going to argue that Thomasson’s construal of the notion of existence 
should not be accepted and neither should the construal of existence claims she defends 
with it. First, I shall argue that her construal cannot be accepted as a completely general 
position concerning the form of existence claims. Next, I shall argue that the problem 
with the cases I discuss first, generalises, and prevents us from accepting it for any of the 
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cases of interest in ontology. The problem, as might be predicted at this point, is that 
instances of Thomasson’s construal will presuppose the existence of the very entities they 
would be used to assert the existence of.  
 
 
§12.2 
Thomasson claims that the notion of existence which she aims to capture with her 
construal is a formal one (Thomasson, 2015, 84-9). She takes this formality to consist in 
topic neutrality (Thomasson, 2015, 63-9). She emphasizes that, unlike other deflationists 
who argue that the existential quantifier has varying meanings, her deflationism does not 
involve the idea that ‘exists’ has different meanings for different people or communities. 
Instead, along with defenders of realism about metaontology (van Inwagen, 2009) (Sider, 
2011) Thomasson proposes to understand ‘exists’ as univocal. She proposes the following 
as “an invariant core formal rule of use” (Thomasson, 2015, 83) for ‘exists’: 
“E: Ks exist iff the application conditions actually associated with ‘K’ are fulfilled” 
(Thomasson, 2015, 86)  
This construal of ‘exists’ is introduced by Thomasson as related to the Fregean 
understanding of ‘exists’ as a second order quantifier but Thomasson notes and accepts 
objections that claims of existence are not claims about either concepts or words 
(Thomasson, 2015, 85-7). She remarks that accepting the biconditional ‘the proposition 
that p is true iff p’ does not involve taking ‘p’ to be about a proposition (Thomasson, 
2015, 87). Similarly, she contends, we can accept her biconditional as expressing a core 
rule of use for ‘exists’ without taking existence claims to be about terms; the term ‘K’ is 
used in the existence claim on the left-hand side but only mentioned in the right-hand side 
explication of that claim. Thomasson speaks of this as “moving up and down the semantic 
scale” (Thomasson, 2015, 87).  
 
§12.2.1 
As noted in §12.1, Thomasson’s construal of existence plays a very important role in her 
argument for metaontological deflationism, and her explicating biconditional is supposed 
to express a core formal rule of use for ‘exists’, a rule which does not vary regardless of 
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the topic discussed. In this section, I shall argue that the claim that her construal can be 
accepted in a completely general way should not be accepted. My argument for that 
conclusion relies on Thomasson’s use of the notions of application conditions and 
situations, so in this sub-section I am going to discuss Thomasson’s treatment of 
application conditions and situations.  
Thomasson’s arguments centrally involve the notion of application conditions. This leads 
her to raise and attempt to answer the question “What are application conditions?” 
(Thomasson, 2015, 89). The importance of this being a legitimate question is something 
which I shall return to but for the moment I shall follow her in addressing the question 
itself. Thomasson defines application conditions as semantic rules which specify the 
situations in which a speaker is entitled to apply a term (Thomasson, 2015, 89-96).  
One objection that might be raised against her construal is that we do not always have to 
know exactly what is required of the world to justify the application of a term that we are 
nevertheless competent users of. To allow for the insights of causal theories of reference 
which might address this objection, Thomasson allows that application conditions may 
“involve deference to experts and to the world” (e.g. the application of a kind term might 
require that something be of the same composition as an originally ostended thing, but 
we might not know what that involved). For Thomasson, application conditions “need 
not be descriptive” (Thomasson, 2015, 94).  
Another point that someone might raise is the point that competent users of terms may 
not have complete or accurate propositional knowledge concerning the conditions in 
which it is appropriate to use the terms that they use. This is specifically accommodated 
in Thomasson’s account. She explicitly affirms that mastery of rules does not require the 
ability to articulate the rules mastered and specifies that competent users of terms of a 
language need to be able to apply and refuse these terms correctly but don’t need to be 
able to articulate the rules they are using in doing so (Thomasson, 2015, 91-3). 
Thomasson also attempts to allow for semantically basic terms by not requiring that all 
application conditions be stateable. Semantically basic terms are still to have application 
conditions, but these conditions are to be such that they will not be stated using other 
terms with application conditions (Thomasson, 2015, 91-3). Instead, the application 
conditions for these terms may be defined directly in terms of the situations in which the 
terms will and will not apply (Thomasson, 2015, 91-3). Importantly, even in these cases, 
Thomasson is still thinking in terms of the fulfilment of application conditions.  
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it is plausible that any language must include some ‘semantically basic terms’, 
that is terms that cannot be learned just by way of learning definitions stated in 
other terms…speakers may learn to master the rules of use for those terms by 
other means, for example, ostensively, we learn that a term is to be applied in 
situations like this (and not in situations like that), or via judgements of similarity 
to ostended paradigms (Thomasson, 2015, 92). 
 
In a section specifically addressing existence claims made using putatively basic terms, 
Thomasson reiterates this position. In this section, she is concerned to deny that there are 
any terms ‘K’ which are such that determining whether the application conditions for ‘K’ 
apply would involve determining whether Ks exist (Thomasson, 2015, 96-112).  This, 
she takes it, would provide a justification for non-deflationary metaontological positions 
at least with respect to the question of the existence of Ks.  
To address the issue, Thomasson first distinguishes two senses of basicness for terms. 
Terms might be thought to be basic in the sense that we learn them before learning any 
other terms or alternatively terms might be thought to be basic in the sense that they are 
to stand for ontologically basic entities. Existence claims involving terms with the second 
sort of basicness are quickly dismissed as not presenting the sort of problems in question 
i.e. as not being such that the application of the term depends on there being such things 
as those in question. The basis for this conclusion is the contention that existence claims 
involving terms for certain putatively ontologically basic entities, specifically numbers 
and propositions, can plausibly be addressed using the deflationary metaontological 
approach (Thomasson, 2015, 104). 
On the issue of conceptually basic terms, Thomasson makes two claims. First, she claims 
that although terms which are basic to a conceptual scheme may not actually be learnt 
through definitions stated in other terms, it may be that they could be so learnt. If we can 
provide definitions of application conditions for terms which are actually conceptually 
basic, then we can show that these terms could be learnt on the basis of mastery of other 
terms. The fact that they are not so learnt is to be understood as an idiosyncrasy of the 
particular language. Thomasson reiterates this point later in the book in defending her 
view against Hofweber’s objections. 
if we took that view, then what things there really are would have to parallel what 
terms happen to appear originally as (underived) nouns in our language. If we 
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spoke a different language, say a fundamentally feature placing language or van 
Inwagenese…we would come to very different conclusions about what ‘objects’ 
‘really exist’ ‘out there in reality’…What objects we accept as ‘out there in reality’ 
shouldn’t hinge in this way on what terms happen to be basic versus derived in 
our language. (Thomasson, 2015, 283) 
It is worth noting that it is an assumption of this first argument that the terms which are 
basic in our language merely happen to be so. We might easily have happened to speak a 
feature placing language instead of the language we do speak. This is an assumption 
which one might want to reject but for the moment I shall not pursue this objection.  
The second claim that Thomasson makes about existence claims involving conceptually 
basic terms is the claim that even if we were to find that there are terms say ‘K’ such that 
we cannot give a definition of their application conditions using other terms, it still 
wouldn’t be the case that the application conditions for such a term ‘K’ required the 
existence of a K and so blocked the deflationary approach. Instead, Thomasson contends, 
we would just have a case where there were application conditions which situations would 
fulfil or fail to fulfil but we would determine directly by observation of situations whether 
the situations fulfilled the application conditions (Thomasson, 2015, 110-112). 
As an example of such a case, Thomasson considers the case of the ‘object’ considered 
as a sortal and contends that: 
In determining whether the object concept applies…they [infants] make use of 
perceptual information, using what Carey calls ‘perceptual input analysers’ that 
track such input as spatiotemporal continuity, boundedness and cohesiveness 
(2009, 115). In short infants apply the basic object concept empirically on the 
basis of observable conditions. Those who become more linguistically 
sophisticated and use this conceptually basic concept are entitled to conclude that 
there is an object in a given situation by tracking the relevant features. 
(Thomasson, 2015, 110-11) 
 
Thomasson dismisses as ill-formed the idea of a notion of object which is neither a sortal 
in its own right nor what she calls a covering sortal (a sortal which applies whenever any 
sortal does). This is something to which I shall return below but first there is one more 
point to make about the framework which Thomasson uses to provide her deflationary 
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ontological position. It is a point which I shall contend is related to Thomasson’s dismissal 
of the non-sortal notion of ‘object’. The final point to note concerns the role of situations.  
For Thomasson, situations are what fulfil application conditions. Above I outlined the 
role of application conditions in Thomasson’s account and what she takes them to be. 
Although Thomasson mentions situations less often, and sometimes uses the terms 
‘circumstance’ or ‘condition’ instead, it is clear on the basis of the occasions where she 
does mention them that situations are what allow application conditions to do the work 
they do in the theory. Application conditions are a kind of thing which are fulfilled by 
situations.  
I shall conclude this section with a few quotes which illustrate this.  
Concerning application conditions, Thomasson writes:  
Mastery of these rules of use enables competent speakers to evaluate actual and 
hypothetical situations as ones in which their term (given the rules that govern its 
use in the actual world) would or would not refer (Thomasson, 2015, 90).  
Thomasson claims that we should think of application conditions as rules 
which speakers master in acquiring competence with applying and refusing a new 
term in various situations, and that (once mastered) enable competent speakers to 
evaluate whether or not the term would be properly applied in a range of actual 
and hypothetical situations (Thomasson, 2015, 93) (italics added) 
§12.3 
Thomasson’s account is given in terms of situations and the application conditions they 
fulfil or fail to fulfil. She raises and addresses the question of what application conditions 
are. She needs there to be application conditions and situations which fulfil or fail to fulfil 
them in order for her account to be viable. She needs there to be application conditions 
and situations which fulfil them or fail to fulfil them in order to secure truth for the right-
hand sides of any of the biconditionals she uses to secure her ‘easy’ conclusions 
concerning existence.  
My contention is that the existence claims concerning application conditions and 
situations which Thomasson needs to count as true in order for her arguments to run 
cannot be satisfactorily analysed using a construal of ‘exists’ which is given in terms of 
them.  If this is right, then I will secure my first conclusion which was that even if 
83 
 
Thomasson’s construal of ‘exists’ is viable with respect to existence statements made 
using certain types of terms, it should not be accepted in a completely general way. Such 
a conclusion would entail the rejection of the claim that Thomasson’s construal of ‘exists’ 
articulates a core rule of use of a univocal notion of ‘exists’.  At the very least, such a 
conclusion would limit the scope of the deflationary results of Thomasson’s position and 
allow that some questions of ontology may not be easy. Alternatively, if one wants to 
hold on to the claim that ‘exists’ is univocal, the conclusion for which I shall argue would 
undermine one of the key elements of Thomasson’s deflationary argument and so block 
its conclusion.  
 
§12.4 
How would Thomasson’s approach deal with the following two claims?  
(1) Application conditions exist. 
(2) Situations exist. 
According to schema E of Thomasson’s account, “Ks exist iff the application conditions 
actually associated with ‘K’ are fulfilled.” (Thomasson, 2015, 86) Substituting in 
‘application conditions’ and ‘situation’ for ‘K’ this gives us:  
(1) Application conditions exist iff the application conditions actually associated with 
‘application condition’ are fulfilled.  
(2) Situations exist iff the application conditions actually associated with ‘situation’ 
are fulfilled.  
To appreciate the problem here, it is important to remember how Thomasson’s easy 
ontological method is supposed to work. Although these are biconditionals, the direction 
our reasoning is supposed to take is right to left. We are supposed to determine whether 
some application conditions are fulfilled, empirically or by reasoning from a conceptual 
truth, and we are then supposed to use this to make what is to be a trivial move from right 
to left. Put another way, we can say that existence claims are supposed to be the 
conclusions of easy inferences from the right-hand side to the left. Can we make these 
inferences in these cases? What would it be for the right-hand side of the above 
biconditionals to be true?  
This is where the consideration in previous sections of Thomasson’s discussion of 
basicness becomes important. Thomasson was concerned to rule out the possibility that 
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there might be basic terms ‘K’ with application conditions which were such that Ks had 
to exist in order for the application conditions of ‘K’ to be fulfilled. She thought that that 
would allow back in exactly the sort of ‘hard’ ontology she was concerned to deflate.  
The problem is that this is exactly what happens with the right-hand side of the 
biconditional for ‘application condition’ and ‘situation’. The reason for this is simply that 
the right-hand side claims are given in terms of the fulfilment or otherwise of application 
conditions, by situations. These right-hand side claims are supposed to be true and in 
order for them to be true there have to be application conditions and situations which 
stand or fail to stand in the appropriate relation. When we come to the question of whether 
application conditions themselves exist, and we understand the answer to this question to 
involve determining whether the application conditions associated with ‘application 
condition’ are fulfilled by a situation, we find that considering the question involves 
presupposing the answer. To consider the question, we have to accept that there are 
application conditions associated with ‘application condition’ (‘iff the application 
conditions associated with ‘application condition’…’) and so considering the question 
involves presupposing that there are application conditions (those ones at least).  
Since Thomasson was concerned to argue against exactly this outcome, how is it that 
despite her arguments we get this conclusion anyway? And is the problem which leads to 
this outcome specific to the choice of application conditions and situations as that in terms 
of which to understand the right-hand side of a biconditional explicating ‘exists’?  
 
 
§12.5 
 
Before addressing these questions, I shall raise and set aside an objection that might be 
made to the cases I am considering. Thomasson presents the metaontology she defends 
as neo-Carnapian. But if one adopts a Carnapian approach, and considers Thomasson’s 
position, one might be inclined to object that the existence claims I have presented as 
causing problems for her account are external ones which are illegitimate as such. This 
objection can be addressed and set aside. There are two points to make against it.  
1. One might claim that all external questions are illegitimate on a Carnapian basis. 
However, the actual justification which Carnap gave for the position that we 
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should reject external questions was considered earlier in this chapter and found 
to be easily resisted. Carnap’s basis for rejecting external questions was that he 
interpreted them as questions about whether specific systems exist (Carnap, 
1950/1956, 205) (italics added). On the basis of this claim, along with the claims 
that a system cannot be said to be an element of a system, and the claim that for 
something to exist is for it to exist within some system, Carnap argued that 
external questions lacked cognitive content. Each of Carnap’s premises is 
contentious and more plausibly rejected than accepted. I think the versions of all 
three that Carnap was defending should be rejected. An objection that external 
questions are illegitimate needs to be supported and if its justification is that which 
Carnap supplies, I would conclude that it should be rejected.  
 
2. The objection that the cases I was considering were external existence claims and 
could not be held against the account because of that seemed to have force mainly 
because Thomasson presents her view as neo-Carnapian. The status of 
Thomasson’s account as neo-Carnapian is due to the Carnapian positions she 
adopts, but she does not adopt all of Carnap’s positions on metaphysics, and she 
does not assume the truth of those that she does adopt. She defends them and 
defends the claim that a broadly Carnapian approach to metaphysics should be 
taken. In particular, she defends the rejection of external existence claims and her 
defence of it differs from Carnap’s.  
 
Thomasson argues that the best way to understand the internal to a framework vs 
external to framework distinction is as a distinction between the use and mention 
of terms (Thomasson, 2015, 36). This is an interpretation of the distinction which 
she adopts and adapts from Huw Price (Price, 2009, 324). She uses her construal 
of this interpretation of the distinction, along with her construal of existence 
claims, to defend the Carnapian conclusion that external existence claims are 
meaningless though given the differences in her interpretation, there are far fewer 
existence claims that turn out to be external. Claims that were external for Carnap 
(e.g. ‘Numbers exist’) are internal for Thomasson. For Thomasson, the claims that 
turn out to be external are claims attempting to use terms while separating them 
from their application conditions and thus rendering them meaningless.  
 
86 
 
Both Thomasson’s interpretation of the internal vs external distinction and her 
construal of existence claims are given in terms of situations and application 
conditions. I have argued for the rejection of her construal of existence claims.35 
Since her construal of existence claims is used to defend her dismissal of external 
existence claims, her dismissal of external existence claims cannot be used to 
defend her construal of existence claims.  
 
§12.6 
Having set aside that objection, I shall return to the questions I raised at the end of the 
last section. (1) The conclusion I have claimed Thomasson faces is one she explicitly tried 
to avoid. How is it that it arose for her position anyway? And (2): Is the problem which 
leads to this outcome specific to the choice of application conditions and situations as that 
in terms of which to understand the right-hand side of a biconditional explicating ‘exists’?  
1. The problem with the arguments which Thomasson uses to avoid the conclusion 
which I have argued she faces is a problem with the argument she uses to deal 
with potential ontological basicness in the terms occurring in existence claims. On 
the basis of a contention that existence claims involving two specific sortal terms 
‘number’ and ‘proposition’ can be satisfactorily dealt with by the deflationary 
approach, combined with the claim that numbers and propositions might be 
thought of as candidates for ontological fundamentality, Thomasson concludes 
that there is no problem dealing with existence claims involving terms for the 
ontologically basic.  
 
Claiming that your account can deal with existence claims involving certain terms 
which might be thought of as denoting ontologically basic entities doesn’t justify 
a conclusion that for any term the putative ontological basicness of its denotation 
does not present a problem. 
 
                                                          
35 I would, if space permitted, also argue for the rejection of her position on what allows for use and 
mention because that position amounts to the claim that the meaning of terms is given by their 
association with application conditions, understood as Thomasson intends, with these being defined on 
situations, understood again as Thomasson intends. I would argue, along similar lines as I have elsewhere 
in this chapter that that view of meaning presupposes ontology of situations and application conditions. 
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Thomasson just does not deal with the problem that for any account, it might seem 
that some entities, but perhaps different ones from other accounts, will play the 
role of being ontologically basic. If this is accepted, then to show that your account 
of existence statements doesn’t run into problems when the terms involved stand 
for ontologically basic entities, it is not enough to show that your account can deal 
with terms which might be taken to stand for ontologically basic entities, nor is it 
enough to show that your account can deal with existence statements involving 
terms other accounts take to stand for ontologically basic entities, as your 
treatment may simply show that the denotations of these terms are not 
ontologically basic in your account. (I would suggest that this is what happens in 
Thomasson’s claim that the term ‘object’ fails to be well formed when it is not 
understood as a sortal.)  
 
In order to show that your account of existence statements doesn’t have a problem 
dealing with existence statements for ontologically basic entities, you need to 
show at least that your account doesn’t have a problem dealing with existence 
statements concerning the entities which are ontologically basic in your account.  
 
2. If this is right, then Thomasson’s problem is not specific to the choice of 
application conditions and situations as ontologically basic. Indeed, the problem 
which arises for the Fregean approach concerning objects and properties echoes 
it.   
§12.6 
In defending her construal of ‘exists’, Thomasson doesn’t satisfactorily consider the 
problems that might be raised for her construal by entities which are ontologically basic. 
I have argued that this leads to a problem for her account. This problem requires either 
limiting the scope of the conclusion and letting go of the claim that E expresses a core 
formal rule for ‘exists’, or else, holding on to the univocity of ‘exists’, and letting go of 
the deflationary metaontological position the construal of ‘exists’ as E was used to argue 
for. Either way, there are certainly cases of existence claims, those concerning situations 
or application conditions, for which her construal is not acceptable. At the beginning of 
this section, I said that I would first argue that there are cases of existence claims for 
which Thomasson’s construal could not be accepted, and that I would then argue that the 
88 
 
problem with these cases generalises to all those existence claims which are ontologically 
interesting. I have established the first conclusion. I shall now defend the second.  
 
§12.7 
The reason to think that the problem I have raised for existence claims concerning 
situations and application conditions generalises to all other ontologically interesting 
cases given Thomasson’s construal is that ultimately her construal turns all ontologically 
interesting existence claims into claims of the existence of situations or kinds of 
situations.  
To show this I shall return to her schema E and consider how she uses it to deliver some 
of the results that constitute her simple realism. Schema E, which is said to be a core 
formal use for ‘exists’ is: 
Ks exist iff the application conditions actually associated with ‘K’ are fulfilled. 
(Thomasson, 2015, 86) 
As noted before, for Thomasson, application conditions are things fulfilled or not by 
situations so a fuller expression of schema E runs: Ks exist iff the application conditions 
actually associated with ‘K’ are fulfilled by some situation. The fact that application 
conditions are only fulfilled by situations is important to Thomasson’s easy ontological 
conclusions. If they are fulfillable, they need to be fulfillable by something, but 
Thomasson is specifically concerned to deny that there could be any question of having, 
or failing to have, the objects to fulfil them. This shows that her situations are not entities 
which are made up of components of different types. That would leave open the question 
of whether a situation contained a relevant object or did not and that, for Thomasson, 
would be a re-entry of hard ontology because the question of whether an application 
condition was fulfilled by a situation would depend on a further existence question, 
whether the situation included an object of the right type. That type of question is 
explicitly ruled out; application conditions are defined on situations and are fulfilled or 
not by situations and there is no further question that can be asked.  
This can be seen by considering Thomasson’s comments on the existence of composite 
material objects. Thomasson claims that there is no real difference between what someone 
like van Inwagen accepts and what a believer in middle sized artefacts accepts, certainly 
no difference concerning existence.  
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even if one lacked a term like ‘cup’, but instead (with the eliminativist) merely 
used such phrases as ‘there are particles arranged cupwise’, one could perfectly 
well introduce a term ‘cup’ as follows: if there are particles arranged cupwise, we 
are entitled to infer ‘there is a cupwise arrangement of particles’, and so to infer: 
‘there is a cup’. This enables us to state a sufficient condition for the application 
of a new noun (indeed one for a common sense concrete object) without that 
statement making any appeal to the existence of the disputed object. Of course, 
this is not to say that there must be particles (arranged cupwise) for the application 
conditions for cup to be fulfilled; plenum stuff arranged cupwise would equally 
well ensure the application of the everyday term. (Thomasson, 2015, 107) 
The reason why the above holds, given Thomasson’s account, is that the application 
conditions are defined on situations, generally ostensively, and so the differences between 
the different ways that metaphysicians might take that situation to be made up and 
describe it as such, are collapsed. There can be no question of how the situation is made 
up, so all the descriptions come to the same thing. Our terms have application conditions 
defined on situations and so situations, and perhaps application conditions, will be that 
which provides the content of our terms.  
One other way this can be seen is in Thomasson’s rejection of any notion of ‘object’ other 
than the notion of ‘object’ as a covering sortal and the notion of ‘object’ as a sortal with 
application conditions fulfillable by situations (that the application conditions have to be 
fulfilled by situations is built into her notion of application condition even though it is not 
mentioned below.) 
How else might ‘object’ be used in asking whether there really are enough objects 
in the world to make good on the promises of the existence entailing principles? 
If ‘object’ is not being used with any application conditions at all…then – given 
the deflationary approach to existence questions – the question is simply ill-
formed and unanswerable. 
(Thomasson, 2015, 219) 
If all the terms ‘K’ which can be used in existence claims have to, on Thomasson’s 
account, be terms whose meaning consists in expressing application conditions fulfillable 
by situations, then the only existence claims we will be able to make, given this account, 
will be claims that situations fulfilling certain application conditions exist. For a parallel 
with the Fregean account, application conditions fulfillable by situations are serving as 
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Thomasson’s version of first-order properties and by saying that these application 
conditions are fulfilled (the application conditions actually associated with ‘K’ are 
fulfilled) we say that the entity exists which fulfils them. For the Fregean, this will be an 
object. For Thomasson, it will have to be a situation. So, for any ‘K’, saying that Ks exist 
will be a way of saying that some situation fulfilling K’s application conditions exists. 
Given this, we can see that all the controversial existence claims which Thomasson 
defended as part of her simple realism are conclusions that situations exist. I argued earlier 
that on Thomasson’s construal of existence claims, such claims presuppose the existence 
of situations and so her construal of existence claims cannot provide the form of the 
statement with which we could claim that situations exist. The problem generalises 
because it turns out that all the existence claims that Thomasson defended are claims of 
the existence of situations.  
There are two ways we might understand the more specific existence claims (e.g. 
‘numbers exist’, ‘propositions exist’, ‘tables exist’) which Thomasson defends as part of 
her simple realism. Either way these claims presuppose the existence of exactly the things 
they are used to assert the existence of. On the first way of understanding them the 
ontological part of the claim is just provided by the claim that situations exist. This is then 
added to in different ways by different predications none of which are ontologically 
ampliative. On this understanding, these statements assert the existence of situations and 
the problem is the same as the problem I raised in the first objection.  
A second way of understanding the claims takes them to be asserting the existence of 
different kinds of situations, e.g. F-situations, K-situations etc. On this way of 
understanding the statements also, they will presuppose the existence of exactly the things 
they are used to assert the existence of. The reason this is so is the same reason that 
Thomasson’s easy approach to existence statements leads her to affirm simple realism; 
there can be terms whose application conditions are not fulfilled by any situation, but 
these will tend to be terms whose application conditions are descriptive and complex 
(‘witch’ is an example Thomasson provides. She claims the application conditions 
involve having been given powers by Satan). But the kinds of terms which will figure in 
answers to the ontological question are not like this and given Thomasson’s account of 
how the application conditions for terms are fixed (generally ostensively), these terms 
will only have a meaning (i.e. associated application conditions) if there existed a 
situation which could be used to fix it. Given this, if ‘F’ is to be a plausible candidate for 
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using in an answer to the ontological question, then ‘Fs exist’ will presuppose the 
existence of exactly the entities which it is being used to claim exist.  
I have argued for two conclusions concerning Thomasson’s construal of existence claims. 
First, that her construal cannot be accepted as a completely general position concerning 
the form of existence claims because it is not adequate for claims concerning the existence 
of situations or application conditions. Second, that the first problem generalises (because 
it turns out that given her account, all the existence claims will be claims that situations 
exists), and that this prevents us from accepting it for any of the cases of interest in 
ontology (because on either of two plausible construals of them they presuppose the 
existence of exactly the entities whose existence they ae used to assert). On the basis of 
the above we can conclude that Thomasson’s construal of existence statements cannot be 
accepted as the form of the existence statements with which we answer the question of 
ontology.  
 
§12.7 
The reasons why Thomasson’s construal, as well as the construals considered earlier in 
this chapter, cannot be accepted as providing the form of the existence statements with 
which we answer the question of ontology are instructive. They can help us to see what 
will undermine a construal and what will allow a construal to succeed.  
Part of the problem for Frege’s construal of existence claims was that he needed to both 
fix or clarify the meanings of his terms and then use them in his existence claims. The 
problem was that he couldn’t fix or clarify the intended meanings of candidate kind terms 
and then try to use them with that meaning without presupposing the existence of the 
things whose existence he was trying to assert. Despite the difficulties it leads to, the first 
part of this task always seemed compulsory. In part because the goal in providing an 
answer to the ontological question is to make explicit what there is, to find a way to say 
what there is, and in part because terms in natural language do not seem to have meaning 
which is determinate enough to feature in answers to the ontological question (in either 
precision or content relating to basicness. I argued in the first part of this chapter that a 
term like ‘state-of-affairs’ whose meaning was partially specified but left it open whether 
its constituents were dependent on it or it was dependent on its constituents was not one 
which was determinate enough to feature in existence claims).  
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One of the reasons for considering Thomasson in this chapter was that her account was 
to be one in which the terms featuring in existence claims did so with their natural 
language meanings. It should be clear from the above discussion that this did not end up 
being the case. Defending her metaontology, and the specific existence claims she 
affirmed using it, involved reconstruing the meanings of terms like ‘table’ and ‘cup’ and 
‘number’ and ‘object’ in terms of situations and application conditions. All of these turned 
out to be terms having application conditions fulfillable by situations as their semantic 
values. The things that could be talked about using them were situations. In Thomasson’s 
account, ‘situation’ and ‘application condition’ are the notions in terms of which 
everything else is understood. In other accounts considered, other notions play this role, 
but the role always seems to be played by some notions.  
On account of the role these notions play as providers of the worldly content in terms of 
which everything else is to be understood, it turns out to be incredibly difficult to say 
anything about the world without presupposing the existence of the entities corresponding 
to these notions. This is why sentences about the world having the interpretation intended 
by a metaphysician turn out to presuppose the existence of the entities which would serve 
to provide the semantic values required. Even the existence claims asserting the existence 
of those entities, which cannot be allowed to presuppose their existence, do so.  
Or at least they do so as long as the metaphysician is correct about what there is. That 
which does not exist cannot serve as the semantic value corresponding to an intended 
interpretation of some sentence or range of sentence. This threatens the meaningfulness 
of some of the sentences of metaphysicians who go wrong on questions of ontology but 
the meaningfulness of the sentences with which we express our existence claims cannot 
depend on the correctness of our ontological position. We need to secure a meaning for 
our existence claims which will avoid their doing so. What we want to express with those 
existence claims is the existence of those things whose existence is so difficult to avoid 
presupposing, the things serving as the semantic values of our terms, the things in terms 
of which everything else is understood.  
In Thomasson’s account the notions of ‘situation’ and ‘application condition’ (or perhaps 
‘F-situation’, ‘G-situation’ etc, and ‘application condition’) are candidates for this role. 
In the Fregean account, the notions of ‘object’ and ‘first-order property’, ‘second-order 
property’ etc. (or perhaps, ‘abstract object’, ‘concrete object’, ‘mental event’ etc) are 
candidates for the role. Whatever our candidate basic entity notions are, they will be that 
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in terms of which everything else will be understood, that which putatively serve as the 
semantic values of our terms.  
In the first half of this chapter, I argued for a general approach to ontology according to 
which the goal of ontology is to make explicit what entities in fact serve as the semantic 
values of the terms we use in expressing truth-apt sentences. The candidate basic entity 
notions are the notions for entities which are claimed to do this. But in making claims 
about the entities which serve this role, one can be right or wrong. If one is wrong, one 
will not be able to use terms for the putative entities in question. If one is right, then one’s 
sentences will tend to presuppose the existence of the entities in question (as will 
everyone else’s). It will be difficult to secure the content either way for the relevant 
existence claims but that content needs to be secured. Given the earlier established 
requirements for acceptable truth-conditions for existential claim, it is clear that 
appropriate content will not have been secured for these claims if they are construed in 
such a way that it is secured only for the existence claims which get the ontology right, 
or if it is not secured for false negative sentences concerning the entities of a correct 
ontological theory.  
I have claimed that our truth-apt sentences depend systematically on the entities which 
serve as the semantic values of the terms featuring in them. If this is right, then our truth-
apt sentences presuppose the truth of certain existence claims. To understand what these 
presuppositions amount to, we need to understand the content of the relevant existence 
claims. We will not do so long as we construe them in such a way that their content 
depends on their being correct.  
I am going to defend a construal of existence claims featuring category notions 
understood in a broadly Lowean way. Over the course of the next three chapters I will 
clarify the relevant notion of category and use it to provide a construal of the existence 
claims with which we answer the ontological question. Finally, I shall compare my notion 
of ontological category to others in the literature before going on to draw out some modal 
consequences of the construal of existence claims I have defended and the ontological 
categories which I have claimed feature in them. To begin this work, I shall, in the next 
chapter, introduce and discuss E.J. Lowe’s construal of the notion of an ontological 
category. 
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Chapter 2 
 
§0 
In the last chapter, I argued that there is a presupposition problem for the category/kind 
terms which we use in providing answers to the ontological question. The claim is that 
our language depends systematically for the content it has36 on the entities in the world 
that serve as the semantic values of the various kinds of terms in the language. I argued 
that to answer the question of ontology we use category/kind terms to make claims about 
which terms in our sentences we should take to be referring terms and to what we should 
take them to refer. In doing this, we use category terms to specify the interpretation of 
some range of putatively referring terms. However, to understand how we can use 
category terms to do this, we have to answer the question of how we specify an 
interpretation for the category terms themselves.  
The conclusion which I had reached by the end of the last chapter was that we cannot use 
classes of the putative entities in question or a property of being an entity such as that 
putatively in question to interpret the relevant category term because such content would 
only exist for the category term if the ontological claim it was being used to make was 
correct. I demonstrated this by focusing on the question of how existence claims should 
be understood. The truth of some categorial existence claims is what is presupposed by 
our language’s having the content it does, and these existence claims feature category 
terms but cannot be given an interpretation that presupposes the existence of entities of 
those putative categories. The challenge of interpreting existence claims illustrates the 
ubiquity of ontological presuppositions, brings the problem of presupposition to the 
surface, and forces us to recognise that we need a new way of interpreting these 
category/kind terms that feature in the existence claims the truth of some of which is 
presupposed by everything truth-apt that we say. That’s the presupposition problem as it 
occurs for category terms.  
As outlined above, on the basis of the arguments of chapter one, I concluded that the 
presupposition problem for category terms forces us to reconsider the question of how we 
should understand the category/kind terms which we use to answer the ontological 
question.  
                                                          
36 When things go right and we manage to express determinate propositions 
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In this chapter, and the next, I shall argue that adapting E.J. Lowe’s construal of the notion 
of an ontological category can allow us to avoid falling afoul of the presupposition 
problem and provide a more plausible interpretation of the answers we give to the 
ontological question using category terms.  
I shall begin, in this chapter, with an exposition of Lowe’s construal of the notion of an 
ontological category. Having done that, I shall raise some problems for his construal to 
explain why I cannot adopt it as it stands. I shall go on, in chapter three, to explain how I 
think the construal should be altered to avoid the problems which I have raised for it.  
There are three positions taken by Lowe which I take to be central to his construal of the 
notion of an ontological category. They are the following:  
1. Ontological Categories are not entities. 
2. Ontological Category notions are involved in the individuation of entities  
3. Ontological Categories are associated with the existence and identity conditions 
of the entities that belong to them. 
All three of these positions are responsible for the potential of a Lowean construal of the 
notion to allow us to provide a construal of categorial existence claims which avoids 
running afoul of the presupposition problem. One can see this by focusing just on the 
first. The position that ontological categories are not themselves entities is not unique to 
Lowe37 but, as I shall illustrate in chapter four, it is uncommon in the philosophical 
literature on ontological categories. However, it is crucial to a construal of the notion 
which will allow us to provide a construal of existence claims featuring category terms 
which avoids falling afoul of the presupposition problem. There are two obvious reasons 
why this is so.  
The first is that if ontological categories are themselves entities then, to use talk about 
them to make existence claims will presuppose their existence. If that is the case, then our 
original existence claims having the content intended also depends on this new 
background presupposed existence claim being true (the presupposition of the truth of 
existence claims concerning ontological categories). We should then ask how we should 
                                                          
37 For example, Hale’s (2013) linguistic construal of the notion of an ontological category does not take 
such categories to be entities either. However, although the position is not unique to Lowe, he does 
make it more explicit than others and defend it for reasons which bear some similarity to the reasons for 
which I shall defend it.  
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construe this existence claim on which our original existence claim, and through it our 
original sentences, depend for their content.  
Either we will at that stage deny the need for an entity to interpret a categorial term in an 
existence claim (the categorial term ‘ontological category’) in which case we will just 
have pushed the problem of providing a no-entity interpretation for categorial terms back 
one level to little benefit and some consequence38, or we will insist that an entity is again 
needed to interpret the claim (perhaps a class of classes). If we choose the second option, 
the presupposition problem will simply recur unresolved and in need of resolution.  
The second obvious reason why a no-entity view of ontological categories is crucial to a 
construal of the notion which will allow us to provide a construal of existence claims 
featuring category terms which avoids falling afoul of the presupposition problem is that 
the entities which philosophers take to be plausible candidates for the position of being 
an ontological category tend to be ones which depend for their existence and identity on 
the very entities which belong to that category39. As should be obvious on the basis of the 
arguments in the last chapter, the use of reference to such categories to make existence 
claims cannot be accepted. Such existence claims would presuppose the existence of the 
very entities whose existence they were being used to assert because the categorial term 
in the existence sentence having its intended content would depend on the existence of 
the entities in question.  
The second and third theses are also crucial to the task of providing a construal of 
existence claims which meets the challenge posed by the presupposition problem. The 
way in which the second and third theses are crucial to this task is more complicated than 
the way in which the first is, so I shall leave the task of explaining this to chapter three 
where I shall develop and defend versions of these theses as part of my attempt to provide 
a construal of categorial existence claims which avoids the problems I have raised for 
alternative construals.  
In chapter three, I shall adopt and defend versions of all three of these claims of Lowe’s. 
The versions of these positions which I shall defend will not be exactly the same as those 
which Lowe defends. I shall have argued (in chapter two) that Lowe’s account faces a 
number of problems which require that it be modified. However, it is because of my 
                                                          
38 Among the consequences: an implausibly disjunctive view of existence claims.  
39 I shall demonstrate this in chapter four when I compare the construal of ontological categories which I 
defend to others from the literature.  
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adoption of versions of the three claims stated above that I take my construal of the notion 
of an ontological category to be a development of Lowe’s construal of that notion. It is 
because my construal is a broadly Lowean one that I take it to be incumbent upon me to 
properly explain what Lowe’s account of ontological categories is and defend my claim 
that it cannot be accepted as it stands. That is the work of this chapter. I shall begin by 
presenting Lowe’s construal of the notion of an ontological category and explaining how 
the three positions mentioned above figure in it.  
 
§1 
Lowe (2006) presents and defends his account of ontological categories in the course of 
arguing for a specific answer to the ontological question. He argues for an ontology 
comprising four fundamental ontological categories: substantial particulars (objects), 
substantial universals (kinds), non-substantial particulars (modes), and non-substantial 
universals (attributes).  
Lowe accepts a hierarchy of ontological categories but claims that the interesting 
question, the question that is at issue in ontology, is the question of which such categories 
are fundamental (2006, 7). He contends that ontological categories should be individuated 
by the existence and identity conditions of entities belonging to them (2006, 6) and he 
takes an ontological category to be a fundamental one if and only if:  
the existence and identity conditions of entities belonging to that category cannot 
be exhaustively specified in terms of dependency relations between those entities 
and entities belonging to other ontological categories (2006, 8).  
Lowe’s position is that his four ontological categories are fundamental. In his (2006) and 
(2009) there are categories both above and below these. In his (2013) there are no longer 
categories above the four fundamental ones, but there remain categories below.  
The initial way in which Lowe (2006) generates his four fundamental categories is 
through the combination of the distinctions between universals/particulars and 
objects/properties (Lowe, 2006, 21-2). He argues against collapsing these two distinctions 
into one in part by noting that some nominalists who reject universals accept particular 
properties or tropes. He then argues (Lowe, 2006, 20-33) that the best way of 
understanding these distinctions is as follows; universals are instantiated whereas 
particulars are instances and cannot be instantiated; and objects bear properties but cannot 
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be borne whereas properties are borne. On the basis of this understanding of the 
distinctions, he argues for the distinction between substantial versus non-substantial 
universals (a kind vs. an attribute) and substantial versus non-substantial particulars (an 
object vs. its particular properties).  
If you accept all of this then what you have are Lowe’s four categories with their 
characteristic relationships. You have kinds which are instantiated by objects and 
characterized by attributes. You have objects which are instances of kinds and which are 
characterized by modes. You have attributes which are instantiated by modes and which 
characterize kinds. Finally, you have modes which instantiate attributes and which 
characterize objects.  
Lowe’s main arguments for taking the four categories of his ontology to be fundamental 
are arguments which proceed from his distinction of them and then provide reasons 
relating to explanatory utility in favour of recognizing all four and not reducing any of 
the four to any of the others. He presents a number of arguments in favour accepting each 
of his four categories as fundamental (i.e. not reducing it to one of the others) on the basis 
that accepting it allows one to give the best explanation for some phenomenon. He then 
argues that accepting all four as fundamental provides one with an elegant system which 
allows one to give all of these best explanations.  
Very briefly, Lowe contends (2006, 20-33) that: if we don’t accept objects as fundamental 
(e.g. if we reduce them to tropes) then we cannot provide a satisfactory account of trope 
individuation. If we don’t accept tropes/modes we can’t give a satisfactory account of the 
involvement of the properties of objects in causal interactions like perception. If we don’t 
accept attributes, we can’t give other than a constant conjunction account of the laws of 
nature, and finally if we don’t accept kinds we can’t give the best account of laws of 
natures (Lowe’s account, on which laws consist in kinds being characterized by attributes) 
and we can’t give a satisfactory account of an object’s dispositions.  Central to Lowe’s 
argument in favour of accepting all four of his categories as fundamental, i.e. not reducing 
any of them to, and not understanding them completely in terms of, another category, is 
his contention that accepting all four as he presents them provides the best version of what 
he refers to in the subtitle of his (2006) as ‘A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural 
Science’.  
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Lowe’s account of laws of nature is based on his contention that exemplification is a 
relationship40 which can be realised in two different ways. Lowe takes instantiation 
(which holds between kinds and objects, and between attributes and modes) and 
characterization (which holds between attributes and kinds, and between modes and 
objects) to be primitive relationships. Exemplification, a relationship which holds 
between objects and attributes, is non-primitive. Lowe takes there to be two species of 
exemplification (2006, 121-140). An object can exemplify an attribute either through the 
kind it instantiates or through a mode which characterises it. He claims that the distinction 
between these two forms of exemplification corresponds to and accounts for the 
distinction between that expressed by statements involving dispositional predication and 
those involving occurrent predication e.g. between ‘Table salt dissolves in water.’ 
(dispositional) and ‘The table salt is dissolving in the water.’ (occurrent). If an object (e.g. 
Earth) instantiates a kind (e.g. Planet) which is characterised by some attribute (e.g. 
Having an elliptical orbit), then a statement involving the dispositional predication of that 
object by that attribute will be true. In contrast, if the object is characterised by a mode 
which instantiates the attribute, then a statement involving the occurrent predication of 
that object by that attribute will be true.  
Lowe argues that his account of dispositions allows him to provide an account of laws of 
nature which is superior to the alternatives (2006, 121-55). He takes laws of nature to 
consist in the characterisation of a kind by an attribute, exactly that which he takes to give 
rise to dispositions. When this is the case objects instantiating that kind will be disposed 
to possess that attribute but crucially they need not possess it. Lowe contends that a major 
advantage of his account is that he can avoid a constant conjunction account of laws of 
nature. He argues that such accounts fail to accommodate the fact that laws of nature can 
have exceptions (e.g. when the water is saturated and so the table salt doesn’t dissolve). 
He also contends that his account is superior to other alternatives such as David 
Armstrong’s by arguing that Armstrong’s second order necessitation relation is 
mysterious (2006, 131), and that it is an advantage of Lowe’s account over Armstrong’s 
that it (Lowe’s account) does not have to appeal either to second order relations or to 
general causal relations such as ‘bringing about’ (2006, 144-5) 
 
                                                          
40 Lowe distinguishes between relations, which are entities belonging to the category of attributes, and 
relationships, which are not entities at all and are better thought of as that expressed by primitive 
predicates.  
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§2 
Lowe’s focus in his (2006) is the defence of his four-category ontology. His focus is not 
primarily metaontological. However, in the course of specifying his ontology in terms of 
four categories, Lowe makes clear that he takes the ontological question to be a categorial 
one. According to Lowe, ontological category notions are that in terms of which we 
provide an answer to the question of what there is. He takes the alternatives to his four 
category ontology to be rival ontologies also specified using categories. He lists these 
alternatives as Keith Campbell’s trope ontology, Armstrong’s object-property ontology, 
C.B. Martin’s object-trope ontology, and his own previous object-attribute-kind ontology 
(2006, 10).  
Lowe’s reasons for thinking that ontological categories should not be taken to be entities 
draw on his other two central claims regarding ontological categories ((2) and (3) 
mentioned above) and provide the explanation for his taking the ontological question to 
be a categorial one. For these reasons, a good way to approach the task of explaining 
Lowe’s notion of ontological category is to explain why, for Lowe, such categories should 
not be considered entities. 
Lowe takes ontological categories not to correspond to entities and he takes them instead 
to be what he calls formal notions. For Lowe, formal notions are those which do not have 
entities corresponding to them. Lowe claims that formal notions play an indispensable 
role in ontology; he claims that we make ontological claims by using formal notions. In 
both his (2006) and his (2013), he defends this claim with a number of different 
arguments. The first is based on the claim that there will be irresoluble problems of fit if 
we try to fit entities corresponding to ontological categories into an ontology specified by 
those categories. A second is based on the claim that we recognise distinctions without 
appealing to further entities as the basis on which we do so. A third is based on the claim 
that a vicious regress threatens if we insist that every notion we use in explanation 
corresponds to a further entity.  
 
§2.1 
The first of these arguments is the one which Lowe most emphasises in both his (2006) 
and his (2013) discussion of this issue (2006, 40-9) (2013, 50-66). As presented, the 
argument doesn’t necessarily deliver a conclusion as strong as that given above. It is 
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presented largely as an argument addressing a question internal to Lowe’s ontology, in 
his 2006 discussion of it, or to Aristotle’s, in his 2013 discussion. On this approach, the 
conclusion would be conditional: if you subscribe to Lowe’s four category ontology, you 
shouldn’t take ontological categories to be entities. The force of the first argument as an 
argument for the general conclusion would limited by the need to demonstrate it 
specifically for any given ontology but, although Lowe focuses mainly on making the 
case that ontological categories will not fit into any of the categories of his own ontology, 
there are indications that he does not intend the conclusion to be limited to his own 
ontology.  
In his (2013) he makes the argument with respect to Aristotle’s four-fold division of being 
(2013, 63) and even in his 2006 the argument is not limited to his own ontology. He 
considers and rejects there the suggestion that ontological categories should be considered 
higher order properties despite not including higher order properties in his ontology 
(2006, 42). The considerations Lowe raises against that proposal are the following: a 
category of kinds could be a second order property having the first order kinds as 
instances, but a category of objects would have to be a first order property to have objects 
as instances so ontological categories would belong to different ontological categories. 
Also, Lowe contends, it doesn’t seem possible for there to be category of universals of 
any order under this proposal, given the proposed status of such a category as a universal, 
because that category would have to be a universal of a higher order than itself.   
In making the case with respect to his own ontology, Lowe argues that we shouldn’t take 
categories to be universals because then one of the four categories, the category of kinds, 
would, if taken as a universal, be the universal of kinds, and the instances of such a 
universal would be specific kinds but on Lowe’s view universals are supposed to have 
particulars as instances. Alternatively, if the categories were construed as being objects, 
on the most plausible construal of this suggestion whereby the categories were sets, there 
would be a problem with the set corresponding to the category of object as it would seem 
to be self-membered (2006, 41-2) 
As noted above, Lowe’s first argument against taking ontological categories to be entities 
is focused largely on, though not limited to, his own ontology. With respect both to 
Aristotle’s ontology and to his own, he argues that since ontological categories, if they 
are construed as entities, won’t fit into the ontology specified by those categories, we 
should instead not take them to be entities. In each case the argument depends on 
considerations internal to the ontology in question, such as the position internal to Lowe’s 
102 
 
notion of universal that universals should have objects as instances. This appeal to 
considerations internal to specific ontologies makes the force of this first argument 
dependant on the correctness of a specific ontological position in a way that the force of 
Lowe’s second and third arguments for the same conclusion are not.  
 
§2.2 
Lowe’s second argument for the claim that ontological categories are not entities is based 
on the claim that we recognise categorial distinctions between entities (e.g. between an 
object and a mode) as real without appealing to further entities as the basis on which we 
do so.  
On one way of reading Lowe here, the claim is just that we can make categorial 
distinctions between entities without doing so on the basis of their relations to further 
entities called categories. Understood in this way, Lowe isn’t making a positive argument 
here for the claim that categories are not entities. Instead, he is just arguing that even if, 
as he has already concluded, categories are not entities, we can still make categorial 
distinctions.  
However, his explanations for why this is so involve claims about what we do when we 
categorise. Those claims eliminate the need to appeal to category entities in order to 
explain the truth of a categorial predication and the lack of any role for category entities 
in grounding the truth of categorial predications could be considered a positive reason for 
thinking that the categories in question are not entities. Read in this way Lowe can be 
understood to be making a positive argument for the claim that categories are not entities. 
 In his (2006) Lowe claims that we categorise entities (existent or non-existent) on the 
basis of their existence and identity conditions:  
we categorise correctly when we categorise by correctly apprehending the 
existence and identity conditions of the things concerned (2006, 44)  
and so, we can be realists  
concerning the distinctions that are captured by a system of ontological categories 
without having to maintain that the categories themselves are elements of being.  
(Lowe, 2006, 43).  
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In this argument, the categories concerned seem to be the products of categorising.  
However, Lowe doesn’t seem to intend that the ontological categories at issue here be 
understood as the products of categorising entities.  
In his (2013) he again argues that categorial predications do not require category entities 
as truthmakers. One would think these predications do require category entities as 
truthmakers if one thought that the truth conditions of a claim like ‘a is of category G’ 
were: ‘a is of category G’ is true iff a instantiates the universal G; or that it is true iff a is 
a member of a set G. In the (2013) version Lowe replaces existence and identity 
conditions with form but once again talks about categorising entities. Despite this, it is 
clear that the ontological categories in question need not be considered entities which are 
the product of our categorising of other entities.  
First, if they were, we would need to start off with the entities, but Lowe takes the terms 
for entities categorised as they occur in these claims not to be ontologically committing:  
‘Dobbin is a primary substance’ can be known to be a true – indeed a necessarily 
true – categorial predication whether or not Dobbin is known to exist…just an a 
priori truth arising from an ontological necessity concerning the correct 
ontological categorization of any such item as Dobbin is conceived to be, whether 
or not Dobbin actually exists. (2013, 66) 
Second, Lowe takes the sentences expressing categorial predications to be true, where 
they are true, in virtue of existence and identity conditions (2006) or logical form (2013). 
Lowe argues repeatedly (2006, 52-65) (2013, 50-66) that first order predicate logic with 
identity is based on specific ontological positions, that it is not appropriate for the 
expression of alternate positions (such as his), and that alternative formalisms with 
expressions for items from each category accepted in an ontology should be introduced 
by those with ontological positions differing from that on which first order predicate logic 
with identity is based. It is in the context of this overall view that Lowe makes his (2013) 
claim about categorial predications being true in virtue of form. The idea is that a 
categorial predication will be true if the categorial predicate matches the sort of the term 
to which it is applied, and it will fail to be well-formed otherwise, so that if it is well-
formed it is guaranteed to be true.  
If a categorial predication is true when the category predicated matches up with the 
category which is in some sense implicit in that of which it is predicated anyway, either 
through the existence and identity conditions which allow for its individuation or else 
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through its form, then the category should not to be considered the product of our activity 
of categorisation because it is the basis of that activity, something made explicit when we 
categorise correctly. The idea that a category will be implicit in the form of an entity and 
should be reflected in our terms for it is connected to the other two main claims that Lowe 
makes concerning ontological categories; (2) that ontological categories are involved in 
the individuation of entities, and (3) that ontological categories are associated with the 
existence and identity conditions of the entities that belong to them. These will be 
discussed in the explanation of the third argument below.  
By providing an account of what is required for the truth of categorial predications which 
does not involve category entities, Lowe not only supports his contention that we can be 
realists about categorial distinctions even if we have concluded that categories are not 
entities, he also provides a positive reason for thinking that categories are not entities; 
there is not only no need for, there is no role for, category entities in making true the 
statements which express categorial predictions. 
 
§2.3 
Lowe’s final argument for the claim that ontological categories, as formal notions, are not 
entities is based on the claim that a vicious regress threatens if we insist that every notion 
we use in ontological explanation corresponds to a further entity. This is not an argument 
that Lowe makes specifically with respect to categories though category notions are 
among the notions at issue when he makes it. The argument is one Lowe presents to 
support his claim that there is a distinct notion of form which is relevant to ontology. 
However, when he presents it he doesn’t make the full argument explicit.  
He makes a claim (2006, 45-6) which he intends as support for his notion of form in 
ontology. The claim involves category notions and he takes these to be formal notions. In 
order to draw out why the claim is supposed to suffice to defend the notion of form, one 
has to discuss a number of Lowe’s background claims. In doing so one can expand the 
compressed defence to a full argument in favour of the claim that ontological categories 
are not entities. This is what I am going to try to do in this subsection.   
Lowe claims that there is a distinction between content in ontology (roughly: what entities 
there are) and form in ontology (roughly: how those entities are). Lowe contends that 
notions connected to form will not correspond to entities. Between content and form, it is 
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form which Lowe thinks is most important to ontology and most unlikely to be accepted 
by his readers. It is thus the notion of form in ontology that he seeks to defend. 
The first point Lowe makes to this end is that the ‘how’ used in the explication of form 
in ontology (form in ontology: roughly, how things are) cannot always be interpreted as 
standing for a universal of some kind. The argument Lowe presents for this conclusion is 
an argument for the recognition of primitive predication, or in his terminology, formal 
relationships. 
Lowe argues that failure to accept formal relationships at some level will lead one into 
Bradley’s regress (2006, 30); a relation itself will be always be a third thing between two 
relata, and then it itself will also have to be connected to them and so further relations 
will have to be appealed to and so on. To avoid this, Lowe argues, we have to accept 
relations which are not themselves entities. He contends that we should just insist that, 
for instance, the possessing of properties is a formal relationship between an object and a 
particular property; that possessing is not a relation standing between them; it is not 
another element of being.  
Having argued for the recognition of form by arguing for the recognition of formal 
relationships, Lowe’s next move takes us over to category notions which he also takes to 
be formal. He contends that it is precisely the formal, here the relevant formal notion is 
that of categories, which allows us to individuate entities. It is categories which allow us 
to talk about anything more specific than Dummett’s amorphous lump of a universe 
(2006, 46). It is at this point that the claims numbered (2) and (3) above become relevant 
to this argument for the formal character of categories. Lowe thinks we need category 
notions in order to make reference to specific things in the world, and that without such 
notions we could not succeed in picking out specific things and distinguishing them from 
others. He takes existence and identity conditions to show how we appeal to categories 
in our individuation of entities.  
To defend the clam that we need category notions to make reference to things in the world, 
Lowe focuses on his category of objects and the way the existence and identity conditions 
he has supplied for objects involve his category of kinds. He argues out that ostension 
alone is always insufficient to pick out any specific object because there are too many 
potential candidate entities one could be intending to refer to. Lowe’s favourite example 
here is one of a lump of matter versus what it might be taken to constitute e.g. a statue, or 
a person, etc. With simple ostension, which entity is picked out? Without appeal to a 
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category/kind notion to distinguish between the candidates (even one that is not 
articulated but simply made salient in the context), Lowe claims that it is implausible to 
claim that either a lump of matter or a statue is successfully picked out. The ostension 
will simply fail to pick out anything because there are too many candidates and nothing 
to distinguish them. This is taken to show that category notions are required for 
individuation. In the case discussed, for Lowe, the category notion of object determines 
the relevance of the category notion of kind for the individuation of objects and kinds are 
thus appealed to in the individuation of objects in a way that is prescribed by the category 
notion of object.  
So, Lowe’s position is that category notions are appealed to for the individuation of 
entities. The next relevant claim of Lowe’s is his claim that existence and identity 
conditions are connected to these category notions and can illustrate the way we appeal 
to them in our individuation of entities.  
The idea here is that any notion which is adequate for distinguishing between putative 
candidate referents is going to be a notion which determines existence and identity 
conditions for the entities falling under it. The category notion determines certain 
conditions as ones in which entities of that category exist and further determines the 
conditions in which entities of that category will be the same. These conditions will show 
how the category and/or kind notions allow us to distinguish between different potential 
referents. The different potential referents will be such that they persist in different 
conditions. By considering what we would do in various cases, we can show how different 
identity conditions governing usage distinguish between different potential candidate 
referents.  
In cases in which two initially coinciding objects, such as a cat and a hunk of 
matter, go their separate ways in the course of some extended perceptual episode, 
the correct way to track those different objects will be determined precisely by 
their respective criteria of identity – whence it is reasonable to conclude that 
subjects who succeed in correctly tracking those objects exhibit at least an implicit 
grasp of the criteria of identity governing those objects, and thereby an implicit 
grasp of the categorial concepts under which they fall and which determine those 
criteria of identity.  
(2013, 25) 
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The connection between categories (and/or kinds) and existence and identity conditions 
is taken by Lowe to be such that the latter can be used in explicating (both of) the former. 
In his (2006) Lowe contends that ontological categories are to be individuated on the basis 
of “the distinctive existence and/or identity conditions of their members” (Lowe, 2006, 
6) and that entities belong to the categories that they do on the basis in virtue of their 
existence and identity conditions.  
So, according to Lowe, we need categories to individuate entities and categories allow us 
to do this in part by determining existence and identity conditions for those entities. The 
final point which is relevant for this argument is the following: for Lowe, any claim that 
an entity exists involves taking certain conditions to be conditions in which an entity 
would exist and to do that is to accept a category. Lowe places consideration of 
ontological categories prior to specific existence questions.  
In his (2013) he replaces ontological categories as determiners of existence and identity 
conditions with a formal notion of essence as the determiner of the existence and identity 
conditions of entities. Still, allowing for the shift, the approach he takes to existence 
claims remains the same.  
One is in no position to be able to judge whether or not there is evidence in favour 
of the existence of Ks unless one knows what Ks are supposed to be – what their 
essence is. (2013, 110) 
Once again, a formal notion is taken to determine existence and identity conditions and 
to be required for any existence claim. And, once again, the formal notion which allows 
for this has to be taken to be formal at the risk of a vicious regress.  
Part of the point here is that all entities have essences, so that if we took essences 
themselves just to be entities of a certain kind, then they too would have to have 
essences, and so on, ad infinitum. (2013, 110) 
Shifting back to categories we can see now how the final argument for the claim that 
ontological categories are not entities is supposed to run. Lowe claims that we need 
categories to individuate entities. These categories determine existence and identity 
conditions for entities belonging to them and we implicitly appeal to these existence and 
identity conditions when we make an existence claim. The categories which we use to 
individuate, and which determine these conditions, cannot themselves be entities because 
if they were we would need to use a further category to individuate and refer to the 
108 
 
categories themselves before we could use them to individuate and refer to the entities 
belonging to them, and we would need to use a further category to refer to that further 
category etc. Categories are needed to make existence claims and these categories cannot 
themselves be further entities which exist on pain of a vicious regress. If we are 
committed to the position that we sometimes succeed in making existence claims and 
referring to the entities which we have argued exist, then we have to accept a formal 
notion of ontological category which allows us to do this.  
 
§3 
Having outlined Lowe’s account of ontological categories, and the four-category 
ontology in conjunction with which this account is presented, I shall now argue that his 
account of categories, as it stands, faces serious problems and is in need of modification. 
It is only such a modified version of the account which I propose to adopt. There are 
numerous arguments that might be made against Lowe’s specific ontology and the 
arguments with which he defends it, for example one might dispute whether failure to 
accept his substantial universals forces one to accept a constant conjunction account of 
natural laws. However, I will not engage with such arguments because my concern is not 
with Lowe’s ontology but with the construal of categories he provides in the course of 
defending that ontology. What I shall focus on are the arguments which can be presented 
against the construal of ontological categories which Lowe presents.  
There are four main issues which I shall contend are serious problems for Lowe’s account: 
1. The presupposition problem 
2. The broadness of his notion of ontological category 
3. The duplication of work 
4. His construal of existence and identity conditions 
 
§4 
The main reason I am interested in Lowe’s construal of ontological categories is that I 
think it is such that a modified version of it will allow one to evade the presupposition 
problem I introduced in chapter one. Nevertheless, as it stands, Lowe’s construal of 
ontological categories runs into this problem because of Lowe’s claim that category 
notions can be elucidated and used in a way that is free of ontological commitment. He 
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wants the question of what categories there are, and which is fundamental to which, to be 
questions distinct from the question of what exists. Further, he wants categorial 
predications to be able to be true in virtue of form in a way that is not ontologically 
committing (2013, 65). This approach runs into the presupposition problem because it 
assumes that the coherence of the category notions can be guaranteed in a way that is not 
built on any assumptions about what there is. But they can’t be. In this section, I will 
argue that Lowe’s own system and the arguments he uses to defend his four-category 
ontology illustrate this. If this is correct, then to be viable Lowe’s construal needs to be 
modified to avoid the presupposition problem.    
The first way it can be shown that Lowe’s own arguments demonstrate the presupposition 
problem as it occurs for his account is by considering one of his arguments for 
distinguishing properties from universals. Lowe argues against considering properties and 
universals the same thing by noting that some trope theorists who reject universals accept 
properties (2006, 21-2).  The mere fact that some people do this should not be enough to 
get the result Lowe wants and in other cases it is not enough. In formulating the categories 
of his ontology Lowe rejects distinctions other ontologists might want to make (e.g. 
between an event and an object) and indeed rejects the very construal of tropes that trope 
theorists want to defend. (He adopts dependent modes instead of independent tropes.)  
Lowe doesn’t just need it to be the case that some people make the distinction between 
universals and properties. He needs it to be the case that they are correct to do so. He is 
arguing that those who don’t accept this point and take there to be just a single notion of 
universal are incorrect in doing so. They are conflating distinct notions.  Here it is clear 
that Lowe’s arguments for his ontology are based on arguments about the category 
notions but if this is the case then it is also clear that what category notions there really 
are and how they should be understood are not issues which are ontologically innocent.  
One reason why Lowe can seem to avoid the above issue in his discussion is that he 
accepts a hierarchy of categories and presents the question of ontology as the question of 
saying which is fundamental. So, it seems like everyone is dealing with the same category 
notions, they’re just disagreeing about which categories are fundamental. In his argument 
for a distinction between the notions of universals and properties, Lowe doesn’t have to 
argue that there is no such notion as that which covers both. Instead, he allows that there 
is but says, just like the notion of entity, it is an abstraction from the fundamental level. 
The problem is that given his construal of the notion of categories and the way he 
understands fundamentality for categories, Lowe cannot say this. He cannot claim that 
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everyone is dealing with the same categories but disagreeing about whether they are 
fundamental.  
The reason is that for Lowe categories are individuated by the existence and identity 
conditions they confer upon the entities which belong to them (2006, 6) and a category is 
fundamental if and only if  
the existence and identity conditions of entities belonging to that category cannot 
be exhaustively specified in terms of dependency relations between those entities 
and entities belonging to other ontological categories (2006, 8).  
As an example of existence and identity conditions which are exhaustively specified in 
terms of dependency relations in this way, Lowe provides the case of a reduced version 
of the category of particulars.  
This is why particulars cannot comprise a ‘fundamental’ ontological category if, 
in fact, they are wholly constituted by coinstantiated universals: for in that case, a 
particular exists just in case certain universals are co-instantiated, and is 
differentiated from any other by the universals which constitute it (2006, 8) 
These are not the existence and identity conditions which will be associated with the 
category of particulars by someone, such as Lowe, who takes that category to be a 
fundamental one because it is the form of the existence and identity conditions which 
mark it as non-fundamental. But category notions are, according to Lowe, individuated 
by the existence and identity conditions associated with them, so a fundamental category 
of particulars simply cannot be the same category as a non-fundamental category of 
particulars. It is not and cannot be the case, given Lowe’s construal of the notion of an 
ontological category, that everyone is dealing with the same category notions but 
disagreeing about which one is fundamental. The ones which are fundamental are those 
to which the others are reduced, in terms of which they are given. The question of what 
the fundamental category notions are is, for Lowe, the question of ontology, but if all of 
the notions have to be explicated in terms of the fundamental ones, then none of them can 
be explicated in a way that doesn’t presuppose an answer to the question of what there is.  
Finally, given his construal of the notion of an ontological category, Lowe cannot claim 
that there are categories which are abstractions from the fundamental ones, such as entity 
and the abstracted notion of universal because these will be categories which do not 
determine existence and identity conditions. They will not determine existence and 
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identity conditions because they are not notions which can be used to individuate 
anything. Their status as unfit to be used in individuation is a result of Lowe’s specific 
ontology so a construal of them as such is not independent of that ontology. For someone 
who takes universals to be a fundamental category, this category will determine existence 
and identity conditions and given Lowe’s claim about the individuation of categories, it 
cannot be the same notion as any notion which is such that everything falling under it 
does not share the same existence and identity conditions. In making his claim about the 
distinction between the notions of universal and of properties, Lowe does have to claim 
that someone who conflates these does so wrongly, that there is no such category notion 
as that to which they try to appeal. Once again, explication of category notions is not 
ontologically innocent.  
  
§5 
The next problem for Lowe’s construal is related to some issues discussed with respect 
to the first but the focus is different. The next problem is the problem of the broadness of 
Lowe’s construal of the notion of an ontological category.  
The broadness of Lowe’s notion of ontological category is a problem, both within his 
account and for my purposes, because that broadness results in failure to distinguish 
clearly the relevant and interesting notion of ontological category and keep it apart from 
different notions.  
Perhaps to accommodate the traditional view that ontological categories are hierarchically 
organised, when Lowe (2006) addresses the notion of an ontological category, he accepts 
that these categories are hierarchically organized, and he accepts two levels of categories 
above his four fundamental categories, suggesting as he does so that to do so is both 
uncontentious and, with respect to his own position, unproblematic.   
It is a matter of debate how, precisely, ontological categories are hierarchically 
organized, although the top-most category must obviously be the most general of 
all that of entity or being. Everything whatever that does or could exist may be 
categorized as an ‘entity’. According to one view which I favour myself, at the 
second highest level of categorization all entities are divisible into either 
universals or particulars (Lowe, 2006, 7)  
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The claim that the top-most category is the category of entity is not at all obvious. 
Aristotle, for instance, with whose four-fold division of beings Lowe has compared his 
own four category ontology, denies this. Further Lowe himself at various points in his 
(2006) insists that neither the notion of entity, nor that of universal or particular, really 
denote categories because there are not distinctive existence and identity conditions 
associated with these putative categories. Nevertheless, Lowe (2006) considers 
combining these two positions unproblematic. He later reiterates the categorization noted 
above while noting that: 
The higher-level categories of universal, particular, and entity are not more 
fundamental than those of the third level because they are mere abstractions and 
do no serious ontological work on their own account. (Lowe, 2006, 39). 
He goes on to note that although the universal/particular distinction is  
an important distinction, it serves to explain nothing in ontology that is not fully 
explicable in terms of the defining features of the four categories at the third level 
(Lowe, 2006, 39).  
 
However, these notes do nothing to address the problem of calling these putative higher-
level categories categories at all. The problem is that they simply do not qualify as 
categories on Lowe’s account of what categories are; they do not provide, and are not 
associated with distinctive existence and identity conditions for entities. Saying that they 
are mere abstractions does not help. There are other accounts of what is going on in 
ontological categorization, some of which would hold that what one is doing in 
categorizing is precisely abstracting away from entities, so for Lowe to include among 
his categorical hierarchy some categories which are ‘mere abstractions’ seems like an 
unfortunate and unnecessary mixing of notions within the notion of ontological category 
as it occurs in his account.  
In his (2013), Lowe seems to have partially come around to this point and in the course 
of discussing the categorial terms which he, in that book, associates with identity 
conditions, specifically denies that ‘thing’ and ‘object’ are ontological category terms, 
calling them instead transcategorial terms:   
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But ‘thing’ is not a categorial term: it is a transcategorial term: it is a 
transcategorial term, like ‘object’. It carries with it no specific criterion of identity 
(Lowe, 2013, 27) 
 
However, there is another facet of the broadness of Lowe’s notion of ontological category 
evident in his (2006) and (2009). It is his inclusion of subcategories as ontological 
categories. This remains in place in his (2013). It is a serious problem because if we are 
to have a notion of that which does the individuative work which we are claiming 
ontological categories do, it will not be that of subcategories. Given this, grouping 
subcategories as categories and creating the need to then draw a principled division 
between subcategories and fundamental categories is unhelpful. It makes the target notion 
of an ontological category less clear and creates the impression that that target notion is 
a species of the broader notion.  
That doesn’t seem to be a position Lowe wants to, or can, take. Lowe’s subcategories are 
those reduced to the fundamental categories. Everything there is will belong to a 
fundamental category. One way one might understand Lowe’s fundamental ontological 
categories is as ontological primitives, they are that which cannot be reduced to anything 
else and in terms of which everything is given. But if this is right, then the broadness of 
Lowe’s construal of the notion of ontological category actively obscures this; it presents 
these primitives as a species of something more general and focuses on that more general 
notion. It obscures the distinctive role the primitives play, that of providing the content in 
terms of which everything else is defined, and it obscures the distinctive problems which 
need to be addressed in a construal of a notion which is to play this role.  
The problem presented by the broadness of Lowe’s notion of ontological category is that 
this obscures the important notion doing the work, the notion presented by Lowe in terms 
of the broader notion as that of fundamental ontological category. The broadness of 
Lowe’s construal may have been motivated by a desire to maintain his claim that we are 
all dealing with the same category notions but disagreeing about which ones are 
fundamental. In the previous sub-section I argued that that claim should be rejected. If it 
is it cannot provide the motivation for maintaining the broad construal of the notion of 
ontological category. The broadness of Lowe’s construal obscures the target notion. The 
construal should be modified to more clearly capture the target notion of fundamental 
ontological category as ontological primitive.  
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§6 
The next problem to be discussed is the duplication of work in Lowe’s account. The 
source of this problem is an internal issue for Lowe concerning his distinction between 
ontological categories and substantial universals/kinds. Ontological categories are not 
elements of being for Lowe, and kinds are, but often the same notions seem to be playing 
the roles of both subcategories and kinds for Lowe. This is obviously untenable. The 
problem is that fundamental categories, subcategories, and kinds all do some of the same 
work for Lowe. By the time one gets to his (2013) one finds essences doing some, but not 
all of the work of categories and kinds. However, the reasons for this are not easily 
resolved, and reveal, I think, a serious tension in his overall account.  
For Lowe, both categories, and kinds, and ultimately essences, are understood as 
providing and grounding the identity conditions of that which belongs to them:   
an ontological category is a kind of being, that is, a kind of entities, membership 
of which is determined by certain distinctive existence and identity conditions  
(Lowe, 2006, 20)  
A sortal concept is a concept of a distinct sort or kind of individuals…Sortal 
concepts are characteristically governed by criteria of individuation and identity 
– metaphysically grounded semantic principles which determine what are to count 
as individual instances of the sorts or kinds in question and the conditions for their 
identity and diversity at a time and (where this is appropriate) over time 
(Lowe, 2009, 1). 
The identity conditions of entities of any kind K are grounded in the essence of 
Ks – what it is to be a K. The essence of a kind K is not, however, a further entity 
of any kind, neither abstract nor concrete 
(Lowe, 2013, 115) 
However, despite their similar characterization and vastly different ontological status, 
Lowe does not offer much in the way of argument for his sharp distinction between 
categories and kinds.  
There are four main problems raised by the duplication of the work attributed to both 
sortals and categories (and later essences).  
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1. With respect to objects, the work seems really to be duplicated in a way that 
cannot be accepted.  
2. Insofar as Lowe takes the work to need duplication in the case of objects, this 
raises a problem for the other categories of his ontology because there is nothing 
to play the role of sortals for them.  
3. In explaining relevant notions, e.g. identity conditions, Lowe focuses on the 
notion as connected to sortals and so produces an account which is not applicable 
to entities of the other categories.  
4. In what can be viewed as a by-product of the general duplication of work, certain 
notions are counted both as subcategories and as kinds. But this is untenable. 
 
 
§6.1  
With respect to objects, some work seems really to be duplicated in a way that cannot be 
accepted. Lowe takes objects to be a fundamental ontological category, but he takes the 
relationship of instantiation which objects bear to kinds to be definitive of that category. 
He then takes the role of kinds with respect to objects to be one of facilitating 
individuation. However, as noted above, allowing for individuation is work attributed to 
ontological categories. How can both the category and the kind play this role? It seems 
the category allows for the individuation of objects by specifying that they are to be 
individuated by the kinds they instantiate.  
One place this comes up as an issue is in one of the claims discussed in §2.3 above as part 
of the final argument for the formal status of categories. Lowe claims that the pure thing 
ontologist has no basis for claiming the world involves multiple things rather than just an 
amorphous lump. He claims you need formal categories to allow you to do that. An aspect 
of Lowe’s argument which I didn’t include in the above discussion of it is the following: 
one of the things Lowe is doing in this argument is making a case for the position that 
even though we have to recognise some formal attributes and relationships, we should 
still recognise some universals and/or properties as entities. The argument seems to be 
that the category of objects determines the need for the existence of kinds to allow for the 
individuation of objects (2006, 45-6)  
But now we may begin to wonder why we included properties and relations among 
the elements of being at all. Why not restrict ourselves to a one-category ontology 
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of undifferentiated entities, or things…What, we may ask entitles, the adherent of 
such a view to say in answer to the question of what there is, that there are things 
in the plural as opposed to just something? An adherent of the four-category 
ontology…can point out that objects can be many and distinct, in virtue of 
instantiating different kinds, which confer upon their instances their distinctive 
identity conditions. (2006, 45-6) 
The problem is that there is nothing in Lowe’s account of individuation that allows for 
individuation to be staggered in this way. It just doesn’t seem to make sense for it to be 
so.  
Given Lowe’s account of individuation, our individuation of, and reference to, one and 
the same thing can’t be governed by distinct identity conditions. First, observance of 
distinct identity conditions is supposed to be what determines that we are referring to 
distinct things even when those things coincide. Second, individuation is the picking out 
of a thing and insofar as an entity, a kind, was needed to supplement the existence and 
identity conditions supplied by the category, it seems that what we should say is that what 
was provided by the category fell short of being existence and identity conditions. The 
category did not allow us to individuate. Insofar as the conditions supplied by the category 
had a gap which needed to be filled it seems we have to say that those conditions were 
not identity conditions. They were not a specification of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the identity of a thing. At this point it seems that what is doing the 
individuative work is the kind. The kind provides the existence and identity conditions 
for its instances. The kind allows us to individuate those instances.  
This interpretation is supported by much of Lowe’s discussion. In his (2013) defence of 
the claim that we individuate and make reference to entities using notions which 
determine identity conditions, the notions determining those conditions are entities, kinds, 
though he there refers to the highest kind associated with some identity condition as a 
category notion, insisting nevertheless on the important distinction between these 
categories and the ontological categories which are not entities.  
However, even though much support for the position in question can be found in Lowe’s 
work, the position can be challenged with the argument discussed in §2.3 which I take to 
Lowe’s best argument for his claim that ontological category notions are not entities. 
According to that argument, we should accept that the fundamental ontological category 
notions are not entities because we need these notions to get started in individuating and 
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making reference to entities and if we say that the notions we need for doing that are 
themselves entities we set up a vicious regress.  
So, the first problem is that the work of picking out one and the same entity doesn’t seem 
to be such as to be able to be done twice over in different ways. However, if we address 
this first problem by diminishing the work of the category to allow for the work of the 
kind we run into a different problem which is the vicious regress outlined above. We then 
need to provide notions which allow us to individuate and make reference to those things 
which we are using to individuate and make reference to objects, i.e. kinds, and so on. 
This brings us to the second problem raised by Lowe’s duplication of work between 
categories and kinds.  
 
§6.2 
Insofar as Lowe takes the work to need duplication in the case of objects, this raises a 
problem for the other categories of his ontology because there is nothing to play the role 
of sortals for them. Obviously, the viciousness of the regress is a serious problem, but 
even at the first level of it Lowe cannot accommodate a need for entities playing the role 
of kinds for the other categories. Lowe does not accept second order kinds or attributes. 
There are no entities of which kinds or attributes are instances and so no entities to play 
the role of kinds for them.  
The category for which it would seem most likely that Lowe could provide something to 
play the role of kinds is the category of modes because, for Lowe, modes are instantiations 
of attributes. However, even here, we find that Lowe does not take attributes to determine 
the existence and/or identity conditions of modes. Attributes and modes, although they 
stand in the same relationship of instantiation as kinds and objects, nevertheless are not 
related in exactly the same way. Lowe takes the category of modes to determine that they 
depend for their identity on the object that they characterise. This identity dependence is 
different again from the dependence for identity conditions which holds between objects 
and kinds. The idea is that the object characterised makes up part of the essence of the 
mode characterising it, so that the mode is e.g. Peter’s tallness. Another way it can be 
made clear that Lowe does not take the identity conditions of modes to be determined by 
attributes in the same way that identity conditions of objects are apparently determined 
by kinds is to consider the way Lowe explicates the notion of an identity 
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condition/criterion of identity. 41 Lowe explains what he means by identity conditions in 
a way that only addresses objects and the way their identity conditions are conferred upon 
them by kinds.  This lead one to the next problem. 
 
§6.3 
It is a problem connected with Lowe’s duplication of work between categories and kinds 
that in explaining relevant notions e.g. identity conditions, Lowe sometimes focuses on 
the notion as connected to objects and sortals and so produces an account which is not 
applicable to entities of other categories. This is a problem insofar as we want to hold on 
to the idea that categories determine existence and identity conditions. In light of the two 
previous problems discussed it seems that we should want to do that, but doing so would 
require that Lowe’s construal of the notion of identity condition be modified.  
I think that this is not the only problem with Lowe’s construal of the notion of an identity 
condition. Other problems with that construal will be discussed in §10 so I shall postpone 
further discussion of the construal until that point.  
 
§6.4 
The final problem caused by Lowe’s duplication of work between categories and kinds 
which I shall discuss can be viewed as a by-product of the general duplication of work. 
Certain notions are counted both as subcategories and as kinds. But this is untenable. 
In some cases, Lowe’s duplication of work between categories and kinds manifests as a 
claim that two different notions do the same work for a single entity. However, in other 
cases, the duplication manifests in a different way. It is not claimed that two different 
notions do the same work, instead the notion which does the work is counted twice over 
as both a category and a kind. But this is untenable. The same thing cannot be both a 
category and a kind. Categories are not supposed to be entities, or to use Lowe’s term, 
elements of being, at all, whereas kinds are supposed to be entities of a specific nature.  
                                                          
41 Lowe uses ‘identity condition’ and ‘criterion of identity’ interchangeably.  
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Part of the problem seems to be that Lowe doesn’t have a basis for the sharp distinction 
he makes between categories and kinds given that they do much of the same work for 
him.  
They do also do some different work. Kinds are utilized in the account of dispositions 
and laws of nature which Lowe provides. He needs kinds to be entities for that account 
and he takes the ability to provide that account to be one of the main virtues of his 
ontology. The formal character of categories is used to avoid the infinite regress discussed 
above and to provide the construal of the question of ontology which Lowe wants to 
defend. However, Lowe’s defence of the claim that there are the kinds he wants to make 
use of in his account of laws involves attributing to them, just for the case of objects, 
much of the work that he previously attributed to categories.  
It is not clear that he can maintain the construal of categories he originally introduced, 
along with a construal of kinds according to which they do, in a limited way, much of the 
same work. The problem is exacerbated by Lowe’s acceptance of a hierarchy of 
categories and the broadness of his notion of ontological category which results. This 
exacerbates the problem because in his counting of notions as both categories and kinds 
Lowe is often counting them as categories by counting them as subcategories.  
What follows are some examples of the numerous notions which are characterized by 
Lowe sometimes as categories and sometimes as kinds. Lowe offers set as an example of 
a category in his (2006):  
Sets themselves comprise just one category of entities amongst many, and one 
which certainly could not be the sole category of entity existing in any possible 
world 
(2006, 6)  
and then as a kind/sort in his (2009):  
Another point which emerges here, however is that where a criterion of identity 
for a given sort ϕ does make use of the notion of identity itself, it can apparently 
do so informatively only by alluding to the identity of things of another sort or 
sorts. Thus, the criterion of identity for sets is stated in terms of the identity of 
their members…What criterion of identity is applicable to any given set member 
will simply depend on what sort of thing that set member is – for example, planet, 
number, or indeed set. (2009, 22).  
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Similarly, in both in his (2006) and his (2009) Lowe offers arguments against identifying 
a living organism with the matter of which it is constituted. However, in his (2006) ‘living 
organism’ seems to be a category:  
Thus, the category of living organism, to which an individual tiger belongs, is a 
sub-category of the higher-level category of individual substance or particular 
‘object’ (in one sense of that dangerously ambiguous term) 
(2006, 20)  
whereas in his (2009), ‘living organism’ seems to be a kind/sort:  
my main concern once more is merely to emphasize the difference that must be 
acknowledged to obtain between any adequate criterion of identity for living 
organisms and any adequate criterion of identity for either parcels of matter, or 
collections of material particles – the consequence of this difference being, of 
course, the non-identity of individuals belongs to sorts or kinds governed by these 
different criteria 
(Lowe, 2009, 110).  
Although Lowe may claim that there are degrees of abstraction involved in the distinction 
between categories and kinds42, and in knowledge of them, these degrees do not seem 
sufficient to provide him with the basis for making a sharp distinction between categories 
and kinds. They don’t seem to provide him with a cut-off point in terms of level of 
abstraction, as can be seen from the fact that he doesn’t seem clear on where the cut-off 
point should be. This is a problem as is especially clear when one considers that categories 
are not supposed to be entities at all whereas kinds are. This problem can be viewed as a 
by-product of Lowe’s general duplication of work between categories and kinds. 
                                                          
42 “An ontological category is a kind of being, that is, a kind of entities, membership of which is determined 
by certain distinctive existence and identity conditions whose nature is determinable a priori. Such a kind, 
then, is not to be confused with so-called ‘natural’ kinds, referred to by specific sortal terms such as ‘tiger’ 
or ‘gold’. For, although the members of such natural kinds will, of course, be entities belonging to 
appropriate ontological categories—as, for example, a tiger is a living organism and a portion of gold is a 
quantity of matter or stuff—the nature of such kinds is determinable only a posteriori, by scientific 
observation and experimentation. Ontological categorization, as I understand it, operates at a higher level 
of abstraction than does scientific taxonomizing, and the latter presupposes the former.” (Lowe, 2006: 20).  
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§7 
The final problem with Lowe’s construal of the notion of an ontological category which 
I shall discuss in this chapter is the specific construal of existence and identity conditions 
which it is connected to.  
On Lowe’s construal, the notion of an ontological category is closely connected to the 
notions of existence and identity conditions. Ontological categories are to be individuated 
by the existence and identity conditions of their members (2006, 6) and entities are 
categorised correctly when they are categorised on the basis of their existence and identity 
conditions (2006, 44).  
 
§8 
Although Lowe mentions existence conditions repeatedly, he doesn’t specifically address 
the question of what he understands existence conditions to be. In defending her construal 
of ‘exists’ in her (2015) Amie Thomasson argues against numerous substantial existence 
conditions but what she considers under the heading of ‘existence conditions’ are claims 
that something only counts as existing if it meets some specific condition(s), e.g. making 
a causal contribution. (Thomasson, 2015, 115-122) It is clear from what he does say that 
Lowe is not proposing any such condition. Instead what he seems to have in mind are 
conditions which are different for different categories and which specify the conditions 
in which a thing of that category would exist.  
Although Lowe does not provide a detailed explication of what he means by ‘existence 
condition’, he does give an example of an existence condition, along with an identity 
condition, for a reduced category of particular:  
This is why particulars cannot comprise a ‘fundamental’ ontological category if, 
in fact, they are wholly constituted by co-instantiated universals: in that case, a 
particular exists just in case certain universals are co-instantiated, and is 
differentiated from any other by the universals which constitute it (2006, 8) 
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Here the existence condition is given in terms of a putatively fundamental category of 
universal. For this reason, the form used here would not be adequate for an existence 
condition associated with a fundamental category. 
What is most interesting about fundamental ontological categories is that they are the 
highest kinds. They are that in terms of which everything else is defined but they 
themselves cannot be defined. This raises a problem of how to explicate them and Lowe’s 
proposal of explicating them though the existence and identity conditions of entities 
belonging to them provides a potential way of addressing that problem. However, since 
fundamental ontological categories are the highest kinds, the existence conditions for 
entities belonging to these categories cannot be given in terms of an even higher category 
and so cannot be given along the model of the example supplied above.  
Lowe does specify various relations of existential dependence which he takes to hold 
between entities of certain fundamental categories and those of others (2006, 35-40). For 
instance, he takes modes to be rigidly dependent for their existence and their identity on 
the objects they characterise. He defends an Aristotelian conception of both kinds and 
attributes according to which they depend for their existence on their instances but only 
non-rigidly, i.e. they depend for their existence on having instances, but they don’t depend 
for their existence on having any specific instance. These claims about existential 
dependence are partially specified necessary conditions for the existence of the entities 
concerned. They are clearly not sufficient conditions and they are not plausible as 
candidates for the role of existence conditions for the relevant entities.  
Lowe does not provide examples of existence conditions or explain what he would take 
their form(s) to be or how he would take them to function. These are pressing questions 
which need to be addressed if one is to have a non-trivial notion of existence condition 
which can help in the explication of fundamental category notions. The lack of such a 
construal of existence conditions is therefore a problem for Lowe’s account.  
 
§9 
For the notion of identity condition there is no such problem with Lowe’s account. Lowe 
provides a very detailed construal of the notion of identity condition/criteria of identity.  
 Given the connection he proposes between categories and individuation, Lowe might be 
expected to articulate his construal of existence conditions for fundamental categories in 
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the course of explaining the role of those categories in individuation, but he doesn’t. In 
discussing individuation, he tends to focus instead on the work of identity 
conditions/criteria of identity43.  This is one way his notion of individuation comes away 
from that which I shall propose in the next chapter.  
In his discussion of individuation Lowe focuses on singular reference. For Lowe, 
individuation is “a kind of cognitive achievement, namely the successful singling out of 
an object in thought” (Lowe, 2013, 19) and in his discussions of individuation he focuses 
on the achievement of distinguishing an entity from others of its kind. Some version of 
this is supposed to be that which the understanding of the identity criterion of a kind 
allows for.  
 
§9.1 
I shall begin by presenting Lowe’s construal of identity conditions, and I shall then raise 
some problems for it. I shall argue that these problems with the construal of identity 
conditions present problems for the construal of the notion of ontological category which 
Lowe explicates using it.  
 
§9.2 
The distinction between the function it may be claimed a proposition has to fulfil if it is 
to be a criterion of identity and the content it is claimed the proposition serving as a 
criterion of identity has is an important one in discussions of criteria of identity.  
In the literature, discussions of criteria of identity often distinguish between metaphysical 
and epistemic understandings of these criteria. It is held that the criteria can be 
metaphysical or epistemic in either of these two ways, function or content44. Most of the 
participants in the discussion accept that the content of a proposition which serves as a 
criterion of identity is metaphysical; such a proposition states necessary and sufficient 
conditions for entities of some kind to be identical. However, this agreement doesn’t 
                                                          
43 Lowe uses these terms interchangeably and I shall do so as well.  
44 One might want to reserve the term ‘criteria of identity’ for the epistemic and use ‘identity conditions’ 
for the metaphysical. Lowe considers this but claims that ‘criteria of identity’ as it is used in the literature 
is not exclusively or primarily an epistemic notion. He claims that since this non-exclusively epistemic 
usage is entrenched, it wouldn’t be helpful to use it for purely the epistemic notion.  
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preclude disagreement on the question of how we should understand the notion of a 
criterion of identity.  
This is in large part because the question of function remains open. The disagreements 
about the function of criteria of identity drive several of the disagreements about the 
notion of a criterion of identity. Once this is seen, it can be seen that some of these 
disagreements about the notion may be unnecessary; the participants may just be talking 
about different notions. However, there is reason to think that sometimes participants 
might, in addition to thinking that their understanding was the correct one, also think that 
we should not accept the opponent’s notion even if it is not as considered as being a notion 
in competition with their own. It seems that Williamson would say this about the notion 
of criteria of identity which Lowe defends.  
In this section, I am going to draw out the approach to the notion of a criterion of identity 
which is defended by Lowe. This construal was defended by Lowe over the course of a 
number of books and articles in which he engaged in a debate on the topic with Timothy 
Williamson. I shall illustrate how the different functions Lowe and Williamson take 
criteria of identity to have underlie other positions they take on the criteria. 
A good starting point for understanding Lowe’s construal of the notion of a criterion of 
identity can be found in what are important points of agreement between Lowe and 
Williamson. Both agree that criteria of identity express necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the identity of entities of some kind. Both also agree that identity is neither 
a notion which can be defined in more fundamental terms, nor an ambiguous notion which 
has different senses for entities of different kinds. These points of agreement set up a 
basic question to which Lowe and Williamson each provide different answers. The 
question is: what is the point of criteria of identity? Given that both Lowe and Williamson 
agree that the notion of a criterion of identity is a theoretical one, another way of putting 
the question might be: what role do criteria of identity play in philosophy?  
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Lowe gives a developed answer to this question in his 1989 article ‘What is a Criterion 
of Identity?’45 and he restates much of what is defended there in his (2013), albeit with 
one very important difference46.  
In his (1989), Lowe claims that sortals47 are required for reference and that criteria of 
identity convey some important semantic information about sortals. Grasping the 
information conveyed by these criteria is necessary if one is to have full grasp of the 
relevant sortal and this full grasp of the relevant sortal is required if one is to be able to 
make reference to the entities falling under it. Lowe’s claim is that the criteria of identity 
convey important information about the sortal by expressing what identity consists in for 
the entities falling under that sortal. So, for Lowe, criteria of identity have two functions, 
the second of which they fulfil by fulfilling the first. The first is allowing for a full grasp 
of sortals, the second is allowing for reference to the things falling under those sortals.  
Lowe’s project, in both his (1989) and in the relevant section of his (2013), is to clarify 
the notion of a criterion of identity. He takes criteria of identity to be semantic principles 
which are useful in metaphysics, but which are subject to controversy and scepticism. His 
later clarification of this claim is that criteria of identity are both semantic and 
metaphysical principles because in fulfilling the first function noted above they convey 
information about both the meanings of the sortal terms and about the natures of the 
sortals:  
We could sum this up, perhaps, by saying that criteria of identity are 
metaphysically grounded semantic rules (Lowe, 2009, 26).  
Lowe’s goal is to defend the notion of a criterion of identity by clarifying it and addressing 
what he takes to be the two main points of contention concerning it. These are the 
following: first, whether we should accept criteria of identity in which terms for the 
entities whose identity is in question occur on the right-hand side of the criterion. Lowe 
claims that we should. Second, whether sortals understood through the grasp of criteria 
                                                          
45 On some occasions, notably Lowe (1997), Lowe deviates slightly from the answer defended in this 
article. However, the view defended in Lowe (1989) is defended over numerous articles and is returned 
to in Lowe (2009) and for this reason I am presenting and considering it here simply as his view as opposed 
to considering it as his early view. 
46 In his (2013), Lowe no longer claims that there are criterionless sortals which allow us to achieve our 
first understanding of what it is to make singular reference. 
47 The term ‘sortal’ is used by Lowe in discussion of this topic in part, it seems, because its usage in 
connection with identity criteria is established. I shall follow him in using the term in this subsection. 
However, despite the change in terminology, there is no change in ontology here. For Lowe, sortals are 
substantial universals, i.e. kinds, and sortal terms are kind terms. 
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of identity underlie all of acts of reference, even the most basic. In his (1989) he answers 
no to this question, but by the time of his (2013) he had reconsidered and changed his 
answer to yes. His answers to these questions, as well as the overarching question of what 
the form of an identity criterion is, structure his defence of the construal he provides. His 
defence of the answers he gives to these questions is based on the function he takes criteria 
of identity to fulfil.  
Crucial to Lowe’s approach is the connection he takes there to be between criteria of 
identity, sortals, and our capacity to refer to entities in the world. Lowe contends that 
Locke recognised the fact which we recognise in giving criteria of identity, the fact that 
identity consists in something different for things of one sort than for things of another. 
Nevertheless, Lowe does acknowledge Frege as the person responsible for introducing 
the notion under the term ‘criteria of identity’, for providing a well-known example of 
such a criterion, and finally, for recognizing the crucial connection between criteria of 
identity, sortals, and the making of singular reference. It is the general version of this 
connection which provides the force for most of Lowe’s arguments in favour of the 
positions he takes on the contentious issues concerning criteria of identity.  
One of the central aspects of Lowe’s construal of the notion of a criterion of identity is 
the claim he makes about the logical form such criteria should be taken to have.  
 
Having traced the notion of a criterion of identity back to Frege, Lowe begins by 
presenting what he calls the Fregean Thesis using a quote from Frege’s Grundlagen:  
 If we are to use the symbol a to signify an object, we must have a criterion for 
deciding in all cases whether b is the same as a, even if it is not always in our 
power to apply this criterion (Frege, Grundlagen §62, quoted in Lowe, 1989, 2)) 
As an example of a Fregean criterion of identity, Lowe considers the criterion of identity 
for directions (for all a, b, the direction of a = the direction of b ↔ a is parallel to b).  
Lowe calls criteria which share the form of this one criteria of type A. Where f( ) is a 
functional expression and R is an equivalence relation, the general form of criteria of type 
A is said to be: 
∀x ∀y (f(x) = f(y) ↔ Rxy)  
Lowe notes that the form Frege’s criterion takes is one in which the entities whose identity 
is in question are referred to by means of a functional expression on the left-hand side of 
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the biconditional and are not referred to at all on the right-hand side. However, Lowe 
argues against taking such a form to be a requirement for all criteria of identity on the 
basis of the general version of the Fregean thesis noted above which Lowe subscribes to.  
Using Williamson as an example, Lowe notes that some people have tried to formulate 
criteria of identity in the form noted above for such entities as persons. Lowe contends 
that we shouldn’t go along with this because (a) there isn’t a good reason to think that our 
primary means of referring to persons is through the use of functional expressions, and 
(b) there is a good reason not to think this; the ontological dependency of directions on 
lines makes it natural to refer to the former through the latter but trying to refer to persons 
in this way just neglects the fact that there is nothing on which persons are ontologically 
dependant in the way that directions are on lines.  
Lowe uses this argument to reject the position that the form of the Fregean examples of 
criteria of identity is the required form for criteria of identity. The argument is based on 
the function he takes criteria of identity to have, which he contends is the same one Frege 
took them to have. The claim that criteria of identity should have a form is an assumption 
which drives this argument. 
Having rejected the explicit form of the Fregean examples as characteristic of the notion, 
Lowe considers Frege’s description, as given in the Fregean Thesis quoted above, of what 
we want from a criterion of identity:  
a criterion for deciding in all cases whether b is the same as a, even if it is not 
always in our power to apply this criterion (Frege, Grundlagen §62, quoted in 
Lowe, 1989, 2). 
Lowe finds this too general a desideratum, noting that Leibniz’s Law provides a trivial 
such criterion which nevertheless fails to differ between kinds as Frege wanted the criteria 
in question do. Since it doesn’t differ between kinds, it also doesn’t shed light on the 
meaning of the general sortal terms involved in the criteria and Lowe observes that this 
was one of the things Frege hoped to achieve with criteria of identity; the criterion was to 
shed light on the meaning of the sortal term occurring in the functional expressions on 
either side of the identity sign, and this was to allow us to grasp that general sortal and 
use it to refer, specifically on the meaning of ‘number’ as it occurs in the functional 
expression ‘the number of (   )’ 
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Lowe notes that once we have moved to a general or universal version of what he called 
the Fregean Thesis, the connection between the singular term occurring either side of the 
identity sign and the general sortal term on the meaning of which we might require the 
criteria to shed light has to be taken to change from being an explicit one to being an 
implicit one. Still, he claims, this is plausible.   If the desideratum of shedding light on an 
associated general term can be met in this way, on the basis of an implicit connection 
between a singular term, e.g. a name for an artefact, and a sortal term, e.g. ‘Big Ben’, then 
the universally appropriate form for a criterion of identity which was being sought to 
replace the Fregean template can be found, Lowe avers, in what he calls type B criteria.  
Lowe’s type B criteria of identity are criteria which share the form of the axiom of 
extensionality for sets (∀x∀y ((x is a set & y is a set) ⊃ x = y) ↔ ∀z (z ϵ x ↔ z ϵ y)), so, 
taking F to stand for some sortal concept, and R to stand for an equivalence relation, the 
general form of what Lowe calls a type B criterion is the following ‘∀x∀y (((Fx & Fy) ⊃ 
x = y) ↔ Rxy)’ 
Lowe claims, given that we are seeking universal applicability, that it is a point in favour 
of the type B form of criteria, that it can be used to express criteria of the form found in 
the Fregean examples but that the reverse is not the case. Again, this consideration in 
favour of type B is driven by what Lowe takes the function of criteria of identity to be; 
we are seeking universal applicability because Lowe takes criteria of identity to be 
required for, and serve the function of, allowing for reference quite generally.  
 
§9.3 
According to Lowe’s account, criteria of identity serve to allow us to grasp the meaning 
of the sortal term which occurs in the antecedent of the left-hand side and is associated 
with the singular terms on either side of the identity sign, and this grasp of the meaning 
of the sortal term allows us to use that sortal term to refer, by means of singular terms in 
which it is implicit, to entities in the world. However, Lowe thinks that one aspect of his 
type B criteria might look like it presents a problem for this account. The problem is that 
in type B criteria singular terms in which the sortal in question is implicit occur on the 
right-hand side of the biconditional as well as on the left-hand side. Given this, unlike the 
Fregean criteria where it can be claimed that our understanding of the right-hand side 
allows us to understand the terms on the left, in a type B criterion it looks like, unless we 
can understand the use of the singular terms at issue we can’t understand the criterion, 
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but the criterion is supposed to be what allows us to understand the use of the singular 
terms at issue (and thereby the sortal a term for which occurs in the antecedent).  
Lowe’s defence of type B criteria against this potential criticism is again driven by his 
interpretation of the function of identity criteria. He notes that Frege initially tried to use 
criteria of identity for definitional purposes and that type B criteria would be unacceptable 
if criteria were to serve that purpose because that would be a case of the definiendum 
occurring in the definiens. However, he claims, Frege realized that criteria of identity 
aren’t capable of providing a full definition of a sortal like number as they only explain a 
limited number of cases in which the term may occur. Similarly, he says, he does not 
intend his criteria of identity to constitute definitions. He contends that they can, despite 
this, shed some light on the meaning of a sortal term.  
Lowe’s claim is that we don’t need to be in a position to successfully use a and b to refer 
in order to be in a position to understand criteria of identity, we just need to be in a position 
to understand the general type of terms a and b, i.e. that they are individual variables 
referring to particulars. According to Lowe, that much understanding allows us to grasp 
what is being conveyed by the criteria of identity, which in turn allows us to fully grasp 
the relevant sortal concept and then to be in a position to use a and b referentially, and to 
understand their use as referential terms.  
The crucial point then is that what a type (B) criterion of identity is intended to 
convey (namely, an aspect of the sense of a certain general term) can be 
sufficiently grasped by a person not already equipped to deploy singular terms 
governed by that criterion, provided at least that that person understands in general 
what it is to make singular reference to, or quantify over, particulars. 
(Lowe, 1989, 13) 
 
§10 
The point of considering Lowe’s construal of the notion of criteria of identity was that he 
connects criteria of identity, along with existence conditions, to the notion of ontological 
categories. He doesn’t provide a clear construal of existence conditions, but he does, as 
shown above, provide a very detailed construal of the notion of criteria of identity. 
Nevertheless, that construal was included in this section as part of problem four for 
Lowe’s account of ontological categories, the problem of his construal of existence and 
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identity conditions. Why think that Lowe’s construal of identity conditions is a problem 
for his account of ontological categories?  
There are two main problems with Lowe’s construal of criteria of identity which I think 
should persuade us to think this. In the next chapter, when I give my alternative construal 
of identity conditions, these problems will be developed and further supported, but these 
issues raise problems for Lowe even without that development. 
  
Problem 1: The construal unduly limits the notion of a criterion of identity 
This problem was discussed previously and is, to a large degree, internal to Lowe’s 
account. The problem is that Lowe, in presenting his notion of an ontological category in 
his (2006) and (2009), presents criteria of identity as connected to all four ontological 
categories, but, given his ontology, this is not compatible with his construal of the notion 
of a criterion of identity. It was noted above that criteria of identity need to be understood 
in terms of their function not just their content. The function of criteria of identity on 
Lowe’s construal, as detailed above, is to shed light on the meaning of different sortal 
terms and thereby allow for singular reference to objects of different kinds because terms 
for objects of these kinds will include as part of their sense the sense of the (highest) sortal 
under which they fall. Lowe’s construal of the notion of a criterion of identity limits that 
notion to allowing for reference to objects by illuminating sortals used to make that 
reference. This is just too narrow to be a satisfactory construal of a notion he claims is 
connected to all four of his fundamental categories, and also to both categories and 
fundamental categories generally.  
A problem internal to Lowe’s account which would arise in an attempt to generalise the 
construal is that Lowe doesn’t accept properties of any order higher than first. I argued 
earlier that even if one did accept such properties a problem would still arise but Lowe’s 
rejection of second order properties would make the problem arise quickly in any attempt 
to generalise his construal of the notion of a criterion of identity so that criteria of identity 
weren’t such that they could only be given for things from the category of objects.  
 
Problem 2: Lowe’s criteria run into Williamson’s triviality problem and fail to fulfil their 
function 
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For Lowe, the function of a criterion of identity is to allow for singular reference to objects 
which one did not have the capacity to singularly refer to before coming to know the 
criteria. Criteria of identity are supposed to fulfil this function by fulfilling the subsidiary 
function of allowing for understanding of a relevant sortal and thereby allowing for its 
use in making singular reference to things falling under it. As noted above, one reason 
that one might think that Lowe’s type B criteria were not capable of fulfilling this function 
is that in type B criteria the variables on the right-hand side are to be understood to range 
over entities of the kind in question. Also, the relevant sortal term occurs in the 
antecedent. It seems that unless we understood the kind term already we would not be 
able to understand its use in the antecedent, and unless we were already able to use 
singular terms in which it was implicit to make singular reference we would not be able 
to understand the right-hand side of the condition which is supposed to allow us to do so.  
As outlined above, Lowe attempts to resolve this problem by claiming that we don’t need 
to be able to make singular reference to things of the kind in question to understand the 
condition, we just need to be able to understand what it is in general to make singular 
reference. Presumably, he would have to say something similar about the occurrence of 
the sortal term in question in the antecedent. First, he might note that he doesn’t intend 
the identity condition to provide a complete definition, he only intends it to provide some 
semantic information, albeit information which is necessary for any grasp of the sort 
adequate to allow for the use of it to make singular reference. Then he might add that to 
understand the condition we don’t need to start with a full understanding of the sortal 
term which occurs in the antecedent. We just need a partial grasp of the kind for which 
that sortal term stands and an understanding of what it is in general for a kind to be 
predicated of objects in the way that the kind in question is in the identity condition.  
One problem with this is that it is not clear how we should understand claims about partial 
grasps of kinds and grasps adequate for use in making reference. What distinctive 
information is conveyed by type B identity conditions which is not necessary for 
understanding the condition but is necessary for any grasp of the relevant sortal which is 
adequate for its use in making reference? Attempting to find an answer to this question 
allows us to see that Lowe’s construal runs into Williamson’s triviality problem, a 
problem Williamson takes to be a specific problem for Lowe, and a general problem for 
anyone who seeks to provide a useful notion of identity condition.  
If Lowe’s construal runs into Williamson’s triviality problem, then it will not be able to 
fulfil its function of conveying some semantic information about a sortal the grasp of 
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which is necessary for anyone who is to be able to use that sortal to make singular 
reference. If identity conditions as Lowe has construed them do not fulfil this function 
that is a problem for his construal of identity conditions. However, it is also a problem 
for a position on ontological categories which depends on that construal.  
 
§10.1 
So, what is Williamson’s triviality problem?  
In considering how we should understand the notion of an identity criterion, Williamson 
starts with the understanding of an identity criterion as a statement of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for identity and focuses on the potential triviality of such a condition. 
Given that identity can’t be stated in more basic terms, why, he asks, should we not think 
that a statement of identity is itself the most basic way to state the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for identity to hold between entities of any kind? Given that identity cannot be 
satisfactorily and non-circularly defined, why think that any other way of claiming the 
same thing is more informative? Williamson’s consideration of the notion of criteria of 
identity proceeds from this point:  
if the demand (for a criterion of identity) is not to be trivially satisfiable, it must 
be for a necessary and sufficient condition meeting a certain constraint, where 
such and such does not itself meet that constraint…it would not do to say just that 
the constraint is that the condition should be interestingly different from such and 
such, for then the demand would look merely capricious. Why suppose such a 
condition to exist or hope to find one? (Williamson, 1990/2013, 144)  
The constraint is thus an additional requirement which a necessary and sufficient 
condition for identity of entities must meet in order to be an identity criterion. If any 
necessary and sufficient conditions of identity are to count as identity criteria they must 
satisfy some specific constraint and this constraint will be for this reason partially 
definitive of the notion of an identity criterion. Williamson calls his desired constraint, 
whatever it may turn out to be, a non-circularity constraint.  
Given the way Williamson sets up the problem, it can be seen that the constraint will be 
provided by whatever is taken to be the function of identity criteria, the constraint will be 
satisfaction of that function. This can be seen by considering that the demand for the 
constraint is set up by the triviality problem – it seems that, unsatisfactorily, ‘x=y’ is an 
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identity criterion for itself, indeed the most basic identity criterion for itself. To avoid this 
Williamson imposes the requirement that to be an identity criterion a necessary and 
sufficient condition for identity of some entities must meet some further constraint which 
can’t just be that it be interesting; we need a reason to have identity criteria in addition to 
statements of identity. So, Williamson’s consideration of identity criteria begins with a 
search for the function which he allows will partially define the notion.   
In addition to directly making the constraint, and thus the function, partially define the 
notion of an identity criterion, this approach immediately gives Williamson a different 
notion than Lowe has of the kind of circularity which is dangerous for identity criteria.  
This difference comes out in Williamson’s discussion of the different forms of identity 
criteria. Williamson calls identity criteria which have the form of the Fregean examples 
(‘∀x∀y ((f(x) = f(y)) ↔ Rxy’)) two-level criteria and he calls identity criteria which have 
the form Lowe favours (‘∀x∀y (((Fx & Fy) ⊃ x = y) ↔ Rxy’) one-level criteria. 
Williamson favours the two-level criteria and he does so for reasons connected with his 
non-circularity constraint.  
Williamson describes the one-level criterion of identity for sets as a criterion in which 
“the identity sign is flanked by terms for sets, and the right hand side states a relation 
equivalent to identity between those sets”(Williamson, 1990/2013, 146) Considering 
whether to subsume one-level under two-level as limiting cases “in which the function 
takes everything to itself” he writes that “the move looks trivial and the non-appearance 
of the function symbol on the right hand side would no longer be an effective non-
circularity constraint”(Williamson, 1990/2013, 146). Finally, as part of the debate with 
Lowe, he claims that one shouldn’t reduce two-level to one-level criteria because “the 
point is to say when lines have the same direction without mentioning directions. Given 
Lowe’s construal, no such explanation is possible” (Williamson, 1991, 194).  
He contends that “Lowe’s construal does not permit a principled rejection of an intuitively 
unacceptable answer”, saying that Lowe cannot even “accuse the new answer of 
circularity or total uninformativeness” (Williamson, 1991, 194-5). The proposed new 
answer is that directions are identical when some line has both. Lowe rejects it on the 
basis that it is not informative in the right way; it doesn’t say what identity consists in for 
directions. Williamson’s response to this is to note that in talking about what identity 
consists in for various things Lowe seems to be asking for something more basic than 
identity but he won’t find it.  
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So, for Williamson, it seems the right-hand sides that Lowe seeks will always be 
unsatisfactory because they state a relation logically equivalent to identity between the 
entities whose identity is in question and this falls afoul of his favoured non-circularity 
constraint. For Williamson, satisfaction of the non-circularity constraint requires that the 
right-hand side state a relation which is between the entities by which the entities whose 
identity is in question are presented. Although the non-circularity constraint is not at this 
point in his account specified, his later investigation finds only one satisfactory candidate, 
an epistemic function fulfilled by a metaphysical principle48, and it is the constraint 
                                                          
 
48 Williamson presents the position he finally commits to as a combination of the metaphysical and 
epistemological interpretations of identity criteria. He writes that criteria of identity are “metaphysical 
principles apt to explain epistemic facts” (Williamson, 1990/2013, 144) The propositions are metaphysical 
principles because they still state necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of entities of some 
kind. The epistemic component comes in with the function. It is this which selects as appropriate for the 
right-hand side of the criteria one among the great many less basic way of expressing the identity statement 
which occurs on the left-hand side and provides a point to the expression of this right-hand side with the 
left-hand side. What distinguishes the equivalence relation which occurs on the right hand side of the 
identity criteria from all those which could occur truly in an expression of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the entities in question is that the necessary and sufficient condition expressed by the 
equivalence relation in the identity criterion states the relation to which we do in fact attend, and on the 
occurrence of which we rely, on those occasions on which we successfully discern identity or difference 
among entities of the kind in question.  
By construing criteria of identity as explanations of what we do when we succeed in recognizing and 
differentiating entities, Williamson provides a point for criteria of identity while maintaining them as 
expressions of necessary and sufficient conditions for identity of entities of varying kinds. This point is one 
which he holds requires the two-level form in order that the right-hand side express the basis of our 
knowledge that the left-hand side is true. On Williamson’s account, we do not use criteria of identity to 
make reference. To begin with, criteria of identity are limited to complex singular terms. Further, on 
Williamson’s account identity criteria are an explanation of what we do in recognizing and differentiating 
when the result is knowledge. Such an explanation would not underlie the very practices on which it is 
based, and of which it is a description. Williamson in any case explicitly denies that criteria of identity 
provide the basis for these acts of identity and discrimination. (Williamson, 1990/2013, 153) 
Williamson’s identity criteria serve an epistemic function which it seems to me would never get off the 
ground. Williamson’s identity criteria require that we examine the occasions where we got identification 
or discrimination right, where we had knowledge of identity and difference, and they allow us to produce 
from this an explanation of that knowledge albeit just an explanation of what we were doing when we got 
it right. It is hard to see what function this serves; it is hard to imagine a scenario in which we had the 
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provided by this function which retroactively justifies the inchoate non-circularity 
constraint at work in Williamson’s defence of the claim that identity criteria have a two-
level as opposed to a one-level form. Thus, it is the function Williamson identifies for 
identity criteria which justifies this position he takes on what counts as an identity 
criterion. 
 
§10.2 
Williamson’s triviality problem is a serious problem for Lowe because it is not clear why 
we should think criteria of identity as Lowe has construed them would be as singularly 
important in allowing for the understanding of sortals as Lowe’s account requires. As 
Lowe presents it, one acquires satisfactory understanding of a sortal only by acquiring 
understanding of the associated criteria of identity. Lowe construes criteria of identity as 
conditions which are satisfied by objects and claims that to conceive of a thing as 
something which would fall under a specific sortal, we conceive of it as something which 
would satisfy the relevant criterion. This makes a criterion of identity something which 
can be satisfied. What condition is expressed by a criterion of identity? Lowe contends 
that we should think of his type B as the form for criteria of identity, so it would be a 
condition of the following form; (‘∀x∀y (((Fx & Fy) ⊃ x = y) ↔ Rxy’). The important 
question here is what would go in for R. The point which Williamson presses against 
Lowe in their debate is that for all Lowe has said this could be any equivalence relation 
which holds between x and y whenever x=y. R could be anything which holds between x 
and y whenever they are identical.  
This makes the notion of a criterion of identity collapse into the notion of an essential 
property. But Lowe can’t plausibly be requiring that knowledge of all essential properties 
is required for a grasp of a sortal which allows one to use it to make reference. But if not 
all, if just one, then, which one? Which is the singularly important one that identity 
conditions convey? 
                                                          
knowledge required to pick out the relevant occasions when we got things right and yet we still sought the 
kind of explanation Williamson’s criteria would yield. If his function isn’t compelling, to that extent his 
notion of an identity criterion in itself isn’t compelling.  
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As Williamson notes, Lowe’s appeal to his informativeness condition cannot help him 
here because there will be many such conditions which are to some degree informative. 
If criteria of identity collapse into the broader collection of an object’s essential 
properties, why should we think that there will be one of these which will be both required 
for and sufficient for allowing for understanding of the relevant sortal?   
Lowe’s response to Williamson’s triviality problem is to insist that one such condition 
will reveal what identity consists in for objects of the kind in question. But it seems, as 
Williamson contends, and as it sometimes seems that Lowe accepts, simply implausible 
to think that there is something more basic going on than identity. Lowe’s repeated claims 
that one of the conditions will reveal what identity for things of the kind consists in just 
seems as Williamson contends “to make the hopeless demand for something more basic 
(in some sense) than ‘x=y’” (Williamson, 1991, 194).   
 
§10.3 
If Lowe’s construal of the notion of criteria of identity is such that these criteria become 
simply some essential properties among others, that is a serious problem for the viability 
of the construal itself, at least insofar as the notion that construal aims to capture is 
supposed to be a distinctive one. It is also a serious problem for Lowe’s account of 
ontological categories because that account uses what is supposed to be a distinctive 
notion of identity conditions to explicate the notion of an ontological category and to 
characterise what it is for such a category to be fundamental. If the notion of a criterion 
of identity which Lowe’s construal yields is not distinctive, then that, to some extent at 
least, undermines his account of ontological categories. 
To sum up: Lowe’s account of ontological categories is given in part by appeal to the 
notions of existence and identity conditions but the specifics of his construals of existence 
and identity conditions are such as to raise serious problems for that account. If they are 
to be used to support and explicate an account of the notion of an ontological category, 
Lowe’s construals of existence and identity conditions cannot be accepted as they stand 
but need to be developed and modified. 
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§11 
The above discussion concludes my presentation of the fourth of four problems with 
Lowe’s account of ontological categories.  
These four problems were:  
1. The presupposition problem 
2. The broadness of Lowe’s notion of ontological category 
3. The duplication of work between categories and kinds 
4. Lowe’s construal of existence and identity conditions 
 
As I noted earlier, there are three key positions from Lowe’s account which I intend to 
adopt and defend, specifically:  
1. Ontological Categories are not entities. 
2. Ontological Categories are involved in the individuation of entities  
3. Ontological Categories are associated with the existence and identity conditions 
of the entities that belong to them. 
However, the problems presented above demonstrate that Lowe’s account should not be 
adopted as it stands. In the next chapter, I shall attempt to develop an alternative version 
which nevertheless incorporates and defends versions of the above three positions.   
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Chapter 3 
 
§0 
In the last chapter, I presented Lowe’s account of ontological categories. I emphasised 
what I take to be key claims of that account (versions of which I propose to adopt) and I 
explained the arguments Lowe provides for them.  I also argued that as it stands Lowe’s 
account has problems. In this chapter, I shall develop my own construal of the notion of 
an ontological category. In the course of doing so, I shall explain how I have modified 
the aspects of Lowe’s account which I adopt. I shall argue that my construal of ontological 
categories avoids the problems which I raised for Lowe’s and allows the ontological 
categories of the account to be suited to play the central role which I contend ontological 
categories do play in ontology.  
As I noted in the last chapter, there are three key positions from Lowe’s account which I 
intend to adopt and defend versions of. These are: 
1. Ontological Categories are not entities. 
      2. Ontological Categories are involved in the individuation of entities  
3. Ontological Categories are associated with the existence and identity conditions of 
the entities that belong to them. 
Avoiding the problems which I have argued face Lowe’s account requires that the 
versions of these claims which I defend diverge from the versions which Lowe defends. 
This divergence is most serious with respect to (3).  
The versions of the three claims above that I adopt are crucial to my construal of 
ontological categories and that construal plays a central role in my account of existence 
claims. For that reason, the influence of Lowe’s construal of ontological categories on my 
own will be evident. However, in order to let my account stand on its own, I shall put off 
until the end of the chapter the task of explaining how the categories of my account draw 
on his construal but diverge enough to allow me to avoid the problems which I raised for 
Lowe at the end of chapter two.  
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§1 
I have claimed that language, as used in truth-apt sentences, depends systematically on 
the world for the content it in fact has. It does so because it depends for that content on 
the entities which serve as the semantic values of its terms. For this reason, our truth-apt 
sentences having the content they in fact have (when things go right and we manage to 
express a determinate proposition) presupposes the existence of the entities which are 
needed to serve as the semantic values of the terms in those sentences. If, as seems likely, 
our language features some terms which occur in certain contexts and others which occur 
in others, then we will need kinds of term and correspondingly the sentences will 
presuppose the existence of the entities serving as the semantic values for the one kind of 
terms and also the entities serving as the semantic values of the others.  
The question of ontology is the question of what there is. As I showed in chapter one, it 
is very difficult to understand the form of answers to this question. It is difficult to 
understand the form of the statements we express by saying ‘fs exist’. One reason it is 
very difficult to understand the form of these statements is that most construals of that 
form presuppose the correctness of an answer to the ontological question. They do so 
even though statements of the form ‘fs exist’ will be those with which one provides 
answers to the ontological question. The result will be that the instance(s) of the statement 
‘fs exist’ with which such an interpreter gives their own answer to the ontological 
question will, given their preferred construal, presuppose its own truth. It will depend for 
the content it is intended to have on the correctness of the answer it is being used to give.  
This result cannot be accepted but it should not really be surprising. If we accept that 
truth-apt sentences depend for their content on the entities serving as the semantic values 
of their terms, then we should expect that in trying to specify the correct interpretations 
of these sentences we will make use of the entities we think are there to serve as semantic 
values. The entities we think are there to serve as semantic values of terms will be those 
with which we specify what we take to be the correct interpretations of sentences. So 
then, when we come to the question of how we should understand the form of existence 
claims, it should not be surprising that ontologists make use of the entities they think are 
available to serve as the semantic values of terms in specifying what they take to be the 
correct interpretations of those sentences.  
Further, when one is using the entities one thinks there are to specify the correct way to 
interpret a sentence ‘fs exist’, securing the content aimed at for ‘f’ ends up leading one to 
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select a semantic value for ‘f’ which requires that fs exist. In chapter one, I gave a general 
argument to the effect that this is the case and I then demonstrated the problem by 
considering different philosophers’ construal of statements of the form ‘fs exist’ and 
showing how the problem arose for each case.  
We cannot accept a construal of ‘fs exist’ which has the result that instances of it 
presuppose the truth of the claims that they are being used to assert but it turns out to be 
incredibly difficult to avoid doing so.  
 
§2 
The challenge we face is as follows: our truth-apt sentences having the content that they 
do have presupposes the existence of entities appropriate to serve as the semantic values 
of their terms. This phenomenon of the presupposition of the existence of these entities 
extends even to most construals of existence claims. But that cannot be accepted. We 
need to find a way of construing the form of existence claims such that instances of them 
avoid presupposing the correctness of the claim they are used to assert. If we manage to 
do this, we will also have given an account of what it is that is presupposed by our 
language’s having the content that it in fact has.  
How can we say that ‘fs exist’ without making reference to fs in order to say this?  
The approach for which I shall argue in this chapter is a version of a metalinguistic 
approach to the construal of existence claims. Given the desiderata I have established for 
construals of existence claims, the motivation for adopting some such construal is 
obvious. In order to capture the intended content of a claim ‘fs exist’ we will generally 
have to specify content for ‘f’ that would only be available if fs did in fact exist. I argued 
for this conclusion at length in chapter one. But if we specify such content for ‘f’, and 
then use ‘f’ in our existence claim, our use of ‘f’ will presuppose the existence of whatever 
would provide the appropriate content for it. In this way, we will run into the 
presupposition problem. Since this is the shape of the problem, a move that appears 
promising is the move whereby we avoid using ‘f’ and merely talk about it instead. 
However, although the motivation for moving to a metalinguistic approach is obvious, 
finding a version of this approach which will succeed in capturing the intended content 
for our existence claims presents difficulties.   
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In his (1960), Quine argued that facilitating ontological debate required what he called 
semantic ascent (“the shift from talking in words to talking about them” (Quine, 
1960/2013, 250)). Recommending the acceptance of this view, he wrote that when this is 
not done a debate, for instance over the existence of miles is: 
lost in a jumble of invective and question-begging. When on the other hand we 
ascend to ‘mile’ and ask which of its contexts are useful and for what purposes, 
we can get on; we are no longer caught in the toils of our opposed uses. The 
strategy of semantic ascent is that it carries the discussion into a domain where 
both parties are better agreed on the objects (viz. words) and on the main terms 
concerning them.  
(Quine, 1960/2013, 250-1) 
In chapter one, I argued that the metalinguistic approach to linguistic questions which 
Quine recommends cannot be accepted by metaphysical realists. I noted that the 
pragmatic consideration which Quine presents as decisive in such a debate, (“ask which 
of its contexts are useful and for what purposes” (Quine, 1960/2013, 251)), would not be 
taken to be so by any realist about such questions. More importantly for present purposes, 
I noted that this version of the metalinguistic approach cannot work because although 
Quine claims that a move to the level of words will allow the disputants to agree on the 
objects of the debate, for this to be the case the words (e.g. ‘mile’) at issue will have to 
empty of content, they will have to be words considered merely as a string of symbols 
phonetically or typographically individuated. But discussion over such words and their 
application no longer captures the content of a target ontological debate. Adopting this 
approach, the truth of ‘organisms exist’ could be consistent with there being no living 
things. Kripke argues against such a metalinguistic approach to singular existence 
statements on the basis of this problem. (Kripke, 2013, 152-3). 
The ascent to words cannot be motivated as a move to a level where disputants agree on 
the objects. Construing the existence claims made in such an ontological debate in these 
terms will simply result in failure to capture the content of the debate.  
Thomasson argues for a different version of semantic ascent. Her construal of existence 
claims is given by her schema E which she presents as an articulation of a core formal 
rule of use for ‘exists’. Her schema E is: “Ks exist iff the application conditions actually 
associated with ‘K’ are fulfilled.” (Thomasson, 2015, 86). Thomasson presents this as a 
case of semantic ascent because ‘K’ is used on the left-hand side and only mentioned on 
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the right-hand side. This version of the metalinguistic approach doesn’t have the same 
problem as Quine’s, ‘K’ has not been emptied of content. Instead, Thomasson’s construal 
has the opposite problem, the kind of content ‘K’ is to have has been specified on the 
right-hand side. ‘K’ is to have an application condition as its semantic value. The right-
hand side of Thomasson’s schema E becomes a statement about an application condition 
– that it is fulfilled by a situation (because it is built into Thomasson’s account of what 
application conditions are that only situations can fulfil them). But on account of this, as 
I showed in chapter one, Thomasson’s existence claims would presuppose the correctness 
of the existence claims with which she would answer the question of ontology.  
Quine went wrong because he emptied ‘K’ of content in a way that made it useless for 
stating an existence claim. Thomasson went wrong because she specified the kind of 
content that ‘K’ was to have in a way that delivered existence statements presupposing 
her own ontology. How can we use the metalinguistic approach to provide a construal of 
existence claims in a way that avoids these problems and manages to capture the content 
of the categorial existence claims with which we answer the question of ontology? 
 
§3 
The starting point for my version of the metalinguistic approach to existence claims is 
acknowledgement of the fact that, if a construal of ‘fs exist’ is to be such that instances 
of it can express categorial existence claims, ‘f’ cannot be empty of content in the way 
that it is on the Quinean version of the metalinguistic approach. However, as I have argued 
at length in this thesis, the availability of the content needed for an intended interpretation 
of ‘f’ will itself be a subject of dispute. In general, those who deny that fs exist, should 
also deny that the content used by the defender of fs to interpret statements in terms of fs 
is available. This is to be expected. If language depends for its content on ontology, any 
dispute about ontology will extend to a dispute about the content of language. This was 
the root of the problem that arose, again and again for the positions I considered in chapter 
one according to which existence claims have the form ‘ƎxFx’. I argued there that such 
construals cannot be accepted because a predicate ‘F’ having its intended interpretation 
presupposes the existence of fs and, for this reason, statements of the form ‘ƎxFx’ fail to 
capture the content of claims that fs exist.  
The metalinguistic approach to existence claims which I shall defend in this chapter works 
by embracing this fact rather than attempting to avoid it.  
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The intuitive idea is that if disagreements about ontology extend to disagreements about 
the content of language, then by making claims about the content of language we can 
make claims about ontology49. It is an assumption of my approach, but an assumption 
with which I think most will agree, that we do in fact succeed, at least sometimes, in using 
language to make true and false statements about the world. Another assumption, with 
which I think most should also agree, is that the way in which we manage to use language 
to make true and false statements about the world is not transparent, or at the very least, 
it is not always transparent. The widely contested nature of the content of our terms and 
of the underlying forms of our sentences should be enough to convince doubters of the 
truth of the second assumption.  
If we accept the dependence of language on what there is along with the above 
assumptions, then we can make claims about what there is by making claims about how 
we manage to use language to make true and false statements about the world. The 
construal of existence claims which I shall defend in this chapter is based on the 
contention that we make existence claims by making claims about this. I shall argue that 
the approach I defend allows us to provide a construal of existence claims such that 
instances of those claims do not presuppose the truth of the claims they are used to make. 
If we build the notion of having a semantic value into the notion of a term, so that a term 
is any word that has a semantic value or refers50 to something, the proposal is that we 
make claims about what there is by making claims about how our language features terms 
and how these terms should be understood to refer.  
 
§4 
 
The proposal assumes that the participants of ontological debates are competent users of 
the language that that debate is being conducted in. It is assumed that they have the rough 
grasp of the meanings of their sentences that that requires. But, as noted previously, the 
grasp of meaning that is required to be a competent user of a language does not involve 
                                                          
49 In effect, this approach works by embracing the nature of referring terms as entities which depend for 
their existence and, in a number of different ways, for their identity, on the entities which serve as their 
semantic values. 
50 I am taking reference to be the relation a word of any type bears to its semantic value. Anyone who 
prefers to reserve ‘refers’ for the relation a name bears to an object can use a different term, perhaps 
‘denotes’.  
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knowledge of how that language features referring terms. So, for example, a competent 
speaker of the English language can have an adequate understanding of definite 
descriptions such as ‘the Queen of England’ as they occur in sentences such as ‘The 
Queen of England enjoys horse-riding.’ without knowing whether the expression ‘Queen 
of England’ as it occurs in the sentence  ‘The Queen of England enjoys horse-riding.’ 
should be taken to be a referring expression as Frege takes it to be, or whether it should 
be given a Russellian quantificational analysis which would reveal that it does not 
function as a unit, or whether some other account again is to be given of it.  
On the proposal I am defending, one will make claims about what there is in part by 
making claims about how the various types of truth-apt sentences of our language feature 
referring terms. In doing this, one will start off simply with rough sentence types but the 
interpretations one specifies can collapse some of these together or make further 
distinctions between them. In effect, what is at issue is the making of claims about the 
truth-conditions of sentences of various types, a task which obviously occupies much of 
the time of metaphysicians.  
In doing this for a relevant case one targets some range of sentences, e.g. statements of 
natural laws. One assumes a rough understanding of these sentences on the part of oneself 
and one’s audience. One then specifies the truth conditions one takes them to have. The 
rough understanding of the target sentences is relied on to allow for the understanding of 
the terms in which its truth-conditions are given. The truth-conditions given using these 
terms then allow for a (hopefully improved) understanding of the sentences with which 
one started. 
For example, Lowe provides an account of the truth-conditions of natural laws according 
to which a claim like ‘Planets have an elliptical orbit’ should be understood as a claim 
that a substantial kind, Planet, is characterised by an attribute, having an elliptical orbit. 
He contrasts this with the account Armstrong defends according to which the same 
sentence should be understood as a claim that the second order relation of necessitation 
holds between two first-order properties, that of being a planet and that of having an 
elliptical orbit. These two truth conditions feature different putative referring terms. 
Lowe’s will include referring terms for substantial kinds and attributes. Armstrong’s will 
include referring terms for the second-order relation of necessitation and the specific first-
order properties in question. We understand the more specific referring terms each 
proposes for the interpretation of natural law statements in part by relying on our rough 
understanding of such statements. But having grasped how each intends the referring 
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terms they take to feature in these statements to be understood (e.g. the terms for kinds, 
terms for attributes, term for second-order relations), we then gain a more definite (and 
hopefully improved) understanding of the statements we began with.  
 
§5 
The rough understanding competent users of a language have of their sentences is 
important for my account in two different ways. They are crucial to the ability of my 
construal to meet two different conditions of satisfactoriness.  
There are a number of requirements which any construal of existence statements must 
satisfy. I discussed and defended each of the following as requirements for a satisfactory 
construal of categorial existence claims in chapter one.  
 
1. Avoidance of Presupposition - A construal of existence claims must not be such 
that instances of these claims presuppose their own truth. 
2. Extensional Correctness – A construal of existence claims should be such that 
instances of them place intended requirements on the world. Existence claims 
should be true if and only if some intended requirement is met by the world. The 
thin version of the metalinguistic approach fails to meet this condition.  
3. Informativeness – Answering the ontological question requires that we say what 
there is, not just that we say something that demands that there be whatever there 
is. Categorial existence claims must be claims with which we clarify or make 
explicit what things there are51. They should allow for understanding of what there 
is.  
In chapter one, I argued that the need to meet condition (3) was part of what led Frege’s 
construal of existence claims to fail to meet condition (1) in the first of the ways that it 
did so. 
 
 
                                                          
51 I have also argued that without fixing the content of the categorial term, the term will not be definite 
enough to express a determinate answer to the ontological question. 
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§5.1 
The rough understanding I have claimed competent speakers of a language have of their 
sentences is part of how my construal of existence claims meets conditions of extensional 
correctness and informativeness. Meeting the condition of extensional correctness allows 
an existence claim to capture the claim that a disputant in an ontological debate wants to 
make. As I have shown in this thesis, meeting this condition without falling afoul of the 
presupposition problem, and so failing to meet condition (1), is very difficult. The 
problems that arise for Quine and Thomasson can be understood in terms of this trade-
off. Quine meets condition (1) by taking a course which leads to failure to meet condition 
(2). Thomasson meets condition (2) but does so by taking a course which leads to failure 
to meet condition (1).  
My version of the metalinguistic approach meets condition (1) by construing existence 
claims as claims about the content of language. It meets condition (2) by involving the 
specification of what the content is that one takes language to have. For my construal, the 
way that this is to be done without falling afoul of the presupposition problem, and thus 
failing to meet condition (1), relies on the rough understanding competent language users 
have of the meanings of their sentences. The stipulation that this understanding is not 
complete or precise enough to involve reliable knowledge of how the sentences of the 
language feature referring terms is required to allow us to make use of this understanding 
in specifying the content of existence claims without falling afoul of the presupposition 
problem. On my construal, existence claims will be claims about how various ranges of 
sentences, which are already roughly understood, should be given an interpretation; how 
they can be rewritten in a way that makes the occurrence of referring terms in them 
explicit. The rough understanding we have of the range of sentences we start off with is 
what allows existence claims which are instances of this construal to capture the right 
content. We will not produce statements like Quine’s whose truth is compatible with the 
failure of the world to be as we intend to claim that it is because we will circumscribe the 
range of sentences in which we are interested and make claims that they should be 
understood to feature referring terms in specified ways.  
§5.2 
Appeal to the rough understanding competent language users have of their sentences is 
also what allows my construal to meet condition (3).  How it allows the construal to meet 
this condition is closely tied to the general way in which existence claims as I have 
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construed them are supposed to work and because of this I will return to the point later in 
this chapter. However, succinctly, the way (3) shall be met on my construal is as follows: 
since, as I argued in chapter one, the notions with which we give satisfactory answers to 
the question of what there is will be notions which are, or are at least held to be, basic, or 
primitive, those notions will not be notions which are able to be defined from below. But 
their meanings have to be fixed or clarified, in part for explanatory purposes but also, 
importantly, because their natural language meanings will not be definite enough to allow 
for the expression of a determinate existence claim. Insofar as an understanding of ‘state-
of-affairs’ leaves it open whether the constituents of such an entity are ontologically prior 
to it, that term does not have a definite enough meaning to allow it to be used in making 
a determinate existence claim. Since the categorial notions featuring in existence claims 
cannot be defined from below but their intended interpretation does have to be fixed or 
clarified, they have to be made intelligible from above.  
This move, whereby the primitive entity notions in terms of which a theory will be given, 
since they cannot be defined from below, are instead made intelligible from above, is a 
move that both Frege (1891/1980) (1892/1980(a)) and Hale (2013) make. I have adopted 
the basic idea of this from them52.  
I regard a regular definition as impossible since we have here something too 
simple to admit of logical analysis. It is only possible to indicate what is meant. 
(Frege, 1891/1980, 31) 
One cannot require that everything shall be defined, any more than one can require 
that a chemist shall decompose every substance. What is simple cannot be 
decomposed, and what is logically simple cannot have a proper definition. (Frege, 
1892/1980(a), 42-3) 
Of course, it is exactly existence claims featuring primitive or basic entity notions with 
which we answer the question of ontology. So, we need to fix or clarify the content of our 
proposed primitive entity notions in a way that does not involve definition from below. 
We do this by making them intelligible from above. To do that we need something less 
basic but more accessible which we can use to fix or clarify the content of our proposed 
primitive entity notions. For my account, the roughly understood sentences of a speaker’s 
language are the less basic but more accessible thing used to fix or clarify how the 
                                                          
52 Hale (2013), in particular, focuses explicitly on the challenge of explaining how the fundamental 
ontological categories are to be understood. (Hale, 2013, 9-40) 
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primitive entity notions are to be understood. Existence claims, as I shall construe them 
will be, roughly, claims that some range of proposed primitive entity notions, succeed in 
allowing for reference. The use made of the roughly understood sentences of a speaker’s 
language in fixing or clarifying the intended understanding of the proposed primitives 
with respect to which such claims are made is how my construal of existence claims meets 
the condition of informativeness. However, as noted above, it is also what allows the 
account to work at all. How it does this is what I shall explain in the next section.  
 
§6  
I argued above that we use sentences, which are less basic but more accessible than the 
primitive entity notions featuring in them, to indicate what those primitive entity notions 
are and how they are to be understood. There are two points to make at this point about 
this.  
First, this is an example of the fixing of content rather than the specifying of meaning (to 
once again borrow and adapt Kripke’s distinction). The sentences, roughly understood, 
are used to fix the content of a primitive entity notion. The content of that primitive entity 
notion is fixed as the notion of the primitives which feature in these sentences in these 
ways. Once the primitive is made intelligible, a sharpened understanding of the original 
sentences will be given in terms of it. This sharpened understanding would not be 
available if the sentences were simply used to specify the meaning of the primitives. Then 
the primitives would be no clearer than the sentences were and our understanding of the 
sentences with which we did this would be unchanged53. 
Second, it has been claimed that truth-apt sentences depend for their content on the 
entities which serve as their semantic values. Given this, for any target range of sentences, 
there will be a fact of the matter about how they depend on the world for their content. If 
this is accepted, then it should also be accepted that attempts to use some range of 
sentences to fix the content of a primitive entity notion as the notion of the primitives 
                                                          
53 For examples of how we might understand a sentence more clearly when we understand it in terms of 
the primitives it might be taken to feature we might take the range of sentences which, roughly, pick out 
a subject and say something about it, e.g. ‘Simon is witty’, ‘Mark is trenchant’ etc. On one way of 
understanding these sentences, they feature terms for objects and terms for first-order properties, and 
they say that the objects in question satisfy the properties. A different way of understanding these 
sentences might take them to say that an object is characterised by a moment which instantiates a certain 
non-substantial universal. A different way again would take them to say that a certain bundle of co-
instantiated tropes overlaps with a certain bundle of resembling tropes 
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which feature in these sentences in these ways can go wrong. There might not be anything 
such that terms for it feature in all the relevant sentences in the specified ways.  
Not just any primitive we attempt to introduce is going to allow us to make reference to 
things in the world. Insofar as you think that some expressions, or combinations of 
expressions, are not properly understood as referential terms, you should accept that we 
can go wrong in thinking that an expression is one with which we can make reference to 
things in the world. Insofar as you think there are, or conceivably could be, things with 
radically different natures, one should accept that one legitimate response to an attempt 
to introduce a new form of primitive which was to occur in certain diverse cases but not 
in certain others might be to reject the coherence of a kind which would occur in these 
cases but not those.  
This potential for us to fail to secure the intended content for our primitives is crucial to 
my account of categorial existence claims. My contention is that we fail in exactly this 
way when we get the answer to the question of ontology wrong and then theorise in terms 
of primitives for entities which do not exist54. By contrast, what happens when we get the 
answer to the question right, is that our attempts to refer to things in the world using our 
primitives succeed. On my construal of existence claims, the claim that fs exist amounts 
to the claim that our attempt to secure the relevant content for our putative primitive 
referring terms succeeds.  
We secure the relevant content for our putative primitive referring term ‘f’ not by securing 
content for individual ‘f’s. We do not have individual ‘f’s before we have the notion of 
an f and we do not secure content for terms individually. We secure the relevant content 
for our primitive referring term ‘f’ by securing content for the notion of an f. The notion 
of an f is the notion of that which would serve as the semantic value of a potential referring 
term of kind f. This will be an ontological category notion. If we succeed in securing 
content for the category notion that content will be supplied by the ontological category 
of fs.  
How should we secure content for the notion of an f? We try to secure that content by 
securing content for our proposed primitive referring term ‘f’. We will only succeed in 
securing content for the proposed primitive referring term ‘f’ if an ontological category 
                                                          
54 One might be inclined to think that this is how we should understand theories which appeals to sense 
data. Others might think that this is how we should understand theories which are given in terms of 
tropes. 
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of fs can be used to fix its content. All of this might make ontological categories seem 
very mysterious, but I do not think they should be thought of as such. Ontological 
categories are simply natures. They are the natures in terms of which all other notions 
have to be defined. They supply the content in terms of which everything else is properly 
understood. Because of this they cannot be defined, and they are difficult to talk about. 
But if we are to say that there are fs, as we will need to if we take the notion of an f as a 
primitive, then we will need to explain how the notion of an f is to be understood.  
We cannot simply push the work off into the predicate and say that an f is a thing which 
is (an) f. I argued at length in the first chapter that explaining what it is to be an f will be 
derivative of explaining the notion of an f. We need to start with that.  
I suggest that two familiar philosophical notions can be of assistance here. The notion of 
implicit definition, and the notion of quantifying in. I shall start with the second.  
We explain the notion of an f by trying to fix content for a proposed type of referring term 
‘f’. We do the latter by making claims about the sentences in which such terms could 
occur. One way of thinking about this draws on the notion of quantifying into sentences. 
If we adopted the convention of using a different kind of variable for each proposed 
primitive notion, we could explain what we meant by the notion of an f by making claims 
about which positions in which sentences we could quantify into with variables of this 
kind. The debate about whether or not we can quantify into predicate position can be seen 
in this way. Asking the question of whether we can quantify into predicate position is a 
way of asking the question of whether there are such things as there would need to be to 
allow for such predication. Hale (2013, 12) makes the point that if we can quantify into 
predicate position that is because the sentence into which we quantified was already 
ontologically committed to an entity serving as the semantic value for its predicate55. 
Accepting this point, I can say that if we can quantify into a certain position in a certain 
range of sentences56 then we can say that the content of those sentences is properly 
understood to depend on an entity which is such as to serve as the semantic value of (what 
was revealed to be) the term the variable replaced.  
                                                          
55“it would be obviously and grossly implausible to claim that ‘Something is wise’, for example, introduces 
a commitment to the existence of objects of which ‘Socrates is wise’ is wholly innocent. On the contrary, 
it seems plain that quantification into a position in sentences, assuming it carries an existential 
commitment, merely generalises a commitment already borne by the constant expressions – whether 
names or predicates – which can occupy those positions and which its bound variables replace.”(Hale, 
2013, 12) 
56 I allow for limited ranges to allow that the primitives might be more specific than object, property, trope 
etc.  
151 
 
Some sentences might need to be entirely rewritten in order to explain how the proposed 
primitive referring term is taken to occur in them. This would be because the form which 
reveals the way they depend on the world for their semantic values57 is so different from 
their surface form. Since the rewritten form is to be understood in terms of the original 
and in rewriting, one would be required to distinguish between the primitive entity notions 
occurring in the sentence, this procedure suits my purposes as well as the one above. 
Indeed, focusing on the entirely rewritten form, and the different ways different 
ontologists might propose to rewrite various sentences helps one to appreciate, I suggest, 
that not only do we need primitive predicates (as David Lewis argued in his (1983) and 
as is now widely accepted), we also need primitive entity notions. It is such notions for 
which I am arguing in this thesis. They, whatever they are, are what I take to correspond 
to the ontological categories. Part of my argument for them is the argument presented in 
chapter one to the effect that we need to recognise the futility of trying to export the 
content of all such notions into a predicate.  
So, the first part of the task of attempting to fix content for a primitive term ‘f’ is by 
making claims about when a term of its kind should be taken to be used. I have argued 
that the task of ontology is to be approached as the task of saying how our language 
depends on the world for its content. Given this, it is useful to frame the task of fixing 
intended content for entity notions as a task approached by trying to produce schematic 
rewritings of sentences which make explicit the way they depend on the world for their 
content. In this light it can be seen that the first part of fixing the content of a proposed 
primitive referring term is approached by saying in what sentences in what ways terms of 
that kind occur. In the rewriting task, a claim about this will be a claim that in certain 
ways in certain sentences a term explicitly of this kind can be introduced. I will call claims 
about when fs can be used in rewritings use conditions58 for the proposed primitive term 
‘f’. To allow for the fact that we can form sentences featuring categorial mismatch which 
could not possibly be true, that almost any term (subject only to the restrictions of 
grammar) can feature in such sentences, and that such sentences will not facilitate fixing 
                                                          
57 I do not, and need not, deny that those very sentences will also have forms which serve other purposes. 
Different representations of the form of a sentence can serve purposes of making clear the structure of 
arguments for example. I will regard such form as abstractions from, or specifications of, or in other ways 
derivative of, the form which makes explicit how the sentence depends on the world for its content.  
58 These are obviously related to Lowe’s (2006) existence conditions. I shall go into more detail on this at 
the end of this chapter. I am also drawing, in my construal of both conditions on Thomasson’s construal 
of identity conditions. For Thomasson (2015), identity conditions are metalanguage rules expressed in the 
object language. My conditions are proposals expressed in the object language which become rules if the 
terms they are used to fix the content of succeed in referring.  
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on the notion of a putative kind of entity in question, specifying use conditions requires 
specifying some range of sentences as ones in which a putative type of term can occur 
with truth. These will not be exhaustive. They would only need to be if the aim was to 
specify the meaning rather than to fix it. In some ways this is an intersubstitutability 
approach, but it differs importantly from those in the literature which generally use the 
condition of intersubstitutability to determine a class. I take making a (possibly 
contentious) claim about intersubstitutability to be a way of trying to fix on an ontological 
category.  
Specifying use conditions goes some way towards one’s attempt to fix the content 
intended, the entity will have to be one which would serve as the semantic value of these 
terms in these sentences, but this is not enough. Because we won’t know how to rewrite 
the sentences in terms of the constants of the kind in question unless we know when the 
same term of this kind can be reused59. Specifying that condition imposes serious and 
important requirements on the nature of the entity which would be apt to serve as the 
semantic value of the terms in question. It would distinguish, for instance, between 
persisting rivers and river stages. Between variable collections and sets whose members 
are not variable. And it would help to distinguish, to appeal to Lowe’s favourite example, 
between a statue and the clay composing it, if we are to use the rewriting of sentences in 
terms of proposed primitive referring terms to try to fix the content of those terms by 
doing the rewriting of the sentences in such a way that only entities of the intended 
categories would be apt to serve as the semantic values of those terms then we will need 
to specify the conditions in which a term can be reused60.  
The point above about the requirement for both use conditions and reuse conditions for 
the various kinds of terms we use in our rewriting can be seen another way when it is 
remembered that the purpose of the rewriting is to use claims about language to make 
claims about the world by taking advantage of the status of language as dependent on the 
world for its content. In making claims about how various sentences feature referring 
terms we introduce tentative commitment to entities serving as referents for what we have 
taken to be referring terms. But what we don’t want to do is commit ourselves to taking 
there to be different entities for each different sentence. That would get the ontology 
wrong. Use conditions introduce commitment to entities and reuse conditions specify the 
                                                          
59 The conditions specifying when terms can be reused are obviously versions of Fregean identity 
conditions, a version of which Lowe took to be closely connected to his categories. Having spent chapter 
two preparing the ground, I am drawing on Lowe here but also modifying his account.  
60 As noted, these are obviously a version of identity conditions. 
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conditions in which the terms recognised as referring terms are coreferential. Together 
they allow us to try to fix on the content of a proposed referring term. In making our 
existence claims we shall be claiming that a proposed term understood to function in this 
way allows for reference. However, there will only be such terms if there are things of 
the nature aimed at. If there are things of that nature, then there will be such terms and 
our conditions will have succeeded in securing the relevant nature and letting it provide 
the content for our terms. Both our use and our reuse conditions aimed at such fixing of 
content. They were conditions for being a term such that it would feature in these contexts 
and be reused across these contexts. If there is in fact nothing that would do that then 
these conditions determine nothing. There are no terms that would feature in sentences in 
these ways because there are no entities apt to serve as the semantic values of terms 
featuring in these ways.  
This point is important because it connects back to the role that the potential to fail to fix 
content plays in the current construal of existence claims. Content is secured for the 
proposed primitives if and only if the relevant entities exist. This is why we can make 
claims about what there is by making claims about the content of our truth apt sentences.  
Before moving on I want to draw out the useful comparison with implicit definition. The 
procedure described above can be thought of as a version of implicit definition, albeit 
with some differences from some other versions of that procedure.  
 
§7 
Use and reuse conditions are my account’s version of Lowe’s existence and identity 
conditions. As detailed in the last chapter, one of the questions Lowe tackles with respect 
to his identity conditions is the question of how we should understand the occurrence in 
the identity conditions of the very terms they are supposed to be allowing for the use of, 
terms for entities of the kind in question. The answer I can provide to this question with 
respect to my versions of the conditions is that insofar as they serve to introduce a new 
kind of term and make a corresponding category notion intelligible, use and reuse 
conditions do not initially include genuine uses of the terms which they are being used to 
introduce. They can be understood to feature a gap where the term whose content is being 
fixed is. It is because of this that these conditions, insofar as they serve this role, are not, 
as they stand, truth-apt. They are to be understood initially more as proposals than 
complete statements.  
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Implicit definitions, too, initially, contain a gap on account of which the putative 
containing sentences fail to be truth apt as they stand.  
An implicit definition of a word is supposed to work by our deciding that certain 
sentences (or rules) containing it are correct, and by our presuming that this 
decision fixes the word’s meaning. But what is the justification for that 
presumption?...This question has a standard answer: namely, that the decision to 
regard “#F” as true is, implicitly, a decision to give “F” the meaning it would need 
to have in order that “#F” be true.    (Horwich, 1997, 424)  
If our decision to regard “#F” as true is part of how F acquires its meaning, and F’s having 
this meaning is necessary in order for the containing sentence to be true, then what we 
start off with seems to be something which is not truth-apt, because it has a gap; F doesn’t 
have a meaning, and this is to be changed by our decision to treat the containing sentence 
as true.  
In a similar way, we can say that insofar as we use them to introduce kinds of terms (and 
corresponding categories) which despite this already occur in them, use and reuse 
conditions are not initially truth-apt because they have gaps; the kinds of terms which we 
are trying to use them to introduce are not such as to already be able to be used.  
One of the important differences between use and reuse conditions and implicit 
definitions is the meaning of the rest of the sentence. For implicit definitions, this can be 
taken to be determinate: “it is being assumed that the rest of the sentence “#_” somehow 
already has a meaning” (Horwich, 1997, 424). This meaning in some sense constrains 
what “F” can mean if the sentence is to be true.  
For use and reuse conditions, those given in terms of conditions which are ultimately 
supposed to be understood in terms of the primitives they are being used to introduce, the 
meaning of the rest of the sentence is not understood in a determinate way. We have to 
return to our appeal to a rough understanding of the sentences we are using to introduce 
the primitive and the corresponding category notion. I shall suggest below that we can 
use that as a constraint.  
Another difference is that we are not trying to give meaning to a single term, we are trying 
to give meaning to a kind of term and thus to make intelligible the category which would 
correspond to that kind. Further, given our purposes, we need the terms of the introduced 
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kind to be primitive referring terms, it is of no use to have them acquire a meaning which 
can be further analysed.  
In spite of all the differences it seems to me that we can with use and reuse conditions try 
to do something in some ways similar to what we do in determining the meaning of “F” 
by deciding to regard “#F” as true. The category introduced is just the way of being an 
entity which would allow the new terms to be used to refer. The terms have to be able to 
be used to refer if the conditions are to be true, so we can make the target category notions 
intelligible by taking the associated existence and identity conditions, or instances of 
them, to be true in the contexts the original sentences would be true.  
I have argued that this process must be thought of as (slightly modifying Kripke’s terms) 
fixing the content of the introduced term, not specifying its meaning. I argued that if we 
treat the introduction as specifying the meaning we won’t get the required clarification of 
what were supposed to be non-basic notions appealed to in the introduction of the term. 
We won’t get the desired sharpened understanding of the content of the original 
sentences. Also, if we treat the attempts to specify how primitive kind terms should be 
understood not as fixing their content but instead as specifying their meaning we seem to 
miss our target. We end up with various instances of one kind, whatever corresponds to 
predicates, if any one thing does, rather than with entity notions which could be used to 
say what corresponds to predicates or to sentences or to terms like ‘Peter’s smile’ etc. 
 
One serious problem for implicit definitions is the existence problem.  
One commonly cited difficulty is the ‘existence problem’: the problem of whether 
there is any meaning that “F” could have that would render “#F” true…we can be 
sure to have implicitly defined “F”, in accordance with the standard conception of 
implicit definition, only if we can be sure that there exists a meaning for “F” 
relative to which “#F” would be true.     (Horwich, 1997, 424) 
Use and reuse conditions have some similarities with, but also some differences from, 
implicit definitions. Nevertheless, I want to claim that the existence problem does arise 
for them. However, for use and reuse conditions, understood as ways of explicating 
ontological category notions, the existence problem is not a problem but a feature. It is a 
feature which I claim allows the approach I am defending to avoid the presupposition 
problem I have raised for other accounts including Lowe’s.  
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Since the account of categories which I am defending is a Lowean no-entity account of 
categories, the way in which the existence condition arises for the explication of those 
categories using existence and identity conditions is different from the way that it arises 
for some implicit definitions. Ontological categories are not entities which exist. 
Ontological categories are natures or ways of being an entity. What it is for there to fail 
to be a target ontological category is not for an entity to fail to exist but for some suggested 
notion not to correspond to any way of being an entity. A proposed category notion would 
fail to correspond to a way of being an entity if the terms introduced in accordance with 
it failed to refer.  
The claim that the existence problem is a problem which faces the explication of putative 
primitive category notions is the claim that I defended in chapter one when I argued for 
the presupposition problem. I argued there that the basic reason for thinking that the 
presupposition problem arises for the explication of primitives goes as follows: The 
primitive is explained as that which underlies, in some specified way, the less basic 
notions used to introduce it. If there is in fact nothing which underlies the less basic things 
in question in the way specified, then appropriate content is not provided for the term 
supposedly corresponding to the primitive. I noted in discussing this that a claim in the 
background is that the less basic things couldn’t be as they are but be constituted 
differently but I contended that this is a claim we should accept. If the less basic things 
are to be properly understood in terms of the more basic, then they couldn’t be what they 
are but have a different real definition. If a primitive is introduced by being used to 
provide an analysis of a roughly demarcated range of sentences, but there is nothing which 
occurs in the really correct analysis of the sentences in the way the primitive is said to, 
(perhaps the range of sentences are not correctly analysed together at all), then the term 
for the primitive which was being explained in this way has not been successfully 
explained. It has not been given the content that the introduction aimed to give it.  
One way of thinking about how the existence problem arises for the explication of 
categories is as follows: the categories we try to introduce using use and reuse conditions 
given relative to some specific range of sentences are supposed to structure those 
sentences with respect to which they are given. Those categories are to be the ones with 
which we say correctly how the content of those sentences is provided by the entities 
serving as the semantic values of the terms in them.  But we can be wrong about how 
sentences depend on the world for their content and when we are wrong but, unaware of 
this, we try to introduce some category notion as that which structures these sentences in 
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these ways, we simply fail to capture anything because there is no nature such as that 
which occurs in those sentences in those ways.  
The point is one which I raised against Lowe in chapter two; the explication of notions to 
be understood as ontological primitives cannot be done in a way that is ontologically 
innocent. But if this is the case, how can we use ontological category notions to make the 
existence claims we want to make in ontology?   How can we secure content for these 
claims which allows them to be both true and false? The problem is that the words only 
have the content we want them to have if the world is as we claim. That is the 
presupposition problem and I have argued that it arises for category terms as well. They 
only have the content we want them to if the world is as we claim.  
The way I use my version of Lowean categories to avoid this problem relies on their 
association with use and reuse conditions and the fact that the role of the use and reuse 
conditions is to fix the content of the category notion. The approach I am taking to 
existence claims is a metalinguistic one 
 
§8 
On the metalinguistic approach to existence claims that I am defending, it is to be 
accepted that our truth-apt sentences depend systematically for their content on the 
entities which serve as the semantic values of their terms. This allows us to make claims 
about what there is by making claims about how our truth-apt sentences have the content 
that they do in fact have. We do this by making claims about how these sentences feature 
referring terms. Since the dependence of language for its content on the world is 
systematic, any referring term will be a term of a kind. Different kinds of referring terms 
will occur in different linguistic contexts. The ontological notion of a kind or category 
corresponds to the linguistic one. It is that of an entity whose nature is such that it would 
serve as the semantic value of a referring term of the kind in question i.e. one featuring 
in specified sentences in specified ways.    
The two notions of kind, that of a kind of referring term, and of an ontological category 
of entity that would serve as the semantic value of such a term, are tied together. I have 
argued that we make claims about what there is by making claims about the entities that 
serve as the semantic values of our terms. The way we make claims about the entities 
which serve as the semantic values of our terms is by making claims about the kinds of 
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referring terms that feature in our truth-apt sentences. The systematic dependence of 
language on ontology determines that those claims amount to claims that there are entities 
of the kind required to serve as the semantic values for such terms because the status of 
an expression as a referring term of some kind depends on the existence of fs for it to 
refer to.  
This is the reason why we should not accept the following construal of existence claims 
which is close to, but importantly different from the construal which I shall defend.  
A construal we not accept is: fs exist iff f-terms allow for reference.  
The reason we should not accept this construal of categorial existence claims is that it 
uses the expression f-terms. However, given the dependence of language on the world 
discussed above, there will only be f-terms if there are fs to serve as their semantic values. 
To be an f-term is to be a term which has fs as its semantic values. This points the way to 
an adequate construal of the metalinguistic construal of existence claims that I have been 
developing.  
 
The construal of existence claims which I am defending is the following:  
fs exist iff an expression of a proposed primitive kind, ‘f’, allows for reference 
 
 
§9 
 
One way of thinking about the proposal I have made and its connection of talk of what is 
required for introduction of referring terms of various kinds with existence claims is by 
comparison with the notion of a Carnapian linguistic framework. 
If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to 
introduce a system of new ways of speaking subject to new rules; we shall call this 
procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in 
question. 
(Carnap, 1950/1956, 205)  
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What similarity there is I can embrace. As I discussed in chapter one, I think that the 
interpretation of the importance of linguistic frameworks which Price (2009) proposes, 
and Thomasson (2015) adopts, can be understood in such a way that it poses the 
presupposition problem. (Roughly, terms of kinds, and terms for kinds, can’t be used 
unless a relevant framework is adopted but if the relevant framework is adopted and the 
terms can be used then existence questions concerning them will be trivially true)  
The comparison in fact facilitates understanding of my approach. The claim I defend in 
this chapter is exactly the claim which Carnap was most concerned to deny in his 
introduction of the notion of a linguistic framework in his (1950/1956). I have argued that 
you do need ontological insight to introduce a new kind of referring term successfully. 
Further, I have contended that the claim that you can introduce a new kind of referring 
term successfully, far from being ontologically innocent, is in fact a way of making a 
claim about what there is.  
 
§10 
 
To accept the above construal of existence claims is to accept that we can make claims 
about the world by making claims about language. Before moving on I want to raise one 
objection in order to set it aside.  
First, one might object to the proposal by claiming that it makes ontology objectionably 
dependent on language.  
My response to this objection is that it does not do so;  
First, because the condition on the right-hand side is presented not as a condition for 
existence but as a construal of existence claims. It expresses the condition for the truth of 
an existence claim. There can be entities without there being language but there cannot 
be true existence claims without language61.  
Second, because the reason the construal is supposed to work is that language is 
dependent on ontology, rather than the other way around. It is because I take the content 
                                                          
61 This response of mine draws on the response Thomasson gives to a similar objection to her account but 
diverges from it in important ways because Thomasson’s response focuses on her notion of application 
conditions. (Thomasson, 2015, 85-7) 
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of language to be dependent on what there is that I take claims about what there is to be 
able to be made through the making of claims about language.  
Third, and finally, I do not take the natures of things to inextricably involve language. 
Instead, because language is dependent on the nature of the world, I take the nature of 
language to be able to be used to explain the nature of things. The content of different 
kinds of referring terms is fixed with more or less explicit conditions. Where this fixing 
is successful, the natures of the corresponding entities are able to be understood as natures 
which make them such as to be referred to in this way. I take the response here to articulate 
an important broadly Fregean and neo-Fregean insight, that without taking entities to be 
dependent on the words we use for them, we can explain their natures by presenting the 
entities as apt to be referred to by certain kinds of terms. This is a central point on which 
my construal of ontological categories draws on the linguistic approach of Frege and 
Hale. I shall explain in the first part of chapter four why I have not simply adopted the 
linguistic approach.  
 
§11 
The final thing I shall do in this chapter is return to Lowe. Though, I have not focused on 
it in the course of presenting my view, it is nevertheless the case that the ontological 
categories which are at the centre of my account draw largely on his construal of the 
notion. It is also the case that, as I argued in chapter two, there are problems with that 
construal as it stands.  In this section, I shall draw out the ways in which the ontological 
categories which play a crucial role in my account draw on Lowe’s construal of the 
notion. I shall explain how the three theses mentioned at the beginning of the chapter 
feature in my account and I shall argue that the divergences between the versions of these 
theses which I accept and the versions which Lowe accepts allows my construal of 
ontological categories to avoid the problems I raised for Lowe.  
 
§11.1 
Ontological categories play a crucial role in my account of how we answer the question 
of ontology. Ontological categories, as I have construed them, are not entities which exist. 
Ontological categories are natures or ways of being an entity. There is no more to an 
ontological category than the nature which would allow a way of attempting to refer to 
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entities to succeed. This is crucial to my account of how we make existence claims. I have 
claimed that all referring terms are terms of kinds. As such, we refer to a thing, if we do, 
by referring to it as a thing of a kind. We use use and reuse conditions expressed over the 
sentences of our language to explicate the categories we intend to use to refer to things. 
These categories are natures which cannot be defined but can be explained as that which 
would make an entity apt to be referred to in these contexts, in these ways.  
The above positions which are crucial to my account are easily seen to be versions of the 
Lowean theses about categories mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.  
These are: 
1. Ontological Categories are not entities. 
2. Ontological Category notions are involved in the individuation of entities  
3. Ontological Categories are associated with the existence and identity conditions 
of the entities that belong to them. 
In the course of this chapter, I claimed that all referring terms are referring terms of kinds. 
I defended this claim on the basis that the way that language depends on the world for its 
content is systematic; referring terms come in kinds, all referring terms of the same kind 
require the same category of thing to serve as their semantic value. Given that there only 
exists a kind of referring term if there is an ontological category corresponding to it, and 
given that we use the latter to fix the content of the former, it can be seen that on my 
account we use ontological category notions to individuate entities (single them out in 
thought). Since this is the case, ontological categories could not be, and are not, further 
entities. If they were further entities, we would be left with a regress. Finally, it is clear 
that, on my account, ontological categories are still closely associated with the existence 
and identity conditions of the entities belonging to them, although I have called these 
conditions use and reuse conditions to emphasise their role in fixing the content of 
referring terms as those that are apt to refer to entities of a certain category. Where this is 
successful, these proposals become principles governing the use of terms of the kind in 
question. The modal consequences of this shall be the focus of chapter six.  
 
§11.2 
I shall conclude by reviewing the problems I raised for Lowe’s account of ontological 
categories and considering whether they are problems for my account.  
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There are four main issues which I contended are problems for Lowe’s account: 
1. The presupposition problem 
2. The broadness of his notion of ontological category 
3. The duplication of work 
4. His construal of existence and identity conditions 
My account of ontological categories avoids the presupposition problem because of: (a) 
the change in the construal of existence and identity conditions and the precise role they 
play with respect to ontological categories, (b) the rejection of Lowe’s claim that the 
explication of ontological categories is ontologically neutral, (c) the change in the 
construal of existence claims.  
Lowe’s account of categories faces the problem that it is too broad because it, like many 
other accounts, proposes a hierarchical understanding of categories and thus includes 
various levels of categories within the notion of an ontological category. My account 
avoids the problems this raises by only counting what Lowe would call the fundamental 
categories as ontological categories. This allows my account to present a notion of 
ontological category as ontological primitive.  
On Lowe’s account, ontological categories and substantial kinds do much of the same 
work. This leads to problematic duplication of this work. The absence of Lowe’s 
substantial kind entities from my account allows me to avoid that which leads to the 
duplication of work in Lowe’s account. 
Finally, the main problems I raised in chapter two against Lowe’s construal of existence 
and identity conditions were: (a) the absence of a construal of existence conditions, (b) 
the way the construal unduly limits the notion of a criterion of identity, (c) the way Lowe’s 
criteria run into Williamson’s triviality problem and fail to fulfil their function. The 
existence and identity conditions of my construal avoid each of these problems; (a) I have 
given a construal of existence conditions as use conditions for proposed referring terms; 
(b) I have construed the conditions in a way that is neutral between referring terms of any 
kind. One step that was important for my doing this was taking use and reuse conditions 
always to explicate ontological category notions, rather than sortal kinds as Lowe does; 
(c) My use and reuse conditions do not run into Williamson’s triviality problem for two 
reasons. First, because they are not truth-apt as they stand, and second because they have 
a clear function, that of attempting to secure requisite content for a proposed kind of 
referring term.  
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§12 
As I noted in the course of this chapter, there is another construal of ontological categories 
which has some important similarities with my own. In the next chapter, I shall begin by 
focusing on that construal, and I shall then move on to consider other construals of the 
notion of an ontological category defended in the literature. My interest in ontological 
categories is driven by the fact that we answer the question of ontology using categorial 
existence claims. The notion of ontological category that I am interested in is whatever 
notion is relevant to the content of the categorial terms occurring in those claims. The 
position for which I have argued takes the notion of ontological category which is relevant 
to these claims to be a broadly Lowean one. I shall argue, with respect to each of the 
construals of the notion from the literature considered in the next chapter, simply that it 
is not the notion of ontological category relevant to the categorial terms that feature in 
our answers to the question of ontology. For my purposes, I can set them aside on that 
basis.  
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Chapter 4 
 
§0 
In this chapter, I shall discuss alternative construals of the notion of an ontological 
category in order to locate the construal which I defend in the literature. I have presented 
my construal as broadly Lowean. I based the judgement that it is so on the three theses 
concerning ontological categories which are central to Lowe’s construal of the notion and 
which I adopted from him. In chapter two, I raised some problems for Lowe’s position 
on account of which, I claimed, I could not accept it as it stands. My own construal, 
presented in chapter three, diverges from Lowe’s in a number of important ways with the 
result, I contend, of allowing me to avoid the problems I raised for Lowe.  
The notion of an ontological category in which I am interested is the notion of that which 
is relevant for our understanding of the categorial existence claims with which we answer 
the question of ontology. In this chapter, I shall consider a number of construals of the 
notion of an ontological category from the literature. I shall argue that, insofar as one is 
interested in the notion of an ontological category relevant to our categorial existence 
claims, none of the construals of the notion which I consider in this chapter are construals 
we should adopt. With respect to some of them I shall argue further that the construal of 
the notion defended is a derivative one, obscuring a more fundamental one of the sort that 
I am interested in. In these cases, I suggest, focusing on the derivative version of the 
notion hinders recognition of the more fundamental one.  
 
§1 
I shall begin by focusing on the Fregean and neo-Fregean linguistic construal of the notion 
of an ontological category. In the last chapter, I claimed that the construal which I defend 
has some important similarities with, as well as differences from, the linguistic construal. 
In this chapter, by expanding my discussion of the linguistic construal, I shall draw out 
more clearly what those differences are. I shall focus on one particular version of the 
linguistic construal of the notion of an ontological category, that defended by Bob Hale 
in his (2013). In chapter two, §11, I presented a number of arguments against accepting 
the Fregean construal of existence claims. I specifically argued against acceptance of the 
staggered approach to answering the question of ontology which Hale defends (Hale, 
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2013, 9ff) according to which one asks first what category of things there are, and then 
asks what kinds of things of that category there are. I shall not recap those arguments 
here. What I shall do instead is try to show how much the linguistic construal of the notion 
of an ontological category is tied to, and justified by, that approach to existence claims. I 
shall argue that if we reject the associated approach to existence claims, then we should 
not accept the linguistic construal of the notion of an ontological category, though there 
are a number of different ways we might accept the linguistic construal of the specific 
notions with which Hale is concerned, those of object and property. One of these ways 
involves not taking these notions to be category notions after all.   
 
§2 
Hale accepts the connection between ontological categories and the question ‘what is 
there?’.  
In fact, that’s his starting point. He notes that the question is a crucial question in 
ontology, and he notes Quine’s point that one might think one could answer the question 
with the word ‘everything’ but that that answer is unsatisfactory because it fails to answer 
what is being asked. Hale characterises the question which is being asked as one about 
what basic or fundamental categories should be accepted, noting that further more specific 
questions can then be asked about any answer which is given; one of the examples he 
gives here is that if we agree that there are properties we can ask whether there are mental 
properties as well as physical properties.  
He takes this characterisation of the question ‘what is there?’ to give rise to what he calls 
‘prior methodological questions’ and among these questions he takes the following two 
to be primary: 
How are the various ontological categories to be understood? 
  How are questions about what kinds of things there are best tackled? 
(Hale, 2013, 10) 
 
He then goes on to develop and defend his linguistic approach to categories largely within 
the context of providing answers to these questions. To do this he starts from the 
assumption that, 
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central among the categories to which things belong are those of object, property, 
and relation     (Hale, 2013, 10).  
With this contention in place, Hale proceeds to address the first of the two questions he 
introduced as important methodological questions. This first question was “How are the 
various ontological categories to be understood?” (Hale, 2013, 10) Hale argues in favour 
of the answer given to this question by the linguistic approach to categories on the basis 
that only this answer is appropriately neutral.  
 
What is the answer? And what is the linguistic approach to categories?  
 
Hale’s linguistic approach to categories is a development of the linguistic approach to 
categories introduced by Frege. The idea is that we should start with a logical analysis of 
language. Frege distinguishes between names, in his broad sense of name on which this 
includes for instance definite descriptions, and predicates or incomplete expressions. For 
Frege, singular terms and sentences are basic and the various orders of predicates, and 
functional expressions, are derived given these. A first level predicate will be a sentence 
with some name or names removed, so it is incomplete. In this way, the logical analysis 
of language allows for the delineation of categories of expressions. The idea of the 
linguistic approach to categories is that the ontological categories correspond to these 
linguistic categories. And not just that they happen to correspond, but that it is through 
the categories of linguistic expressions that we grasp ontological categories.  
what I am calling the Fregean approach to ontological questions – basically the 
priority of the analysis of language over the categorization of the types of entity 
(Hale, 2013, 17)  
 
Hale writes about ontological categories being the ontological correlates of the linguistic 
categories (Hale, 2013, 11-3). The idea is that objects are what singular terms stand for 
and properties are what predicates stand for (Hale, 2013, 11-40) 
Hale’s argument in favour of this linguistic approach to categories is that only it is 
appropriately neutral (Hale, 2013, 18-19); he contends that other ways of explicating the 
notions of object and property involve an inappropriate and premature ruling on certain 
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questions which he claims should be left open such as whether there are objects which do 
not exist in space and time as well as objects which exist in space and time. He considers 
various other ways of explaining the notions of object and property and generally finds 
fault with them because they rule out even the question of abstract objects and properties 
thereof. He considers and rejects the idea that the notion of object could be explicated as 
things appropriately similar to some ostended concrete object on the basis a) that it is not 
clear what would count as relevantly or appropriately similar and b) that it is not clear 
how this explanation would allow one to grasp a notion of object which would allow for 
objects which could not be objects of ostension either because they were too large or too 
small for that or because they were not in space or time. He rejects explications of the 
notion of object as something occupying a region of space because this prematurely rules 
out abstract objects, and similarly rejects characterizing properties as things which can be 
in two places at the one time on the basis that it prematurely rules out many properties of 
abstract objects.  
Other putative explanations of the notions are held not to amount to anything; for 
example, it is no good to explain objects as instances of universals unless we can give an 
independent characterization of the notion of universal. Combined with an understanding 
of universals as something which have objects as instances it says nothing. Hale considers 
an explication offered by Russell:  
We speak of anything which is given in sensation, or is of the same nature as 
things given in sensation, as a particular; by opposition to this, a universal will be 
anything which may be shared by many particulars (Russell, 1912/1998, 93)  
and argues that without the phrase ‘or is of the same nature’ this explication again 
prematurely rules out even the question of abstract objects but that with it the explication 
doesn’t say anything so much as note where something needs to be said.  
On the basis of all of the above, Hale contends that it is only the explication of the notions 
of object and property which is given by the linguistic approach which avoids prematurely 
ruling out what should be open and legitimate questions, such as whether there are 
abstract objects. Only the linguistic approach provides explications of the category 
notions of object and property which are appropriately neutral and for this reason, Hale 
argues, the linguistic approach’s explanation of the categories of object and property 
should be accepted.  
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Having argued in this way in favour of an essentially Fregean approach to ontological 
categories, Hale develops that position in order to defend it against two pressing 
objections. These two objections are: 1. That the linguistic approach makes ontology 
implausibly language and mind dependent, and 2. That the problem of the concept horse 
undermines the basic claims of the linguistic approach.   
Hale has a two part response to the first objection, that the linguistic approach makes 
ontology implausibly language and mind dependent (Hale, 2013, 20). The first thing he 
notes is that this approach seems to ignore the non-mind or language dependent 
contribution of truth in the Fregean picture (Hale, 2013, 19). The second part of Hale’s 
response to the objection that the linguistic approach makes ontology implausibly mind 
and language dependent addresses what Hale thinks is an important point which this 
objection can press. This point is that the linguistic approach as so far stated doesn’t allow 
for nameless objects or properties which have not been associated with predicates in a 
language. The move he makes here is to say that the position as so far stated provides 
sufficient but not necessary conditions for being an object or being a property. He says 
that taking the conditions so far provided to be necessary as well as sufficient would 
commit the linguistic approach to taking ontology to be implausibly language and mind 
dependent because being an object would require having been named, being a property, 
having been associated with a predicate. In order to provide a condition which is both 
necessary and sufficient and which does not commit the approach to this result Hale 
modalises the characteristic conditions of the linguistic approach.  
To be an object is to be the referent of a possible singular term, to be a (first-level) 
property is to be what a possible (first-level) predicate stands for, and similarly 
for other cases. (Hale, 2013, 20) 
The second objection which Hale considers is the objection that the problem of the 
concept horse undermines the basic claims of the linguistic approach (Hale, 2013, 21-36). 
Hale’s solution to the problem of the concept horse is to reject the reference principle: 
expressions can stand for the same thing only if they are of the same syntactic 
type, which will be the case only if they can be interchanged in all context salva 
congruitate (Hale, 2013, 25) 
This rejection is another way in which he develops the Fregean approach to categories in 
response to objections. On the basis of the consideration that although we can use singular 
terms to refer to what seem to properties when we do so the terms we use are clearly 
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nominalizations of predicates (e.g. the concept horse from is a horse) Hale introduces the 
idea of basic and less basic ways of referring to an entity. This involves rejection of the 
reference principle because it allows that the same entity can be referred to by expressions 
of different linguistic categories, but Hale doesn’t think this should be considered a cost 
of his solution because he thinks the reference principle is a principle which should be 
rejected. He argues that it was holding on to this principle that led Frege into difficultly.  
Hale argues that subscribing to the reference principle undermines the basic insight of 
Frege’s analysis of language – that there is a single semantic relation holding between 
expressions of different types and entities of different categories, i.e. that expressions of 
different types all stand for something but for different kinds of things (Hale, 2013, 31-
4). According to Hale, it is this insight which underlies the linguistic approach to 
categories - the different categories of things just are what the different types of 
expressions stand for (or could stand for). Hale argues that if you hold onto the reference 
principle this cannot be the case. The reference principle demands interchangeability 
salva congruitate and so it will always conflict with any claim that it is the same relation 
which holds between singular terms and entities of one category and between predicates 
and entities of some different category. Instead given the reference principle some or 
other of these claims will simply be ill-formed.  
Hale rejects the reference principle to offer his own resolution of the problem of the 
concept horse and further develop his version of the linguistic approach to categories by 
modifying his contention that “objects are what actual or possible non-empty singular 
terms stand for” (Hale, 2013, 22) In place of this is the following: 
objects are what are or could be primary semantic values of singular terms 
  properties are what are or could be primary semantic values of predicates 
(Hale, 2013, 32) 
 
§3 
In the last section, I explained the central claim of the linguistic approach to categories, 
the position that the ontological categories are the ontological correlates of the linguistic 
categories, and I outlined how Hale develops the central claim of the approach to give his 
version of the linguistic approach to categories.  
170 
 
Hale develops the position as part of the task set by the first of the methodological 
questions he took to be raised by the connection of categories with the question ‘what is 
there?’. This first question was “How are the various ontological categories to be 
understood?” (Hale, 2013, 10).  
The second important methodological question he noted was “How are questions about 
what kinds of things there are best tackled?” (Hale, 2013, 10). The main thrust of the 
answer Hale gives to this question can be understood from the above. Given the 
connection of categories with the question, and the linguistic approach to categories, for 
Hale: 
questions about what kinds of things there are are inseparable from, and in one 
way posterior to, questions about the logical analysis of language (Hale, 2013, 9)  
I outlined his developments of the Fregean position on the connection between the 
products of the logical analysis of language and the kinds of entities there are above, so I 
shall conclude the exposition by providing the specific answers he gives to his second 
question in light of the answers he has given to the first question.  
The second question is:  
How are questions about what kinds of things there are best tackled?  (Hale, 2013, 
10). 
For Hale, singular terms and predicates are the linguistic categories, so objects and 
properties are what there is. How do we determine that there exists some object or 
property? Earlier, he noted occurrence in a certain kind of true sentence as what is 
required but in his final position this requirement is modified somewhat as follows.  
Concerning objects, he writes:  
there exist objects of a specified kind if and only if (i) there are or could be singular 
terms which would if non-empty refer to objects of that kind and (ii) if there were 
such terms there would be true atomic statements containing them (Hale, 2013, 
37)  
Part of the motivation for this condition is provided by the consideration that the 
contingent facts about what terms we have introduced should not make a decisive 
difference to the truth of an existence claim concerning an object.  (Hale, 2013, 37) 
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For the case of existence statements concerning properties, Hale considers a parallel 
formulation which would require that there be true statements configuring predicates in 
question or that there would be such true statements but for lack of predicates, but, 
ultimately, he doesn’t require this on the basis of a contention that the possible existence 
of a meaningful predicate is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of 
a property. He argues that such properties could be understood as satisfaction conditions 
associated with predicates. This claim is that if we understand properties as satisfaction 
conditions then if a predicate is meaningful, there will a property for which that predicate 
stands.  
Part of what Hale takes to recommend this construal of properties as satisfaction 
conditions is that it accommodates and explains the fact that we can differentiate between 
the properties for which different necessarily empty predicates stand. An example which 
Hale later provides of two such properties which are, intuitively, different properties 
despite the fact that they are both necessarily empty is:  
the property of being an even prime greater than two and the property of being 
both odd and even    (Hale, 2013, 188)  
On the basis of the considerations mentioned above, Hale concludes that, concerning 
perfectly general properties62: 
We should take the existence of a significant predicate simpliciter as a sufficient 
condition for the existence of a corresponding property, and the possibility of such 
a predicate as necessary and sufficient (Hale, 2013, 37).  
 
 
§4 
In the last two sections I focused on explaining what Hale’s linguistic approach to the 
notion of an ontological category involves. In this section I shall consider Hale’s defence 
of his linguistic approach. The aim of the section is to draw out how closely tied the 
                                                          
62 In addition to perfectly general properties, Hale also recognises what he calls object dependent 
properties. He gives the example of the property of being a brother of Aristotle as a plausible case of an 
object-dependent property (Hale, 2013, 223). The idea is that, if the existence of Aristotle is a contingent 
matter, and the property of being a brother of Aristotle only exists if Aristotle does, then the existence of 
the property is contingent.  
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linguistic approach to categories is to the construal of answers to the question of ontology 
as staggered which I argued we should reject in chapter one, §11.  
According to Hale’s version of the linguistic approach, ontological categories are the 
ontological correlates of the linguistic categories63 so we should understand the notion of 
an ontological category as the notion of an ontological correlate of a linguistic category.  
How does Hale argue in favour of understanding the notion of a category in the way 
recommended by his version of the linguistic approach to categories? 
The first thing to note is that Hale accepts the connection which I noted at the beginning 
of this piece between ontological categories and the kind notions which are used to give 
answers to the question ‘what is there?’:  
The central question of ontology, then, is: what kinds of things are there? I am 
using ‘thing’ here as Russell once used ‘term’ – as the widest word in the 
philosophical vocabulary, with no implication of membership in any particular 
ontological category. Accordingly, one way of taking our general question is as 
asking what basic or fundamental categories or types of entity we should 
recognize – where candidates include objects, individuals, particulars, substances, 
properties, relations, universals, events, processes, states of affairs, facts etc. 
(Hale, 2013, 9) 
On the basis of his acceptance of this connection I think that the disagreement which I’m 
going to develop with his position won’t be a merely verbal one about how we are to use 
the term ‘category’. The occurrence of category notions in common answers to the 
question ‘what is there?’ was the way I characterized the target notion and it is also the 
way Hale introduces and characterizes the notion.  
In addition to connecting ontological category notions with answers to the question ‘what 
is there?’, Hale argues for his position as a general one concerning how we should 
understand ontological category notions. So, for example, he writes: 
As anticipated, I shall recommend a broadly Fregean answer – that is, an answer 
according to which ontological categorization (save in special cases, 
categorization of non-linguistic entities) is dependent upon and derivative from 
prior logical categorization of expressions. (Hale, 2013, 10) 
                                                          
63 Hale takes the linguistic categories to be those of singular terms and predicates 
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Hale’s defence of his position as a general position concerning ontological category 
notions is based on the presumed status of the notions of ‘object’, ‘property’ and ‘relation’ 
as paradigmatic category notions. The general question of how we should understand 
ontological category notions is approached through the specific question of how we 
should understand these notions (Hale, 2013, 10, 18-9). 
 
It is worth noting that Hale does not claim that the notions he is assuming to be category 
notions constitute the complete list of category notions, he nevertheless does take the 
defence of the claim that the notions he assumes to be category notions should be 
understood on the linguistic approach to support the entirely general claim noted above, 
that category notions should be understood as on the linguistic approach. Thus, it seems, 
as I suggested above, that it is assumed, not only that certain notions are category notions, 
but that they are in some sense paradigmatic category notions. This might be taken to be 
implicit in the use of the word ‘central’ in the statement of the assumption:  
I shall assume that central among the categories to which things belong are those 
of object, property, and relation (Hale, 2013, 10)  
This assumption is not intended to be a controversial one. As shall become clearer later 
in this section, that fact supports my claim that the linguistic construal is closely tied to 
the Fregean/neo-Fregean construal of existence claims. For the assumption to be 
uncontroversial the field of rivals has to be fairly limited. That this would be so is due to 
the connection of the linguistic approach to categories to Hale’s staggered approach to 
existence claims.  
Given that this is the way the linguistic approach as a general approach is defended, what 
is the form of the argument? The way to understand the approach seems to be to take it 
to be similar to the way in which one might approach a question like the following; how 
should we understand the notion of a person? You might think that one legitimate way to 
approach this question is to approach it knowing broadly what we count as a person and 
working from there to give an account of how we should understand the notion of a 
person, of what it is to be a person. Obviously, there will be borderline cases whose status 
is up in the air and will be decided by the answer given so one wouldn’t start with a 
complete set of the things which were to count as persons, but it does seem like an 
important aspect of one seemingly legitimate way of approaching this question that we 
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could approach it knowing broadly what we want to count as persons, or paradigm cases 
of what we want to count as persons, and working from there.  
Hale’s defence of the claim that category notions generally should be understood in 
accordance with the linguistic approach is supported by his defence of the claim that the 
notions of object and property should be understood in accordance with the linguistic 
approach. The argument he offers in defence of that claim is that only the linguistic 
approach offers a sufficiently neutral characterization of these notions. He argues that 
other characterizations prematurely and unfairly rule on what should be an open question, 
this question being the question of whether there are abstract objects (Hale, 2013, 18-9) 
Where does the force of this consideration come from? The argument isn’t that there are 
abstract objects and so they shouldn’t be ruled out by definition, the argument is that the 
question of whether there are abstract objects should be left open. And, so for this reason 
it is claimed that we need a characterization of our category notions, of object, and of 
property, which leaves as a legitimate question the question of whether there are objects 
which are not in space and time as well as objects which are in space and time.  
The force of this consideration relies on the assumption that the more specific kind 
notions, here, abstract object and concrete object, have to be understood in terms of, and 
indeed understood as building on, the more general category notions. This assumption is 
not just that the notions of abstract object and concrete object are both, or should both, be 
able to be subsumed under the more general notion of object. Given the context, wherein 
a neutral linguistic conception of categories generally is being called for on the basis of 
its being required by the notions of object and property, the assumption that object and 
property are categories and the accepted characterization of categories as those notions 
which feature in answers to the question ‘what is there?’, the assumption is not that the 
more specific kind notions are subsumed under the more general category notions, it is a 
different more specific  assumption.  
The assumption is that what these more specific kind notions are are further specifications 
of the category notions and that existence questions first address the more general 
category notions and can somehow only address the more specific kind after this. 
Answering the question of ontology requires completing both parts of this task.  
Hale’s defence of the claim that his paradigmatic category notions should be understood 
in the manner recommended by the linguistic approach seems to rely on the further 
assumptions that (a) sortal kind notions have to be, or should be, understood in terms of 
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the paradigmatic category notions, understood as further specifications of them64 and (b) 
existence claims should be made in this way. The task of making such a claim has two 
parts, first, introducing the acceptable category notions, and second making existence 
claims using claims of the form ‘ƎxFx’. 
§5 
In the last section, I showed how Hale’s argument in favour of his linguistic approach to 
ontological categories is tied to, and relies on, the correctness of his position on how we 
provide answers to the question of what there is. In this section I shall argue on the basis 
of this connection that we should not accept the linguistic approach to the notion of an 
ontological category. I shall offer some considerations against accepting that this version 
of the linguistic approach gives a satisfactory account of the notion of an ontological 
category as that notion is relevant to satisfactory answers to the question ‘what is there?’   
It is important to note, in connection with this point, that the notion of ontological 
category which Hale is targeting with his construal is not a notion of that which can be 
used to answer the question of what there is without a further specification. It is, as I 
showed in the last section, the notion of that which would figure in his proposed Fregean 
approach to existence claims.  
The main reason why Hale’s version of the linguistic approach to categories does not 
provide a satisfactory elucidation of the target notion of an ontological category relates 
back to the accepted connection between categories and specifications of an ontology, 
answers to the question ‘what is there?’. The force of the neutrality constraint invoked to 
defend the linguistic approach depends precisely on the fact that the notions of object and 
property in themselves fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question ‘what is 
there?’. But the notion of category in which we were interested was precisely the notion 
of the categories which can be used to answer this question. I argued in chapter one that 
we should not accept Hale’s construal of our answers to the question of ontology. 
However, if we reject it, then we undermine the basis for a construal of ontological 
category notions which would figure in it.  
According to the linguistic approach to ontological categories, ontological categories are 
the ontological correlates of the linguistic categories. In the view I developed in the last 
                                                          
64 They do, after all, work together to say what there is. The first (the category notion) is not enough by 
itself (it has been required that it be limited in this way), and the second (the kind) can only be added to 
the first, it cannot be given by itself.  
176 
 
chapter, I claimed that the ontological categories are closely tied to kinds of referring 
terms. The important way in which my view differs from the linguistic approach is that 
on my view the status of some range of expressions as a kind of referring term is 
dependent on their all referring to things of one ontological kind, but the former is not 
something we can know independent of knowing something about the things in the world. 
The connection allows us to make claims about what kinds of things there are by making 
claims about which expressions are referring terms but, given the way that I have drawn 
it, there is no room for ontologically innocent theorizing about the kinds of terms there 
are. This is the opposite of the Fregean and neo-Fregean position. According to that 
position, we start with the analysis of language. We discern its categories. Non-
ontologically loaded linguistic analysis is held to reveal these to be the categories of 
singular terms and predicates.  This result allows us to make certain claims about the 
world (Hale, 2013, 13-5), and helps us to provide answers to the question of what there 
is.  
This is why it is so important for Hale that we be able to recognise an expression as a 
singular term without knowing whether it had an object serving as its semantic value 
(Hale, 2013, 15). This is also why the linguistic approach to ontological categories 
generally can be seen, I contend, to be the linguistic approach to certain putative category 
notions, along with the view that they are the category notions.  
I claim that we should not adopt the linguistic approach as a general approach to the 
notion of an ontological category because the question of what the ontological categories 
are should be an open question, not one determined by our construal of the notion of a 
category. I take the question of what the ontological categories are to be the question of 
ontology65.  
The final claim I want to make is the claim that we can accept that, as an answer to the 
question ‘what is there?’, the answer ‘objects and properties’ could be correct as it stands. 
The linguistic approach could be used to make these intelligible and still we would not 
be committed to the general version of the view which I have argued we should reject. It 
could also be correct such that the answer was correct but unsatisfactory after the manner 
of the answer ‘Everything’.  In keeping with this we could accept the linguistic approach 
                                                          
65 Obviously, Fregeans might not accept this. With his neutrality constraint, Hale specifically restrains 
ontological categories from being such that they could answer the question.   
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to understanding the notions of object and property (which is what it was primarily 
offered as) while rejecting the assumption that these notions are ‘central among the 
categories’, or that they were categories at all, when the categories are understood as that 
with which we can provide an answer to the question ‘what is there?’. It could be that 
they are best understood as abstractions from the level the semantic values are given on.  
 
§6 
For the remainder of this chapter I shall discuss some other accounts of the notion of 
ontological category defended in the literature. I have argued that the intersubstitutability 
approaches to the notion of ontological category have a presupposition problem; the 
notion of ontological category defined is given using an apparatus which presupposes a 
notion of ontological category which cannot be accommodated as such under the 
definition given, which looks to be both the more fundamental notion and that which is 
relevant to the task of giving an answer to the question of what there is. I have also 
suggested that it is as to render the defined notion otiose. Over the course of the rest of 
this chapter I shall argue that most other accounts of the notion of an ontological category 
in the literature have the same problem. Two notable exceptions are the linguistic 
approach to ontological categories and the approach of E.J. Lowe (2006), both of which 
I shall discuss in the next chapter. 
 
§6.1 
 
The first alternative account of the notion of ontological category from the literature 
which I shall consider is that given by Jan Westerhoff in his 2005 book, Ontological 
Categories: Their Nature and Significance. As noted above, the point I want to make is 
that in various accounts from the literature a more fundamental notion of ontological 
category is used to provide a definition of a less fundamental notion of ontological 
category. One reason why Westerhoff’s account is interesting is that the manner in which 
it does this is quite explicit. Westerhoff’s account might seem to be a variation on the 
intersubstitutability approach discussed in the introduction but it is importantly different. 
The accounts discussed previously were based on intersubstitution of terms in sentences. 
The fact that some such substitutions resulted in category mistakes provided the basis for 
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the clarification of categories. Westerhoff is concerned with intersubstitution of 
constituents in states of affairs and, though I shall not spend much time discussing it, one 
problem for his account is that he doesn’t have a basis such as ‘lack of significance’ for 
claiming that some substitutions are acceptable while others are not.  
Westerhoff asks how we should understand the notion of an ontological category. He 
approaches the question by considering construals of the notion from the literature and 
extracting features common to different construals. One of these features is the 
understanding of categories as sets or collections, another is the understanding of them as 
hierarchically organised.  
Westerhoff rejects the construals from the literature on the basis of problems he calls ‘the 
problem of too-specific categories’ and ‘the cut-off point problem’. He claims these 
problems show that the construals fail to provide a definition of ontological category 
which would distinguish ontological categories from other sets or collections in a 
hierarchy. He then attempts to develop a definition which would.  
Westerhoff argues that he needs a primitive to provide a definition. He adopts states-of-
affairs as the unanalysed primitive of his theory and gives a number of arguments 
defending this choice. Although his states of affairs are to be understood as unanalysed, 
Westerhoff does take them to have constituents. Two different states of affairs can both 
have a constituent. In that case they will share constituents. It is this sharing of 
constituents that Westerhoff claims allow us to talk about the constituents of states of 
affairs. We can talk about them using what Westerhoff introduces as Carnapian ‘similarity 
circles’.  
Westerhoff does not just give a construal of the notion of an ontological category. He 
gives a definition of it. To do so he uses two notions he introduces; that of form-sets; and 
that of base-sets.  Form-sets are sets of constituents of existing states of affairs which are 
intersubstitutable in all the same existing states of affairs (Westerhoff, 2005, 91). 
Westerhoff is explicit about the fact that he does not take these form sets to be based on 
essential properties (Westerhoff, 2005, 208). Instead the states of affairs that the world 
contains as a matter of contingent fact determines what form-sets there are.  
 
Westerhoff’s notion of a base-set is to be understood in terms of that of a form-set. For 
Westerhoff, base-sets are form-sets from which all the other form-sets there happen to be 
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can be constructed (Westerhoff, 2005, 96). Westerhoff provides his definition of the 
notion of an ontological category by identifying ontological categories with base-sets.  
 
 
§6.2 
One problem which could be raised for Westerhoff concerns the specifics of his account. 
The problem is that his claim that we can know, concerning constituents, whether they 
can intersubstitute in various states of affairs, is in tension with his claim that those 
constituents either only exist, or else can only be known about, by abstraction from the 
states of affairs in which they occur. In the context of his account these two claims are 
incompatible. However, this is not the objection in which I am interested. The objection 
in which I am interested concerns the framework of his definition.  
 
Westerhoff approaches his project by trying to develop upon an understanding common 
to various construals of the notion of ontological category in the literature.  In numerous 
different accounts, he notes, ontological categories are construed as sets, or collections of 
some kind, which are hierarchically organised. Westerhoff’s approach to his definitional 
project is to adopt this construal and try to build on it to provide a definition which will 
distinguish ontological categories from other sets or collections which feature in the 
relevant hierarchies.  
 
On the basis of the definition he develops Westerhoff argues that we should reject claims 
that ontological categories play the important role in ontological theories which they have 
been taken to play. Specifically, he rejects (1) Absolutism - there is a unique set of 
categories under which everything is subsumed; and (2) Essentialism - the entities which 
belong to a category do so essentially (Westerhoff, 2005, 3) (Westerhoff, 2005, 7) 
(Westerhoff, 2005, 237). On Westerhoff’s account, being an ontological category is a 
status a set has as a result of systematization; there isn’t one right answer to the question 
of what the ontological categories are, and the entities which belong to categories do not 
do so essentially.  
 
The problem is that in providing his account Westerhoff commits to the sort of 
ontological categories which he rejects with his account. In his account, Westerhoff’s 
primitive, state-of-affairs, is functioning as this sort of ontological category. 
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Westerhoff spends the first part of his book arguing for the position that the world should 
be considered a world of states of affairs. He explains what he takes the nature of states 
of affairs to be (Westerhoff, 2005, 90). There is no question of states of affairs only being 
states of affairs contingently. Having done all of this, Westerhoff defines everything else 
in terms of states of affairs, using the notion of a state-of-affairs as his primitive notion. 
Regarding states-of-affairs, Westerhoff is both absolutist and essentialist.  
However, state-of-affairs is at least a putative ontological category. Westerhoff even 
admits himself this in passing: “states of affairs cannot form parts of an ontological 
category other than themselves” (Westerhoff, 2005, 72) But the fact that state of affairs 
is an ontological category cannot be accommodated by Westerhoff’s account of 
ontological categories. There are two notions of ‘ontological category’ at work in the 
account: a fundamental one, providing the terms in which the account is given, and a 
derivative one, defined using the terms provided by the fundamental one.  
The notion of ontological category Westerhoff defines is in keeping with aspects of 
various theories of ontological categories from the literature. These ontological categories 
are, as Westerhoff contends, unsuited to the work ontological categories have been taken 
to perform in ontological theorising. However, in his adoption and defence of an 
ontological category notion, state-of-affairs, as a primitive, Westerhoff takes there to be 
a need for something which does the work he claims ontological categories don’t do.  
Westerhoff’s problem is that he defines a notion of ontological category on top of entities 
given by his primitive, but assuming there to be such entities as would-be values of his 
primitive is an ontological position expressible in terms of acceptance of some specific 
ontological category, in his case states of affairs. His contention that his primitive 
successfully refers presupposes acceptance of an ontological category, but his definition 
can’t accommodate this role for ontological categories. There is a conflicting and more 
fundamental notion of ontological category at work in his account and it is this notion 
which is relevant to questions of what there is.  
 
§6.3 
It is common in the literature to construe ontological categories as classes or sets. As 
discussed above, both Russell and Westerhoff made this identification. Another common 
construal is the construal of categories as properties. The following are some examples 
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from the literature of these two construals. I shall begin by presenting them and I shall 
then explain why these construals run into the problem with which I am concerned; they 
define a defensible notion of category by making use of a more fundamental notion of 
ontological category which their definition cannot accommodate as such.  
An example of categories being construed as collections or classes can be found in van 
Inwagen’s paper ‘What is an ontological category?’. van Inwagen gives his definition of 
the notion of an ontological category in terms of natural classes. He defines ontological 
categories as follows: “a natural class x is a primary ontological category just in the case 
that - there are large natural classes, - x is a high class” (van Inwagen, 2014, 6) For van 
Inwagen a natural class is large if its membership includes “a really significant proportion 
of the things there are” and a natural class is high if “it is not a sub-class of any natural 
class” (van Inwagen, 2014, 6). The way in which he seems to equivocate on his construal 
of categories as classes is in his explanation of his use of the term natural class. He writes:  
I do not necessarily mean that there are objects in the world called ‘natural 
classes’, for an ontologian (why is there no such word?) may well deny that there 
are classes of any description. Indeed, anyone who did deny the existence of 
classes would ipso facto be engaged in ontology. What I mean by saying that there 
are natural classes is a consequence of the thesis that there are natural, non-
conventional lines of division among things. (van Inwagen, 2014, 2).  
Another example of categories being construed as collections or classes can be found in 
Alex Oliver’s 1996 discussion of the metaphysics of properties. Oliver writes:  
A metaphysical theory has two parts: the ontology and the ideology. The ontology 
consists of the entities which the theory says exist (“entity” is my catch-all for any 
kind of thing). The ideology consists of the ideas which are expressed within the 
theory using predicates. The sorting of the entities into ontological categories is a 
matter of ideology; predicates such as “…is a set”, are used to say to which 
category an entity belongs.  (Oliver, 1996, 2).  
Although the above leaves open the possibility that we sort entities into categories 
because those are the categories of which they are members that suggestion would run 
counter to what is actually expressed which is that categories are something into which 
we sort entities on the basis of their satisfaction of other predicates. Although it is stated 
that this sorting is a matter of ideology, the example is included as a construal of 
categories as collections or classes because we don’t sort things into predicates or 
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properties though we may sort things into collections or classes on the basis of their 
properties or the predicates which apply to them. So, insofar as Oliver’s description 
clarifies the notion, I would contend that it does so by construing categories as collections 
or classes.  
Ontological categories are also construed as properties in the literature. An explicit 
example of such a construal can be found in Javier Cumpa’s 2011 paper ‘Categoriality: 
Three Disputes Over the Structure of the World’. Cumpa construes categories as 
categorial universals. He writes:  
While individuals, because of the defined range of its bearer, can only exemplify 
properties; constituents, however, according to its undefined range can exemplify 
any categorical property (category). The range of the substrates is in one case 
restricted, and in the other transcendental...It should be emphasised that what are 
bare properly speaking are not particulars, but being a constituent of a state of 
affairs…For if a constituent exemplifies a categorical property, the constituent 
remains bare because the relation between it and the categorical property is not 
necessary. (Cumpa, 2011, 19-21) 
Another example of categories being construed as properties can be found in Erwin 
Tegtmeier’s (2011) paper from the same volume. For Tegtmeier, categories are the 
intensions of classes and being a category is being a property of such a property:  
In section 1, systems of categories were introduced as classifications. 
Furthermore, I frequently talked of category membership. That suggested that 
categories are classes. The role of the categorial entities with respect to these 
classes would be that of the intensions. The category and class of particulars is, 
e.g. the class of all those entities which are connected with the categorial entity of 
particularity…To consider systems of categories as classifications implies also 
that there has to be a foundation of a system of categories (a fundamentum 
divisionis). The question about the foundation of a classification is always the 
question: “which determinable is the foundation of the classification?”. The easy 
answer is in our case: “the determinable category”. What this answer means, more 
precisely speaking, depends on one’s ontology. I would claim that determinables 
are properties of properties and that the determinable category is the property of 
being a categorial entity. (Tegtmeier, 2011, 177-8) 
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§6.4 
These construals run into the problem of presupposition and attendant limitation. The 
notion of ontological category in which I am interested is a notion of ontological category 
with which we can say what there is. The accounts presented in the previous section use 
a specific ontological category to say what an ontological category is. This presupposes 
an ontology which includes things of the ontological category in question, in these cases 
classes or properties, and takes ontological categories to be specific versions of things of 
this kind.  This yields a notion of ontological category which cannot be that which is used 
to claim that there are e.g. classes and/or properties, because on the definition given the 
notion of category presupposes that very thing.  
Insofar as one is interested in the notion of ontological category as the notion of that with 
which we answer the question ‘what is there?’ and provide the terms used to define all 
other entities, the construals of category in question can be seen simply to miss this target 
notion and define a derivative one. So long as one uses a presupposed ontology to define 
a notion of ontological category, the notion of ontological category in which I am 
interested will never be what one has defined, instead the role of category in which I am 
interested will be played in the theory in question by the whatever entity-notions were 
used for the definition of the term ‘ontological category’.  Using a notion of ontological 
category to define the notion of ontological category just moves the question.  
Another way of approaching the problem is to observe that these construals of the notion 
of ontological category, like those of Westerhoff, build the notion of ontological category 
on top of entities which there are taken to be. On account of this, there is, and we can see, 
a more basic notion of ontological category at work in the accounts. It is the notion of 
that which we implicitly accept in taking ourselves to be able to refer to the entities in 
question. So, we accept the categories of class, and/or property, but we also accept the 
categories of whatever entities we take those classes to collect, or those properties to be 
true of. In taking there to be these entities, in taking ourselves to be able to refer to them, 
we endorse an ontological position which can be expressed in terms of acceptance of an 
ontological category or categories. But the notion of ontological category at work here 
cannot be that defined above because the notion of category defined is built on top of the 
very entities in question, it is a notion of a class which collects them or a property which 
is true of them. Another way to put this point would be as follows; on these construals, 
ontological categories are properties or classes which have a particular status on the basis 
of their relation to other things there are. The truth of the claim that something is an 
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ontological category will depend (a) on there being properties or classes, and (b) on the 
other entities there are (because some property or class being an ontological property will 
depend on its being true of, or collecting, a ‘large proportion’ of things there are). Thus, 
what ontological categories you commit to will be something which is determined by 
your ontology and reflects it. This is a derivative notion of category but there is more 
fundamental notion at work even in the accounts providing the definitions. I argued in the 
first three chapters of this thesis that to take there to be an entity, and adopt an appropriate 
semantics for some range of sentences, is to adopt an ontological position which can be 
expressed in terms of accepting an ontological category and taking it to allow for 
expressions used in certain ways to succeed in referring to things in the world. If this is 
accepted, it can be seen that the accounts in question are also utilising this more 
fundamental notion of ontological category, in taking there to be properties and/or classes, 
and taking there to be whatever entities are available to be described or classified by these 
properties or classes. This more fundamental notion of ontological category is that with 
which a claim may be made about what there is. The derivative notion will simply reflect 
a position, or assumption, about what there is.  
In making use of the more fundamental notion but providing a construal of a derivative 
one, these accounts show the need for a construal of the more basic notion but cannot be 
taken to provide it. Insofar as one is interested in the notion of an ontological category 
which is relevant to the categorial existence claims we use to answer the question of what 
there is, these construals of the notion should not be adopted.  
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Chapter 5 
 
§0 
In this chapter, I shall introduce and try to motivate the proposal that we should 
incorporate the notion of an ontological category into accounts of how de re modal truths 
are grounded. In the next chapter, I shall go into more detail about how I think this should 
be done. I shall begin this chapter by pointing out some overlap in the work that 
ontological categories and essences are called upon to do. I shall contend that, largely, 
where there is overlap, categories should be taken to do this work, rather than essences, 
and we should modify our account of essence accordingly.  
 
§1 
The claim that ontological category notions, or terms putatively corresponding to them, 
are used to give answers to the question of what there is is not particularly odd. However, 
taking these categories to play a role in grounding de re modal truths might be seen as 
odd. Taking essence to play such a role is not, indeed it is a fairly popular position. My 
first claim is that consideration of the work taken to be characteristic of ontological 
categories and of essences should lead one to reject that initial disinclination to take 
categories to be relevant to the grounding of de re modal claims.  In this chapter, I shall 
focus on construals of the notion of essence presented by Kit Fine, and by E.J. Lowe.  
Three main features common to the construals of the notions of an ontological category 
and of an essence are: (1) Both notions are taken to, in some sense, allow one to say what 
something is; (2) Both notions are presented as resolving problems of relevance which 
might arise in answering this question. (3) Both notions are connected with existence 
claims. In the case of essence, this connection leads both Lowe and Fine (at times) to 
contend that essence is prior to existence.  
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§1.1 
 
(1) Both notions are taken to, in some sense, allow one to say what something is 
It is a contested but plausible position that ontological category notions can be used to 
give answers to the question of what there is. The ontological question requires one to 
say what there is and we seem to do this, or try to do this, using what are plausibly, if only 
roughly, characterised as ontological category notions. But the task of saying what there 
is does not seem to be one which could be satisfactorily completed in such a way that it 
was nevertheless left mysterious what those things (that there are) are. Instead it seems 
that if one manages to say what there is, one will have managed to what the things (that 
there are) are. 
The task of saying what something is might seem to be a different task from the task of 
saying what there is because the former task, but not the latter task, seems to allow one 
to presuppose the object of enquiry. I shall suggest that this is not always the case. There 
is a sense in which approaching the question of what something is with the thing in 
question as an available referent or object of perception can be thought to involve 
approaching the question with one important answer to the question of what it is already 
in hand. On this line of thought, for something to be an available referent or object of 
perception it has to be understood as a thing of some kind. One version of the ‘what is 
it?’ question could be understood to be looking for this kind to be made explicit. That 
version of the question of what something is would be badly answered if one presupposed 
the object of enquiry and tried to give an answer explaining some further facts about what 
that thing is. I shall suggest in (3) below that essence is, at least sometimes, connected to 
the version of the question for which it is not appropriate to presuppose the object of 
enquiry.  
To sum up: ontological category notions are connected to the work of answering the 
question of what there is but if they can do this work, it seems that they will also provide 
the answer to (at least one version of) the question of what those things (that there are) 
are. 
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The notion of essence is explicitly connected to this latter question. Fine introduces the 
real definition construal of essence which he goes on to defend as follows:  
Just as we may define a word, or say what it means, so we may define an object, 
or say what it is. The concept of essence has then been taken to reside in the “real” 
or objectual cases of definition, as opposed to the “nominal” or verbal cases. (Fine, 
1994, 2) 
He argues against the sufficiency of the modal construal of essence in part by appeal to 
the intelligibility of a position which takes containing Socrates to be essential to singleton 
Socrates but denies that belonging to singleton Socrates is essential to Socrates. Once 
again, the notion of essence at issue is explicitly connected to the answer to the question 
of what something is. 
For can we not recognise a sense of nature, or of “what an object is”, according to 
which it lies in the nature of the singleton to have Socrates as a member even 
though it does not lie in the nature of Socrates to belong to the singleton? (Fine, 
1994, 5) 
Although Lowe’s construal of essence differs in some important ways from Fine’s, he too 
explicitly connects his construal of the notion of essence to the question of what 
something is.  
In short, the essence of something, X, is what X is, or what it is to be X. In another 
locution, X’s essence is the very identity of X. (Lowe, 2013, 144-5) 
To know something’s essence is not to be acquainted with some further thing of 
a special kind, but simply to understand what exactly that thing is. ((Lowe, 2013, 
147) 
 
§1.2 
(2) Both notions are presented as resolving problems of relevance which might arise in 
saying what something is. 
One challenge presented by the ontological question is that of the appropriate level of 
generality. As has been well noted in the literature, one’s answer to the question of what 
there is can fail to be satisfactory if the notions with which it is given are either too general 
(e.g. everything), or too specific (e.g. pharmacies, school uniforms, symphonies). Since 
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they seem to be able to be used to give satisfactory answer to the question, ontological 
categories seem to be those kind notions at the desired level. Indeed, in the first four 
chapters of this thesis I have argued that we should reject the common hierarchy approach 
to ontological categories according to which kind notions of all levels of generality above 
some point are accepted as ontological categories. I defended a construal of the notion of 
ontological category according to which to be an ontological category is to be a notion 
appropriate for giving an answer to the ontological question.   
The point here is that the ontological question challenges us to say what there is and we 
often do this using what seem to be ontological category notions at least in part because 
these are the notions that seem to be at an appropriate level of generality, in some sense, 
to provide a satisfactory answer to the question.  
 
A problem of determining which information should be included and which information 
should be excluded also arises for those who try to provide real definitions of things and 
thereby say what they are. The notion of essence is held to resolve that problem. Fine 
notes that: 
one of the central concerns of metaphysics is with the identity of things, with what 
they are. But the metaphysician is not interested in every property of the objects 
under consideration. In asking ‘What is a person?’, for example, he does not want 
to be told that every person has a deep desire to be loved, even if this is in fact the 
case…What is it about a property which makes it bear, in the metaphysically 
significant sense of the phrase, on what an object is?...what appears to distinguish 
the intended properties is that they are essential to their bearers. (Fine, 1994, 1) 
 
 
§1.3 
 
(3) Both notions are connected with existence claims. 
This is obvious with the notion of an ontological category, and it is explicit in the 
construal of that notion which I have defended. Central debates in ontology address 
existence claims which are made using what seem to be, and are often taken to be, 
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ontological category notions. Examples include debates over whether properties exist, 
whether propositions exist, whether numbers exist, whether composite material objects 
exist. These are notions of different levels of generality and so if one connected the notion 
of an ontological category with a certain level of generality, not all of these debates would 
be included. In the construal of ontological categories which I have defended in the first 
four chapters of this thesis the notion is connected not to any predetermined level of 
generality but instead to its connection to existence claims.  The ontological category 
notions are those with which we give answers to the ontological question. Although the 
connection of ontological category notions with answers to the question of what there is 
is especially firm in my construal, it is not at all peculiar to it. What seem to be, or are 
taken to be, ontological category notions are frequently used in providing answers to the 
question.  
 
The connection of the notion of essence with existence claims is less well-established but 
it is defended by both Fine and Lowe. The existence claims in question here are individual 
existence claims but the essences in question are general essences, not individual 
essences.  
Both Fine and Lowe (at times) defend the claim that essence precedes existence to try and 
capture the fact that it is not the case that we say that something exists and then ask what 
kind of thing it is. Instead, in saying that something exists, we are saying that something 
of a specific kind/category exists. There is in some sense a fact about what it is that we 
are saying exists which does not depend on the truth of that claim.  
In his (2005) Fine introduces a distinction between worldly and unworldly predicates and 
realms to facilitate this.  
it will be suggested that the identity of an object – what it is – is not, at bottom, a 
worldly matter; essence will precede existence in the sense that the identity of an 
object may be fixed by its unworldly features even before any question of its 
existence or other worldly features is considered. (Fine, 2005, 321) 
all that the possibility of his being a man and not existing comes down to is the 
genuine possibility of his not existing and the unworldly, or circumstance 
indifferent, fact that he is a man. (Fine, 2005, 339) 
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Lowe also defends the claim that essence precedes existence. In his discussion of this 
point he emphasises the role he takes a priori knowledge of essence to play in facilitating 
empirical discovery of existence.  
Another crucial point about essence is this: in general, essence precedes existence. 
That is to say, we can in general know the essence of something X prior to 
knowing whether or not X exists. Otherwise we could never find out that 
something exists. For how could we find out that something, X, exists before 
knowing what X is…? (Lowe, 2013, 148) 
 
§1.4 
 
What I hope to have shown in the paragraphs above is that there is an overlap in the work 
which ontological categories are taken to do, and the work which essences are taken to 
do. It is not my claim that the way categories and essences are held to do this work is the 
same. Indeed, since the notions of categories and of essences are different, it would be 
odd if that were the case, and if the notions were not different all that would be at issue 
in my discussion would be a terminological point. The claim made in this section has 
simply been that there is overlap in the work categories and essences are held to do. Next, 
I shall argue that where there is this overlap, we should take ontological categories to do 
the work at issue and modify our notion of essence accordingly.  
 
§2 
Although, as noted in (1) above, both the notion of an ontological category and the notion 
of an essence are explained in part through their potential to provide answers to the 
question of what something is, that question itself can be answered in many different 
ways, and can be thought of as looking for many different kinds of answers. For this 
reason, connecting the notions with the question is not enough to fully clarify them.  
That the question of what something is can be answered in many different ways is 
generally acknowledged in attempts to clarify notions of category or essence by appeal to 
it. This is mentioned in (2) above. (2) notes that it is accepted that the question of what 
something is can be answered in many different ways and that it is then claimed by 
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various ontologists that the notions of category and/or essence allow us to pick out the/a 
kind of answer to this question that is in some way relevant to, or important for, ontology.  
The claim I shall defend in this section is that there isn’t just one kind of answer that is 
relevant to, or important for, ontology. I shall claim that there are at least two, one 
corresponding to answers given in terms of categories, and another given in terms of 
something which may line up in some respects with Fine’s notion of essence. I shall argue 
that essences are simply unsuited to providing the answers to the question of what 
something is that categories provide. Properly understood, I shall contend, answers to the 
question of what something is which are given in terms of essence build, explicitly or 
implicitly, upon answers to that question given in terms of categories. Answers given in 
terms of categories should thus be understood as basic but not exhaustive.  
One way to object to this suggestion would be to claim that, although there are at least 
two ways to provide an ontologically interesting answer to the question of what something 
is, both such answers can be accommodated within the notion of essence.  
For instance, one could follow Fine (1994b, 56-8) in distinguishing between constitutive 
and consequential essence. Constitutive essence consists of those essential properties 
which are not possessed in virtue of more basic essential properties. Consequential 
essence consists of both the properties of the constitutive essence and the properties which 
are possessed in virtue of the possession of the properties of the constitutive essence. 
Adopting this distinction, one could claim that we can, with essences, provide both a 
comprehensive and a sparse answer to the ontologically interesting question of what 
something is.  
My answer to this objection is that the constitutive notion of essence cannot provide the 
same answer to the question of what something is that the notion of category can be used 
to provide.  
Both the constitutive and the consequential notions of essence are notions of classes of 
either properties (corresponding to the predicate modifier account of essence) or 
propositions (corresponding to the sentential modifier account)66.  
                                                          
66 Fine acknowledges the possibility of another “algebraic” construal, according to which the essence of 
an object is a single entity to which that object is mapped by an appropriate function. I am not going to 
focus on this construal, mainly because, although Fine mentions it, it is not the construal with which he 
works. Later distinctions in the paper are made in terms of the construal of essences as classes of 
properties or propositions. Also, since the essence here is still an entity, many of my objections to the 
claim that essences could play the role of categories still apply to this construal of essence. 
192 
 
In the spirit of the predicational or sentential approaches, one might regard the 
essence of an object as the class of its essential properties or as the class of 
propositions that are true in virtue of what the object is. (Fine, 1994b, 55) 
The fact that both the constitutive and the consequential notion of essence are such classes 
is clear from the reason Fine provides for his choice to work mainly with the 
consequential notion.  
A related problem is to know how to draw the line. Given the whole essence of an 
object on what basis do we break it down into its component properties? And 
given one such component, on what basis do we choose between its logically 
equivalent forms? Perhaps these questions can be answered. But until they are it 
seems advisable to work as far as possible with the consequentialist notion.  (Fine, 
1994b, 58) 
 
In the next subsection I shall defend the claim that a notion of essence according to which 
essences are classes of properties or propositions is not suited to doing the work that 
ontological category notions do in answering the question of what something is. 
Basically, I shall argue that answers given using ontological category notions articulate a 
thing’s fundamental nature, the nature which is presupposed in any attempts to refer to it. 
By contrast, answers given in terms of properties of the entity build on that nature without 
articulating it.  Unlike Fine, Lowe defends a no-entity view of essences, so the argument 
of this subsection will not address his view. I shall raise objections to Lowe’s view in a 
subsequent subsection.  
 
§2.1 
In (1) above, I noted that ontological category notions can be used to say what something 
is. However, ontological categories notions, as I have construed them are not primarily 
understood by their connection to this question. Instead ontological category questions 
are primarily understood by their use in attempts to answer the question of what there is. 
Nevertheless, as I noted above, if a notion can tell you what there is it must be able to 
give you some metaphysically interesting answer to the question of what those things 
(which you’ve just said there are) are. So, if ontological category notions can be used to 
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provide answers to the question of what there is, then they also provide answers to the 
question of what those things (that there are) are.  
Since we connect ontological category notions primarily to the question of what there is 
rather than the question of what things are, our construal of ontological category notions 
is constrained by desiderata arising from the peculiar problems of providing construals of 
existence statements, notably the problem of presupposition (the meaningfulness of your 
existence statement shouldn’t presuppose the existence of what it is being used to claim 
exists) and the problem of generality (ideally, your construal of an existence claim ‘There 
are Fs’ should be adequate regardless of what is substituted for F.67) The construal of 
ontological category notions which I have defended in this thesis is designed to meet the 
challenges posed by these problems connected with existence statements. Ontological 
categories are to be ways of being an entity in virtue of which a certain way of attempting 
to refer to entities would succeed. Existence claims are to be understood as claims that 
the world is such that a certain way of referring to entities would succeed.  
I argued previously that the presupposition problem arises, for referring terms of any kind, 
because it turns out that those terms having the content we want them to have depends on 
the world being as we say, or presume, that it is. My construal of ontological category 
notions, and the existence claims we make using them, attempts to avoid this problem by 
embracing the fact that the availability of content for our terms seems to depend on how 
the world is. It embraces this by talking about the availability of content in order to make 
claims about how the world is. Any attempt to use a putative referring term to refer will 
be an instance of some way of trying to refer. It will be successful only if the world is 
such that the way of referring of which it is an instance is one by which you can secure 
content.  
To use a term of that kind involves the presumption that it does have this content. My 
construal of category notions and existence statements makes the provision of content 
that which is at issue and so it avoids presupposing that content, and thereby an ontology, 
and allows for the failure as well as success of attempts to provide content. As the above 
makes clear, my construal of ontological category notions is designed to allow those 
notions to be adequate for use in providing satisfactory answers to the question of what 
there is. 
                                                          
67 Suggested by Fine in his ‘The Question of Ontology’ (2009) 
194 
 
 
§2.1.1  
What kind of answer will such category notions provide to the question of what those 
things (which we said there are) are? With ontological category notions we will make 
explicit the answer to the question of what something is which is implicit in the way we 
try to refer to it, rather than any answer to that question which we might go on to give 
with sentences which use terms for the entity in order to say something about it. So, with 
category notions we will provide answers to the question of what something is which 
articulate a sense of what it is which is implicit in the way it is referred to.  
In the next subsection I shall argue that answers to the question of what something is 
which begin with the entity in hand and aim to say something further about it build on, 
and assume, the category answer to what that entity is, without articulating it. My claim 
is that this is how answers to what something is which are provided with essences should 
be understood. They build on, and assume the answer provided by the category without 
articulating that answer. If this is the case, the essences would not be correctly thought of 
as the source of any necessities or possibilities which held in virtue of the aspect of what 
the thing was which was to be found in the answer provided using the category.    
 
§2.2 
In §2.1 I contended that, given the fact that ontological categories are such as to feature 
in existence claims, the answers which can be provided with them to questions of what 
the things (which we have said exist) are will be more basic than any answers to those 
questions which simply refer to the entity(ies) in question and aim to say something 
further about them.  I suggested at the end of the section that essences, construed as classes 
of properties or propositions should be understood as providing answers of the latter sort.  
One way of objecting to this conclusion would be to argue that it is terms for essences, 
not categories that feature in existence claims and so it is essences not categories which 
possesses the relevant basicness. Indeed, I noted in (3) in §1, that both Fine and Lowe at 
some point make the suggestion that essences feature in existence claims. Fine’s defence 
of the position concerns singular existence claims (e.g. Socrates exists) and individual, 
rather than general essences (what it is to be Socrates rather than what it is to be a person 
(or an animal) (or an object)). 
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 My position on existence claims does take singular existence claims to build on general 
ones, but in this chapter, I am not concerned with individual essences but rather with the 
general essences discussed in (Fine, 1994) and (Fine, 1994b). For this reason, in this 
subsection I am not going to focus on the specific account Fine defends. Instead I just 
want to note that one motivation for both Fine and Lowe’s defence of the claim that 
essence precedes existence seems to be the intuition that there is a sense of what 
something is which is not established by the fact that it exists. They both contend that the 
claim that something exists is a claim that a thing of some general kind exists. The kind 
of the putative entity is not determined by its existence. One way to try to allow for this 
is to claim that essence precedes existence and try to construe existence claims in terms 
of essences.  
The basic intuition here is one with which I agree. I take the intuition to be something 
like the following: for something to exist is for a thing of a kind to exist; a thing’s kind is 
not a further fact about it which is dependent upon its existence.  
My position is that this intuition is correct but that it should be accommodated by appeal 
to the notion of an ontological category rather than an essence. It is ontological category 
notions not essences which allow us to articulate this fundamental aspect of what 
something is.  
Construing existence claims in terms of ontological categories will accommodate the 
intuition. It will deliver the result that for something to exist is for a thing of a certain kind 
(category) to exist, and that a thing being of a certain kind (category) is not a further fact 
about it dependent on its existence (because the fact of its existence will already include 
its being of that kind). In this section I shall argue that, by contrast, the notion of essence, 
as construed by Fine and Lowe, simply does not allow for satisfactory accommodation of 
the intuition and so is not able to articulate this fundamental aspect of what something is. 
 
§2.2.1 
As noted above, I am not going to focus on the specific position Fine takes in defending 
the claim that essence precedes existence because that position mainly concerns 
individual essences and that is not the topic with which I am concerned at this point. 
Instead I am going to focus on whether general essences could plausibly be taken to be 
that in terms of which general existence claims are made. The reason for considering this 
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question is as follows. I argued above that different answers could be given to the question 
of what something is, and that one such answer is provided by the notions with which we 
say what there is. Drawing on arguments from previous chapters I suggested that the 
notions with which we say what there is are category notions. I contended that on my 
construal of them these category notions provide an answer to the question of what 
something is which explicates the nature which is implicit in a term with which one refers 
to an entity and so presupposed by any claim about what that thing is which is specified 
using a term for it. I claimed further that if that is correct, there is a sense of what 
something is which is due to its category. Any further facts about what it is, such as those 
which might be included in its essence, build on this aspect of its nature but are not the 
source of it.  
Against this conclusion, I noted the potential objection that the general notion of essence 
with which I am dealing in this chapter could be taken to play the role that categories 
have been accorded. If that were the case, then that notion of essence could be taken to 
be the source of facts about what the thing is which I have taken categories to be the 
source of.  It is with this suggestion that I am now concerned. I shall argue for the rejection 
of the suggestion by arguing that general essences cannot plausibly be taken to be that in 
terms of which general existence claims are made.  In defending the basicness of 
categories as compared to essences in this way, I am taking the notion in terms of which 
general existence claims are made to be that which can provide a sense of what something 
is on which what it is is not a further fact building on the thing’s existence and which 
allows for the truth of the claim that what it is for something to exist is for something of 
a kind to exist.  
 
§2.2.2 
Some of the reasons why essences as Fine construes them are not plausibly that in terms 
of which general existence claims are made are familiar from earlier chapters of this 
thesis. However, at least one is particular to Fine’s notion of essence. I shall discuss two 
reasons to think Finean essences are not plausibly that in terms of which general existence 
claims are made. In the second objection, I am going to focus on the construal of essences 
as classes of properties because that is the one on which Fine focuses in his (1994b), 
however the objection will carry over to the construal in terms of propositions.  
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1. Wilson (forthcoming) argues persuasively that given Fine’s construal of 
ontological dependence and the role that dependence plays in his construal of 
essence, at least some putative fundamental entities will be such that their 
essences will not be able to be accommodated within Fine’s construal.  
 
She notes that since Fine chooses to work with his notion of consequential essence 
rather than his notion of constitutive essence, he is rightly concerned to avoid 
irrelevant objects becoming part of the essence of something simply because of 
the reach of logical consequence.  
 
Consider the proposition that 2=2. It is a logical truth and hence a logical 
consequence of any proposition whatever. So, under the consequentialist 
conception it is true in virtue of the nature of any objects whatever that 
2=2. (Fine, 1994b, 59) 
Fine appeals to a notion of pertinence in order to avoid the inclusion in the 
essences of things of objects irrelevant to their nature. Initially, this is explained 
in terms of the possibility of generalising away reference to an object.  
not only is it true in virtue of the identity of Socrates that 2=2, but also that 
for any object x, x=x. (Fine, 1994b, 59) 
However, almost from its introduction the notion of pertinence is connected to 
the notion of ontological dependence. An object a pertains to the essence of an 
object b iff b ontologically depends on a (Fine, 1994b, 59). It is this connection 
that Wilson focuses on. She argues that this construal of essence cannot allow for 
real definitions of putative fundamental entities which do not depend on any other 
entities and which are such that the propositions which are true in virtue of their 
natures include propositions which refer to objects which are dependent on the 
defined entity. 
Wilson gives two examples of such putative entities. One of these is based on an 
atomic physicalist position which takes a nominalist view that predicates refer to 
disjunctions of physical objects. A person with this position, Wilson argues, might 
claim that “it is in the nature of a given atom – say, an atom a of type A – that…If 
a were to exist in certain circumstances C, a would enter into composing a 
molecule of type M” (Wilson, forthcoming, 11). The problem, Wilson says, is that 
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given Fine’s construal of essence, this makes atom a ontologically dependent on 
a molecule it composes but this is a misconstrual of the nature of atom a and of 
the atomist’s position. 
Wilson argues that her two cases constitute counterexamples to Fine’s construal 
of essence by arguing that it is crucial to Fine’s position concerning the notion of 
essence, and to his arguments for that position, that his construal of essence 
accommodate all intelligible ontological positions. Wilson contends that the cases 
she presents are not only intelligible but defended in the scientific community and 
thus she concludes that if their essences cannot be accommodated within Fine’s 
construal then that construal fails on its own terms because it fails to accommodate 
all intelligible positions.  
If we accept that Wilson is correct that her cases cannot be accommodated by 
Fine’s construal of essence, that seems to leave two options concerning the 
suggestion (that we can use essences to make existence claims) with which I am 
concerned in this section. One option is to accept Wilson’s cases as 
counterexamples. On this option, one accepts that Fine aims to accommodate all 
intelligible positions with his construal and that Wilson’s cases show that he does 
not. One rejects Finean essences on this basis. If Finean essences are rejected, then 
they clearly cannot be that in terms of which we make existence claims, and so 
the suggestion that they can compete with categories for this role can be 
dismissed.  
 
A second option is to accept that Wilson’s cases show that Fine’s construal of the 
notion of essence cannot accommodate all intelligible positions but to deny that 
they are counterexamples to the construal by placing much less weight than Fine 
does on the importance of accommodating all intelligible positions68. However, 
even this second option is not promising for the suggestion with which I am 
concerned because even if Wilson’s cases are not counterexamples to the whole 
construal they will be cases which the construal cannot accommodate, cases 
without Finean essences. The reason why they lack these essences is important 
for the topic at issue. They lack appropriate essences because they are fundamental 
                                                          
68 On this option, it would become important for Fine’s case for his account of essence that the 
modal account does miss something about the nature of Socrates and singleton Socrates, it 
would not be enough that it is intelligible to claim that it does. 
199 
 
entities which are such that their essential properties, or the propositions true in 
virtue of their nature, do not include objects upon which they depend but only 
objects that are dependent on them. That entities such as these are the ones which 
cannot be accommodated presents an insuperable problem for any suggestion that 
Finean essences are that in terms of which general existence claims are made 
because it is exactly entities such as these that we would be interested in claiming, 
or denying the existence of in ontology.  
 
One final way one might try to preserve the claim that entities such as these have 
Finean essences which can be used to make existence claims might be to try to 
separate the notion of pertinence from the notion of ontological dependence. 
Wilson doesn’t consider this an option because she claims that the connection is 
built into the foundation of the Finean approach.  
 
his preferred understanding of essence as a form of real definition 
associated with “the idea of definitional priority, the priority of the 
defining terms to those defined”. It is this understanding, set out in 
‘Essence and Modality’, that is, I speculate, the deeper source of Fine’s 
assumption that the essence of an object adverts only to that upon which 
it depends (Wilson, forthcoming, 19)   
Even if one denied this ‘deeper connection’ and tried to separate the notion of 
pertinence from that of ontological dependence, one could not get essences with 
which one could make existence claims. The reasons for this will be dealt with in 
my next objection to the suggestion under consideration.  
 
 
2. The second problem with the suggestion that we could use essences in the role of 
categories in existence statements is a problem concerning the provision of 
content for the predicates which are used in the real definitions of objects. This is 
the problem of presupposition which is especially intractable for construals of 
existence questions. My claim is that the predicates which occur in a real 
definition would either fail to have content or would presuppose the existence of 
the things they were being used to specify the essence of. This is the problem 
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which I claim would arise if one tried to avoid the problems presented by Wilson’s 
cases by separating the notions of pertinence and dependence.  
 
I going to focus on the construal of essence as a class of essential properties. For 
an entity like Socrates the real definition of the general essence might include 
predicates for sortal properties like ‘is a person’ or ‘is an animal’ and predicates 
for characterising properties like ‘is warm-blooded’ or ‘is in some mental state’. 
 
With predicates for each type of properties, we have to ask what content they have 
and how they have it. Regarding the predicates for either sort of properties, we 
should ask whether the relevant notion of properties is one according to which 
they are dependent on their instances or one according to which they are 
independent of them. For example, on the popular understanding of properties as 
sets of their instances, properties are dependent on those instances. Similarly, on 
the nominalist approach mentioned in Wilson’s case above, a property is a 
disjunction of individuals, and will thus depend for its identity and existence on 
its instances. On any account of properties which takes these properties to be 
ontologically dependent on their instances, the essence or class of properties 
which they help to compose will not be a plausible candidate for featuring in 
existence claims. This is because the properties will depend for their existence on 
their instances (or at least one of them, in the case of non-rigid dependence of the 
sort found in Lowe’s conception) and an essence partially composed of such a 
dependent property cannot plausibly be used to say that there the things it is true 
of. It is being presupposed that there are those things insofar as there is taken to 
be the property in question which depends on them. 
 
Alternatively, the property for which a predicate stands might be taken to be 
independent of its instances. In this case the problem becomes one of securing the 
content for the predicate. My contention is that where the content can be secured 
you have a problem of presupposition and where the content cannot be secured 
you cannot provide a real definition and so cannot specify the essence you might 
want to use in making the existence claim.  
 
The basic problem is that even if the existence of the property is independent of 
the existence of its instances, its instances will often be used in one way or another 
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to secure reference to it. For instance, if we secure reference to the property by 
abstraction from a statement in which it is correctly attributed to an object, there 
needs to be an object to which it is correctly attributed. It is not clear how we will 
secure reference to the property and thereby content for the predicate without 
making use of any instances. The problem becomes even more difficult if we do 
not even have the ability to specify that it is a property that we are trying to refer 
to. Nevertheless, it seems that this is a problem we will run into if ‘property’ itself 
has an essence, perhaps a class of the essential properties of (first-order?) 
properties. This seems like it would lead us to run into the same problems at the 
higher level before we can even get to the lower level.  
 
It seems that without making use of the instances we won’t be able to secure the 
essential properties as content for the predicates in the real definition, but if we do 
make use of the instances the essence provided by the real definition will 
presuppose the instances and won’t be suitable for use in existence claims.  
 
I noted at the beginning of this section that the problem of presupposition or lack 
of content would arise for anyone who tried to deal with the problem with real 
definitions which was presented by Wilson (forthcoming) by separating the notion 
of pertaining from the notion of ontological dependence to allow for real 
definitions to refer to entities which ontologically depend on the entity being 
defined. If real definitions could do this, then the class of properties/propositions 
which compose the essence of fundamental things would include 
properties/propositions which were ontologically dependent on the entities in 
question (because those properties/propositions themselves referred to and thus 
depended on objects which were dependent on the entities in question). If 
properties of the essence, and thus the essence itself69, are ontologically dependent 
on the objects defined by the essence, then that essence presupposes the existence 
of those objects and cannot plausibly feature in an existence claim for those very 
objects. Separating the notions of pertaining and dependence do not provide a way 
out of the problem Wilson poses.  
 
                                                          
69 Given that the essence is a class 
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In conclusion, it seems that Fine’s construal of essence cannot accommodate 
essences for (at least some) fundamental things and further it seems that predicates 
which occur in a real definition will either fail to have content or will presuppose 
the existence of the things they are being used to specify the essence of. In light 
of these two reasons, it is not plausible to suggest that Finean essences are that in 
terms of which existence claims are made.  
 
 
§2.2.3 
Before moving on, I shall briefly discuss the possibility of using Lowean essences in 
existence claims. The problem with using Lowean essences to make existence claims is 
their apparent comprehensiveness and multiplicity. Lowe’s view of essence is a no-entity 
view. He does not take essences to be entities of any kind. Along with Fine, he connects 
the notion of essence to the answer to the question of what something is (Lowe, 2013, 
145). Unlike Fine he explicitly connects general essences to answers to the question of 
what there is (Lowe, 2013, 148). Lowe also connects essences to identity conditions. 
It is only because Hesperus and Phosphorus are taken to be planets and thereby 
material objects of the same kind that their spatiotemporal coincidence can be 
taken to imply their identity…But the principle that distinct material objects of 
the same kind cannot coincide spatially is not an empirical one: it is an a priori 
one implied by what it is to be a material object of any kind – in other words it is 
a truth grounded in essence. (Lowe, 2013, 150) 
There are a number of problems with using Lowe’s notion of essence in existence claims. 
I shall focus on two. Much, though not all, of the material to be discussed was already 
discussed in detail in chapter two, so I shall be brief in my treatment of them here.   
1. The first problem with using Lowe’s essences in general existence claims is that 
there is a lack of distinction between notions of differing levels of specificity. 
With his notion of essence, Lowe covers much of the same ground as he covers 
with his notions of ontological category and of kind in his (2013). He uses the 
same examples. He connects all three notions to identity conditions70 even though 
                                                          
70 Though the connection of categories with identity conditions is repeated in many works by Lowe e.g. 
(2006) (2009), it is not mentioned in his (2013). Nevertheless, in his (2013) both substantial kinds and 
essences are connected with identity conditions.  
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he takes kinds to be entities but ontological categories and essences not to be. He 
takes both categories and kinds to come in hierarchies and accepts everything on 
the hierarchy as a category or kind.  
 
I objected to that inclusive approach in chapter two. However, in his discussion 
of the hierarchies of ontological categories, and of substantial kinds, Lowe 
defends the claim that there are distinctively important levels. For categories, this 
is the level of his four fundamental categories which he says is the level at which 
the work is done. For kinds, it is the most general sortal associated with a 
particular identity condition. However, in his (2013) discussion of essence, no 
level(s) of specificity is(are) identified as distinctively important. This works to 
facilitate his reduction of metaphysical necessity and possibility to essence, but it 
makes the use of such essences in saying what there is implausible. They are too 
specific and include too many details about what things are.  
 
Lowe claims that “essences are the ground of all metaphysical necessity and 
possibility” (Lowe, 2013, 152) and his approach to explaining how this is so 
makes use of the locution ‘it is part of the essence of X that’.  
 
One reason, thus why it can be the case that X is necessarily F is that it is 
part of the essence of X that X is F…But this is not the only possible reason 
why something may be necessarily F. X may be necessarily F on account 
of the essence of something else to which X is suitably related…Socrates 
is necessarily the subject of the following event: the death of 
Socrates…because it is part of the essence of that event that Socrates is its 
subject. (Lowe, 2013, 152) 
Lowe’s inclusion in his discussion of both individual essences and importantly 
general essences of varying levels of specificity allows him to find, for any modal 
consequence, an essence with respect to which he can plausibly say that it is part 
of the essence in question that the consequence holds. But not all of these notions 
can plausibly be taken to feature in claims about what there is.  
For example, he writes about the essences of bronze statues and lumps of bronze. 
In the course of making the point that our knowledge of essences is not knowledge 
of separate entities but just knowledge of what things are, he writes:  
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we know what a bronze statue is and what a lump of bronze is. We thereby 
know that these are different things and that a thing of the first sort must, 
at any given time, be composed by a thing of the second sort since it is 
part of the essence of a bronze statue to be composed of bronze. (Lowe, 
2013, 153) 
Bronze statue is clearly not a highest sortal. The highest sortal in the vicinity might 
be artefact, or it might be composite material object. Statue is even a more 
plausible candidate than bronze statue. Two reasons to try and look for a highest 
sortal are: (a) an answer given to the ontological question using terms of this level 
of specificity fails to provide what we are looking for in such an answer; (b) the 
avoidance of double-counting. For Lowe, knowledge of essences allows inferences 
of existence claims on the basis of empirical evidence (Lowe, 2013, 114, 148) but 
if this is the case then we can’t allow for essences corresponding to ‘bronze statue’, 
‘statue’, ‘artwork’, ‘artefact’, ‘composite material object’ etc. each of which 
licenses inferences of existence claims. The identity conditions with which Lowe 
might try to avoid double counting are conditions for identity of things of the same 
kind and so to apply them in order to avoid double counting we would need to 
recognise things which have different (relatively general) essences as things which 
nevertheless are of the same kind. This pushes us back to the notion of the highest 
sortal and that move connects identity conditions primarily with highest kinds, 
rather than essences. Since this move connects the identity conditions which are 
supposed to prevent our licensing too many existence claims with highest sortals 
rather than essences, this move also connects existence claims with kinds rather 
than essences.  
The move back to kinds presents a problem for Lowe’s reduction of modal 
discourse to discourse about essences and what is part of them. If the notion with 
which we say that the bronze statue exists is the notion of artefact, or of composite 
material object, it is no longer straightforwardly part of this understanding of what 
it is that it has to be made of a lump of bronze. Lowe’s use of the notion of essence 
in his reduction of modal discourse produces a notion that is too specific to be that 
which features in general existence claims. The problems with this may push us 
back to his notion of kinds but I would contend that this is no help since, as I argued 
in chapter two, there are other problem with the use of Lowean kinds in existence 
claims.  
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2. The second serious problem for Lowe’s essences which prevents their being 
plausible candidates for use in existence claims is that they run into the 
presupposition problem. I argued for this conclusion at length in chapter two and 
I will not repeat the argument here. One way of drawing out the problem is to note 
that Lowe takes essences to determine that certain empirical evidence licenses 
existence claims (Lowe, 2013, 114, 148) however he also takes elucidation, 
knowledge, and statements of essence to be ontologically innocent. They are not 
supposed to presuppose the existence of the things in question. But different 
ontological positions would lead to different views about whether certain 
empirical evidence did license a given existence claim. For example, the 
circumstances which Lowe would take to license the inference of the claim that 
there exists a bronze statue would not be circumstances that van Inwagen would 
take to license the inference of the claim there exists a bronze statue. So, the 
elucidation of, or claims of knowledge of, an essence of bronze statues which 
would license this inference in the specified circumstances is not innocent of all 
ontological claims. That essence embeds precisely what would be at issue between 
Lowe and van Inwagen. Lowe’s essences run into the presupposition problem and 
thus fail to be appropriate for use in existence claims.  
 
§2.3 
To summarise the argument again: I argued above that different answers could be given 
to the question of what something is, and that one such answer is provided by the notions 
with which we say what there is. Drawing on arguments from previous chapters I 
suggested that the notions with which we say what there is are category notions. I 
contended that on my construal of them these category notions provide an answer to the 
question of what something is which explicates the nature which is implicit in a term with 
which one refers to an entity and so is presupposed by any claim about what that thing is 
which is specified using a term for it. I claimed further that if that is correct, there is a 
sense of what something is which is due to its category. Any further facts about what it 
is, such as those which might be included in its essence, build on this aspect of its nature 
but are not the source of it. Against this conclusion, I noted the potential objection that a 
general notion of essence could be taken to play the role of categories in existence claims. 
If that were the case, then that notion of essence could be taken to be the source of facts 
about what the thing is which I have taken categories to be the source of.  
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On the basis of the arguments presented in the last two subsections, I conclude that we 
should reject the suggestion that either Finean or Lowean essences could be that in terms 
of which we make existence claims. We should accept that ontological categories provide 
an answer to the question of what something is which is more basic than the answer to 
that question provided by essences. It is more basic in the sense that the answers to the 
question provided by essences build on, and assume the answers provided by categories 
without articulating that answer and without being the source of it or anything which 
follows from it.  If this is correct then, in explaining metaphysical necessity and 
possibility in terms of the natures of entities, or what they are, we should not treat what 
they are as univocal but instead recognise the ontological categories of entities as 
constituting an important and basic part of what they are. If we take metaphysical 
necessities and possibilities to hold in virtue of what things are we should recognise a role 
for ontological categories in grounding the truth of these claims.  
 
 
§3 
In §2, I concluded that ontological categories should be recognised as a source of modal 
truths. In this section I am going to begin to develop this suggestion. It will be developed 
in detail in the next chapter.  
 
§3.1 
In explaining necessity and possibility in terms of essence, Fine did not provide, or 
attempt to provide, a reduction of the modal to the non-modal. Vetter (2011) explains this 
helpfully in terms of narrow and broad understandings of the modal.  
We can use the terms ‘modal’ or ‘modality’ in two ways. In a narrow sense, there 
are two modalities: necessity and possibility…in a broader sense, the modalities 
comprise a much larger package: necessity, possibility, and the counterfactual are 
part of that package, and so are dispositional properties and powers, essences, and 
anything that is expressed by modal expressions in the linguists’ sense: can, must, 
may, would, and so on…The new actualists reverse the order of explanation 
within the broader modal package and claim that it is necessity and possibility 
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(and perhaps the counterfactual conditional) that have to be accounted for in terms 
of some other part of the package. (Vetter, 2011, 743) 
 
In suggesting that ontological categories be recognised as a source of modal truths, a 
source which does some of the work essences were taken to do, and some further work 
that they were not necessarily taken to do, I take myself to be doing something in keeping 
with the above; using one modal notion to account for another. I take the notion of an 
ontological category to be a modal notion in the sense that it is a notion of a nature which 
is modal. The most obvious reason to think this is the modal aspect of the use and reuse 
conditions with which we specify these categories.  
Use conditions for entities of a kind are specified by the identification of a range of 
sentence types and a role or roles for terms in sentences of these types, and the claim that 
a putative kind of entity is such that terms which occur in these sentences in these ways 
are terms for entities of that kind. So that if any such sentence is true it carries a 
commitment to the existence of an entity of that kind. One way of thinking about this is 
as the explication of these sentences through the construal of them in terms of various 
sorted constants and variables. One immediate result of such Use conditions is a 
determination of which sentences are to be considered category mistakes and which are 
not. 
There are two points to note about this. The first is that this is broadly in keeping with a 
long tradition in metaphysics of explicating ontological category or kind notions by 
explicating the ranges of significance71 of terms for entities of that kind. The second point 
worth noting is that there are clear modal implications when one specifies the sentence 
types in which terms for entities of putative kinds can legitimately feature. Even if one 
accepts the truth-aptness of category mistakes, I will contend that one should distinguish 
between degenerate and genuine truth-aptness. Those who take category mistakes to be 
truth-apt, generally only take them to be what could be called degenerately truth-apt. 
There is an intuition to the effect that these sentences should be meaningless, but this is 
outweighed by other considerations and instead of failing to be truth-apt all category 
mistakes are automatically given the truth value false just in virtue of their status as 
category mistakes.  
                                                          
71 ‘Ranges of significance’ is the phrase used by Russell.  
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One objection to the proposal under discussion is that the category notions which we fixed 
in part using claims about which sentences are category mistakes would not have 
implications for which sentences are category mistakes because nothing substantive is 
done when what has been built into a definition is derived from it. My response to this 
objection draws on the way that my construal of ontological categories avoids the 
presupposition problem. The category is fixed as that which makes the sentences in 
question either category mistakes or not category mistakes. If the sentences are not in fact 
category mistakes, then there is no ontological category which makes them so and so the 
attempt to secure content for the category term (and to secure reference for the constants 
and variables of the category) in this way will fail. To avoid the presupposition problem 
existence claims are construed as claims that the world is such that attempts to refer and/or 
secure content in a specific way are successful.  
This approach will not produce definitions of ontological category notions that are given 
using claims that certain sentences are category mistakes. Instead, explications of 
ontological category notions are offered. A category notion can be explicated as that 
category notion which does have these implications concerning which sentences are 
category mistakes. Only if there is a category notion which does have these implications 
will such an attempt to secure content succeed and if it does do so it will only be because 
the category does make certain sentences category mistakes and make other sentences not 
be category mistakes. There are two conclusions I want to draw from this. First, 
ontological categories can have modal implications, these implications are not built into 
the category in such a way as to undermine their status as truths which hold in virtue of 
the category. Second, ontological category notions are themselves modal notions. This is 
evident from the fact that they are notions we can only explain satisfactorily through the 
use of modal notions (albeit less basic ones). 
If ontological categories are modal notions, they are modal notions which are 
interestingly different from Fine’s essences or the dispositional properties which Vetter 
uses to explain necessity and possibility. Both Fine’s essences and Vetter’s dispositions 
are understood as modal properties, or classes of such properties, and they are each 
connected primarily to one or other of the two less basic notions of necessity and 
possibility. Vetter calls Fine’s essences necessity rooted in things and she calls her 
potentialities possibilities rooted in things.  This has some counterintuitive results. In the 
case of essences, the possibility of a man thinking becomes less basic than the necessity 
of a man not being true.   
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□ and ◊ are interdefinable and so if both or one is going to be a primitive, simplicity 
dictates that only one should be a primitive and the other should be defined in terms of it. 
However, if both are going to be explained in terms of some other notion, a notion of 
nature, it is not clear why that notion should have to be more closely tied to one than the 
other. Both de re possibilities and de re necessities can be thought to flow from the 
category of a thing. If we take this position, we can avoid the counterintuitive results 
which follow from giving either a necessity first or a possibility first account of natures.  
Categories might be thought of as both facilitating and constraining the postulation of 
possible worlds. Both the facilitation (possibility) and the constraint (necessity) of the 
postulation of worlds would flow from the categories of things and neither would flow 
from the other. Indeed, the only way we can get necessities from a collection of possible 
worlds is by appeal to totality facts about that collection and such facts come very close 
to the being the exclusion of possibility i.e. necessarily not.  If an account of natures as 
ontological categories could be given on which both de re possibilities and de re 
necessities flow from the nature, with neither having to be derived from the complete 
collection of the other that would be a positive feature of the position.  
One important point about categories as the source of modal truths is that if we take 
categories to be such a source and ask about their modal implications that seems to 
provide us with some modal truths but not all that we may want (e.g. probably not 
necessity of origin for persons or artefacts) and it leaves us with some results which 
diverge from what we would want (e.g. the possibility of 4 being prime). If we want to 
account for, or rule out, these further modal claims, we need to add a further element to 
the account. This could be an appeal to essential properties or dispositions. The relevant 
notion of essence might be something like Fine’s notion of consequential essence but 
instead of taking this notion to build upon the constitutive essence of a thing we could 
take it to build upon the category.  
As is clear from the above, one consequence of adopting the position that ontological 
categories should be recognised as a distinctive source of modal truths is that we get a 
less simple account of modality than we get from an account given simply in terms of 
essence. I think this is a consequence we should accept. It is worth lessening the simplicity 
to capture the difference in the impossibility of 4 being prime and of Emma being prime. 
This seems to be a difference which is due to the source of the impossibility and that is 
exactly the kind of distinction which we are supposed to be capturing in moving from the 
modal approach to essence to the real definition approach.  
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In the next chapter, I shall draw out some of the consequences of doing this and argue 
that they offer independent reasons for adopting the proposal.  
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Chapter 6 
 
§0 
In the last chapter, I argued that ontological categories should replace essences as that in 
virtue of which some de re modal statements are true. In this chapter, I shall develop the 
position into one whereby I claim that ontological categories ground or partially ground 
all de re modal truths. The position I defend is offered as a proposed amendment of 
essentialism. Essentialists, such as Kit Fine (1994) (1994b) and Bob Hale (2013) claim 
that propositions are true in virtue of the nature of a relevant object(s), and not in virtue 
of the nature of others. Fine’s very well-known example is that the sentence ‘Socrates is 
a member of singleton Socrates’ is true in virtue of the nature of singleton Socrates but 
not in virtue of the nature of Socrates72. They then use this position to offer an account of 
metaphysical necessity generally.  
Indeed, it seems to me that far from viewing essence as a special case of 
metaphysical necessity, we should view metaphysical necessity as a special case 
of essence…The metaphysically necessary truths can then be identified with the 
propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatever. (Fine, 
1994, 9) 
The claim that it is metaphysically necessary that p iff ∃X1,…,Xn □x1,…,xn p really 
amounts to an explanatory hypothesis – we might call this hypothesis the 
essentialist theory of necessity. (Hale, 2013, 150) 
My discussion shall focus on the first essentialist move according to which the source of 
the truth of various modal statements is located in essences of particular entities. I shall 
not have space to discuss the broadening of the essentialist account to metaphysical 
necessity generally. However, since my account is offered as an amendment to 
essentialism, it is my intention to follow essentialists in taking metaphysical necessity 
generally to be explicable in terms of the notion of a proposition being true in virtue of 
the nature of some thing or things. The amendment I offer is one concerning how we 
should understand the notion of nature appealed to.  
                                                          
72 He uses this example to explain the difference between what he takes to be the target notion of essence 
and the notion which is captured by the modal construal of essence as de re necessity. 
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My proposed amendment follows from the construal of ontological categories which I 
have given over the course of this thesis. It is also a construal which has virtues 
independent of this. Over the course of this section I shall explain what the proposed 
amendment is, how it follows from the construal of the notion of an ontological theory 
for which I have argued, and what its attractions are independent of that status.  
 
§1 
In chapter one, I argued that all of our truth-apt sentences presuppose the truth of some 
categorial existence claims or other. I concluded that we needed to understand the content 
of those claims in order to understand the work that they were doing in facilitating our 
assertions. In chapter three, I defended a metalinguistic construal of categorial existence 
claims. According to that construal, we use ontological categories to make reference to 
things in the world, i.e. we refer to any thing, at least any thing that we can refer to, as an 
f, for some notion f. However, in order to use categories to do that we need to fix on them. 
Since ontological categories are no more than natures which allow some ways of 
attempting to refer to things to succeed, we fix on them by formulating rules for proposed 
types of expressions which will refer to things of the putative category e.g. we might 
formulate rules for the use and reuse of terms for sets. If there is such a nature as that 
which would be apt to be referred to in these ways, then our attempted introduction of a 
new type of term will allow us to fix on the nature of that which would be apt to be 
referred to by such terms e.g. the category, set. We can then use that category to refer to 
things in the world. We can only use expressions of a proposed kind ‘f’ to refer to things 
in the world if, by stipulating the rules for the use73 of these expressions, we manage to 
fix on an ontological category F74 75 which we can use to refer to fs 
                                                          
73 As I have acknowledged previously, in presenting my use and reuse conditions as establishing rules of 
use when their introduction is successful, I follow Thomasson to some degree while also greatly modifying 
her position on what rules of use are. 
74 Although I used an upper-case letter, I do not suggest that ontological categories are properties. For 
the reasons established in chapters 1 and 2 this category notion cannot be understood as a property. 
Although, I  have claimed, we do need a kind notion to refer to things in the world, this kind notion cannot 
be a property; first, because there would be no way to give content to the predicate for that property 
while allowing the property to serve the role proposed, second, we are immediately involved in a regress, 
we will then need to refer to that property to refer to anything else, but we need the notion of a property 
to do so,  if that is again a property, then, etc. The regress is vicious because it is running in a context 
wherein it is accepted that we need to fix on a kind notion and use it to refer to things of that kind. The 
regress puts off our ever getting hold of such a notion.  
75  The category F will be a nature in virtue of which any fs will be apt to be referred to by expressions 
used in the way we have proposed. 
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If this is right, then ontological categories play an indispensable role in allowing for the 
terms of all of our truth-apt sentences to have their semantic values. Appreciating this 
will allow us to see the work these natures, or ontological categories are doing, and how 
they do it. One way of doing this is by focusing on how we fix on them.  
The way we do this, I have argued, is through the stipulation of use and reuse conditions. 
These conditions are not exhaustive, and they do not, and are not intended to specify the 
meaning of the new kind of term. Instead, they are intended to fix that meaning. The terms 
introduced are to refer to entities of the kind which would be apt to be referred to in these 
ways in these contexts. If there is no such kind (category), then the attempted introduction 
of the new kind of term is unsuccessful, and attempted uses of instances of it will suffer 
from reference failure. We fix on ontological categories by trying to fix on them as the 
ontological category or nature which would allow a way of referring to be successful.  
There are two points I shall draw out here which are very important to the argument of 
this chapter.  
1. The use and reuse conditions are modal claims. If we can only refer to things, and 
refer to them again, by referring to them as things of a certain kind, then claims about 
the linguistic contexts in which terms for things of this kind can occur and reoccur 
amount to modal claims about the corresponding entities. 
 
The use conditions will specify the range of contexts in which the sort of term in 
question can occur, usually focusing on those which are distinctive of this sort. For 
example, you might introduce events as those things terms for which can occur in true 
sentences asserting causal claims. You might introduce sets as those things terms for which 
can occur in true sentences asserting membership, you might introduce propositions as 
those things terms for which can occur as the subject of a predication of truth or falsity, you 
might introduce persons as those things terms for which can occur in true sentences 
ascribing psychological states and also in those ascribing physical states. The idea is 
that you use roughly but incompletely understood contexts to explain a sort of entity 
you take to be able to figure in a specific way in those contexts.   
 
The reuse condition will state a necessary and sufficient condition for the identity of 
things terms for which figure in the specified way in the specified contexts. So you 
might take events to be the same iff the referents of two event terms occur in the same 
space, or iff they are exemplifications of the same property at the same time by the 
214 
 
same entity, or iff they have the same causes and effects, you take sets to be the same 
iff the referents of two event terms have the same members, you might take persons to 
be the same iff there is a relationship of continuity between the psychological states of 
the referents of two person terms, or iff there is an appropriate relation of causation 
between the organisms that constitute the referents of the person terms, or iff the 
activities of the fundamental particles that compose the referents of the person terms 
constitute the same life.  
 
2. The way these use and reuse conditions are supposed to work is that they fix on the 
category that would make such claims (concerning the terms for referring to entities 
of the category) true.  The category is that which would make true these modal claims 
concerning the terms for entities of that category.  
These two claims are built into my construal both of existence claims and of ontological 
categories. I contend that some such claims need to be accepted76. It is an immediate 
consequence of this construal that ontological categories ground at least some de re modal 
claims. The main consequences I derive from my approach which are at odds with the 
accounts essentialists provide of natures can be drawn out by focusing on the way in 
which the ontological categories of my account are fixed on.  
 
§2 
Before doing that, I shall pause to emphasise one point about the construal of the 
ontological categories I have defended and how it is that such categories are able to 
ground modal statements. One reason one might take them not to be able to provide such 
grounding is that, insofar as we are only able to fix on them using modal claims, one 
might claim that they themselves are modal and so cannot be used to provide the ground 
of modal consequences. My objection to this is in line with that provided by essentialists 
and others who Barbara Vetter (2011) calls ‘new actualists’. The idea is that new 
actualists do not take the actual world to be a possible world among others; they take the 
actual world to be modally thick. My response to the objection is that my claim is not that 
                                                          
76 Some details might change but my position is that we cannot refer to a thing except by referring to it as 
the semantic values of a term which features in certain contexts in certain ways. Doing that I have argued 
amounts to making modal claims about it. 
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the modal can be reduced to the non-modal. My claim is that some modal notions should 
be understood in terms of some others.  
Vetter presents the point particularly clearly:  
Modality comes in a package. There are, of course, the two familiar modalities of 
necessity and possibility. There are also such modal phenomena as (if we take 
them seriously as phenomena; otherwise there are such modal notions as those 
of): laws of nature, essences, the counterfactual conditional, causation, and 
dispositions. A reductive approach to modality will try to describe all of these 
phenomena in a language that is taken from outside the modal package…A non-
reductive account of modality need not be quietist. It will not try to capture the 
elements of the modal package in terms of something non-modal, but it can 
impose a hierarchy on the package itself. 
(Vetter, 2015, 4-5) 
My position, based on the positions given above, is that no reference can be made to 
anything non-modal. Natures are modal. For that reason, I take it that the only way 
explanation can be given, is by providing that explanation with something modal.  
 
§3 
To return to the point of §2, focusing on the way in which we use modal claims about the 
contexts in which proposed kinds of terms can be used to fix on modal notions as that 
which would make such claims true, allows one to draw out some crucial ways in which 
the use of ontological categories as natures differs from the use of essences.  
The way I shall draw out the first is by pointing out that the use conditions correspond to 
claims about de re possibilities, and reuse conditions correspond to claims about de re 
necessities. They work together to fix on the category notion which would make the 
claims of both true. In his (1995b) Kit Fine presents one understanding of his project to 
be that of localising necessity:  
Essence, under the sentential construal becomes a localised form of necessity. 
(Fine, 1995b, 56).  
Vetter presents her (2015) project as a localisation of possibility in the notion of 
potentiality.  
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Ontological categories, as I have presented them, differ from both as being a modal notion 
from which both necessity and possibility can be derived. My contention is that this is 
both a consequence of my account and also a virtue. As I shall detail below, this feature 
of ontological categories, allows for the resolution of what I shall claim are problems that 
come up on the other two approaches. It is also more intuitive than realised.  
Saul Kripke is well-known for rejecting the claim that possible worlds are something we 
can find out about. Instead, he contends, “’Possible worlds’ are stipulated, not discovered 
by powerful telescopes.” (Kripke, 1972/1981, 44). If we adopt a stipulation approach to 
possible worlds, I suggest that we can discern intuitions both about necessity and about 
possibility guiding our stipulations. Kripke’s example focused on Nixon. If we were 
stipulating different possible worlds containing Nixon, our intuitions concerning 
possibility would guide us in stipulating worlds where he took a different job, or made 
different decisions. Our intuitions concerning necessity would guide us by preventing us, 
or leading us to not, stipulate worlds where other features were different. We would not 
stipulate a world where he was a tree. Perhaps we wouldn’t stipulate a world where he 
had different parents. On the possible worlds approach to modality, necessity is supposed 
to come out at the end. What is necessary is what is invariant across the worlds. When we 
think of these worlds as stipulated that becomes less plausible. Thinking of them this way 
makes the notion of a nature that is the basis for both necessities and possibilities intuitive. 
Indeed, for my purposes, talking about possible worlds becomes just a way of articulating 
a position about the natures of some things. So, for instance, we would be expressing a 
view about the nature of persons by refusing to stipulate worlds in which persons have 
different parents in different worlds. We would also be expressing a view about the nature 
of persons by stipulating worlds in which they were reincarnated.  
The derivative status of necessity and possibility on strong actualist views should 
facilitate a move away from the need to conceive of the nature which grounds modal 
truths as a localised version of one of these modalities.  
 
§4 
The fact that on my construal ontological categories directly ground both possibilities and 
necessities is I think a recommendation for my account. I shall argue that positions which 
take natures to directly ground only one kind of modal statements has counter-intuitive 
results. I shall argue that these results can be avoided on my account.  
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 §4.1 
The first counter-intuitive result which I shall consider is one which arises for 
essentialism. It is the question of category mistakes and how they should be explained. I 
opened the thesis with discussion of category mistakes. The problems they present for 
essentialism provided the motivation for this project. The basic problem is that we want 
the following to come out true. It is not possible for ‘The colour green eats breakfast every 
morning’ to be true because the colour green is the wrong kind of thing to eat breakfast. 
Whereas, it is possible for ‘Jeremy eats breakfast every morning’ to be true because 
Jeremy is the right kind of thing to eat breakfast. The problem is that on the essentialist 
account we do not get either of these claims coming out true.  
In the case of categorial fit and the possibilities that that grounds, the essentialist position 
is particularly implausible. The essentialist has to say that it is possible for Jeremy to eat 
breakfast because it is not ruled out by the properties that make up his essence. In other 
words, it is possible for Jeremy to eat breakfast because it is not necessary for him not to. 
This yields the following implausible picture. The impossibility of Jeremy being the 
square root of 4 is more fundamental to him than the possibility that he be happy. The 
impossibility of Jeremy being the square root of 4 will be among the properties that make 
up his nature. That is objectionable in itself. It is made more so because the possibility 
that Jeremy be happy will not be included in his essence. It will be a possibility that holds 
of him by virtue of the fact that none of his essential properties, nothing that is necessarily 
true of him, including such scarcely coherent necessary truths about impossibility as those 
mentioned above, rule it out. All of this is especially counter-intuitive given the practice 
we have in metaphysics of explaining what things are by explaining what can be true of 
them, e.g. a proposition is the kind of thing that can be true or false.  
The essentialist seems to get the explanation of these kinds of possibilities wrong. They 
also seem to get the explanation of the impossibility of the truth of category mistakes 
wrong. The impossibility of the truth of category mistakes becomes, implausibly, 
something which is directly grounded by the essence of the entity in question. That 
Socrates’s essence includes the impossibility of his having the atomic number 79 should 
be counted as a counter intuitive result of essentialism, and as one which seems to get the 
explanation of the source of the impossibility of the truth of that statement wrong.  
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§4.2 
Counter-intuitive results also arise for Vetter’s (2015) contrasting approach. Her account 
uses potentiality, which is to some degree a localised form of possibility, to ground modal 
claims.  
The truth-condition she defends for modal claims is:  
POSSIBILITY: It is possible that p =df Something has an iterated potentiality for 
it to be the case that p     
(Vetter, 2015, 197) 
The problem that arises for her account concerns necessities.  
 NECESSITY: It is necessary that p =df It is not possible that not p 
 (Vetter, 2015, 203) 
She explains what this formulation comes to in her account as follows.  
It is necessary that p just in case nothing has, or had, or will have a potentiality to 
be such that not-p. 
(Vetter, 2015, 203) 
The problem for Vetter is a parallel to the problem for essentialists. It is that it is 
implausible that the right explanation for the necessity of a set to have the members that 
it does is not plausibly explained as derived from the fact that none of a set’s various 
potentialities include the potentiality to be such that it has different members.  
Vetter recognises the problem her account has with necessities and attempts to 
accommodate it by building into her account of potentiality the condition of having a 
potentiality to the highest degree as a limiting case of potentiality (Vetter, 2015, 89). 
Vetter’s examples of such cases “an animal’s disposition to metabolize, the disposition 
of fire to spread heat” (Vetter, 2015, 90) are what would generally be recognised as 
necessities. Accepting this, she calls it ‘the necessity conception of potentiality’. She 
explains the relevant potentialities as:  
dispositions such that their bearer has no potential whatsoever not to exercise 
them. These according to my preferred model of potentialities’ degrees, are 
possessed to the maximal degree.   (Vetter, 2015, 90) 
219 
 
 
There is room for doubt about whether Vetter’s localised notion of possibility can 
accommodate such potentialities. Nevertheless, even if her move to accommodate them 
is successful, it demonstrates the point which I am concerned to make. That point is that 
problems arise for accounts which try to construe the nature of a thing modally as directly 
grounding either necessity statements or possibility statements. On my approach both are 
grounded directly, and this is a virtue of the approach.  
 
§5 
The way in which they do so delivers the right result about statements demonstrating 
categorial fit and categorial mismatch. It is accepted that we can form sentences 
combining terms from mismatched categories, but the categories will determine that the 
entities those terms refer to are not such that those sentences can be true. The role of 
categories in grounding use conditions will directly ground the truth of claims like ‘It is 
possible for Jeremy to be happy’ because the rules for the terms referring to entities of 
Jeremy’s kind will explicitly rule in such uses as ones which can result in possible truth. 
The reuse conditions will explicitly require that for a term for a set to be reused 
legitimately, the referent will have to have the same members. In this way the ontological 
category will directly ground statements of necessity also. Ontological categories as Fs 
will directly ground statements of necessity and possibility. That they do so makes them 
apt as they should be to be explained as the nature of that which can be F, and which must 
be Y. All of this is a virtue of the account.  
 
§6 
The second and final consequence of my use of ontological categories as natures is that I 
will have to allow for a distinction between core nature and complete nature. There are 
points on which this may seem to prove a counter intuitive result, but I suggest that it too 
is a virtue of the account. It is intuitive to suggest that the natures of things are to some 
degree structured. Some of a thing’s essential properties can be explained in terms of 
others. Fine introduced the distinctions of constitutive vs consequential essence in his 
(1995b) to accommodate this.  
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In some cases, ontological categories do not fully ground, but only partially ground the 
modal truths of the entity in question but even in these cases they are crucial to the 
grounding.  
We should allow for the fact that the properties an entity actually has play a role in 
determining what is necessary and/or possible for that entity. In other words, we should 
allow for a thing's nature, in the broad sense of that notion which I have called the 
complete sense, to play a role in determining the de re modal truths which hold concerning 
it.  Examples of specific properties playing such a role can be found by considering the 
cases Kripke presents as a posteriori necessities. For instance, we might consider it a 
property of a specific person that they have the parents that they do and acknowledge that 
this property of the person plays a role in grounding the de re modal truth that it is 
necessary for them that they have these parents.  However, although the property plays a 
role here, there is also a role for the category which cannot be played by the property.  
First, the category determines that the thing in question is of a kind over which the 
relevant property is defined, i.e. a context in which it can be used with possible truth. 
There is a sense in which it is because the thing in question is a person/organism and not 
a theory or a set that the property of having a and b as parents can be true of it. The point 
is that the modal truths grounded by the category play a facilitating role. The fact of an 
entity possessing some property plays a role in determining that some de re modal 
statement is true of that entity, but the category plays a role in facilitating and allowing 
for the possession of that property by the entity in question.   
Second, the category might be taken to play a further role in determining the grounding 
work of properties possessed by entities if ontological categories are taken to ground reuse 
conditions. If we take ontological categories to ground reuse conditions as I have argued 
previously that we should, then, when we consider the cases presented by Kripke as a 
posteriori necessities, there is a natural way in which we might think that the work that a 
property like 'having a, b, and c as members', or 'having e and f as parents', does in 
grounding de re modal truths is once again facilitated by the work that a category does in 
grounding the reuse condition for terms for things of the relevant kind and thus 
determining that it is, for example, a necessary condition for the identity of 
persons/organisms that they have the same parents or a necessary condition for the 
identity of sets that they have the same members.  
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The ontological category as core nature will not ground all modal truths we might want 
to take to be true of things but even those that it does not ground by itself will be cases 
which it partially grounds, cases to the grounding of which it is necessary.  
 
 
§7 
In this chapter, I drew out some consequences of my proposal to use ontological 
categories in place of essences as that which grounds modal truths. As I noted at the 
beginning of the chapter, the proposal is offered and defended as an amendment to 
essentialism. My position is that Fine, Hale, and others, are correct in contending that 
statements of possibility and necessity are true, when they are, in virtue of the natures of 
relevant entities. My proposal has simply been to change the interpretation of ‘nature’ as 
it occurs in this formulation. In this chapter, I drew out some of the consequences of doing 
so and I argued that they offer further support for my proposal by facilitating resolution 
of some counter-intuitive consequences of alternative approaches. In particular, 
concerning category mistakes, I argued that the use of ontological categories, as I have 
construed them, in place of natures, delivers the intuitive results we should aim to 
accommodate.  
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